Rev'd W. F. Bender.

A

with the affectionate remembrance of his friend

Wm Patton

DISSERTATION

CONCERNING

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY;

CONTAINING

REMARKS

ON THE

ESSAYS OF DR. SAMUEL WEST,

AND ON THE

WRITINGS OF SEVERAL OTHER AUTHORS, ON THOSE SUBJECTS.

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BY JONATHAN EDWARDS, D. D.

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I BEGAN this Diſſertation before I ſaw Dr. Weſt's ſecond edition of his First Part *publiſhed with his* Second Part: *But on hearing, that he was about to publiſh his ſentiments on Liberty and Neceſſity more largely, I ſuſpended the proſecution of my deſign, that I might ſee what he ſhould further publiſh. Since the publication of the ſecond part, I have been neceſſarily though reluctantly kept back till this time, from finiſhing what I had begun. At length I ſend it forth, requeſting the candour of all who ſhall read it. If ever candour to a writer be reaſonably requeſted, it is ſo, on the deep and difficult ſubjects brought under conſideration in this Diſſertation.*

The quotations from the Doctor's firſt part, *are made according to the pages of the firſt edition, with which I began. Yet wherever any variation in words, between the firſt and ſecond editions, has been noticed; the ſecond edition has been followed in that reſpect. When I quote the firſt part the page or pages only are referred to. When I quote the ſecond part, I ſpecify the* part *as well as the pages.*

A

DISSERTATION, &c.

CHAPTER I.

Of Natural and Moral Neceſſity and Inability.

PRESIDENT Edwards, in his book on *the Freedom of Will*, diſtinguiſhes between *natural* and *moral* neceſſity and inability. By *moral* neceſſity he tells us, he means, "That neceſſity "of connection and conſequence, "which ariſes from ſuch moral cauſ- "es, as the ſtrength of inclination or motives, and the "connection which there is in many caſes between "theſe and certain volitions and actions." P. 21. By *natural* neceſſity he explains himſelf to mean, "Such "neceſſity as men are under, through the force of "*natural* cauſes, as diſtinguiſhed from what are call- "ed *moral* cauſes; ſuch as habits and diſpoſitions of "heart, and moral motives and inducements." Ibid. He further holds, that "the difference between theſe "two kinds of neceſſity, does not lie ſo much in the "*nature* of the connection, as in the *two terms* con- nected;" that in moral neceſſity, "the cauſe ——— is "of a *moral* nature, either ſome *previous habitual diſ-*

"*poſition*, or ſome *motive* exhibited to the underſtand-
"ing: And the effect is alſo ——— of a moral nature
"——— ſome *inclination* or *volition* of the ſoul or *vol-*
"*untary action.*" P. 22. Alſo he held, that natural neceſſity always "has reference to ſome ſuppoſable "voluntary oppoſition or endeavour, which is inſuffi-"cient. But no ſuch oppoſition or contrary will and "endeavour is ſuppoſable in the caſe of moral neceſſi-"ty, which is *a certainty of the inclination and will it-*"*ſelf*, which does not admit of the ſuppoſition of a "will to oppoſe and reſiſt it. For it is abſurd to ſup-"poſe the ſame individual will to oppoſe itſelf *in its* "*preſent act.*" P. 23, 24. And p. 16. "Philoſophical "*neceſſity* is really nothing elſe than the full and fixed "connection between the things ſignified by the ſub-"ject and predicate of a propoſition. When there is "ſuch a connection, then the thing affirmed in the "propoſition is neceſſary———In this ſenſe I uſe "the word *neceſſity*——— when I endeavor to prove, "that *neceſſity is not inconſiſtent with liberty.*" Ibid. "Philoſophical neceſſity is nothing different from the "certainty that is in things themſelves, which is the "foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of "them."

This is the account given by Preſident Edwards, of the diſtinction, which he made between natural and moral neceſſity. Moral neceſſity is the certain or neceſſary connection between moral cauſes and moral effects; natural neceſſity is the connection between cauſes and effects, which are not of a moral nature. The difference between theſe two kinds of neceſſity lies chiefly in the nature of *the two terms* connected by it. Natural neceſſity admits of voluntary, but ineffectual oppoſition from him who is ſubject to the neceſſity; the immediate effect, produced by that neceſſity, may be oppoſed by the will of the ſubject. But with reſpect to moral neceſſity, which is a previous certainty of the exiſtence of a volition or voluntary action, it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that *in that act* the will

will ſhould either oppoſe itſelf, or the neceſſity from which the act ariſes.——The diſtinction between natural and moral inability is analogous to this. Inability is the reverſe of neceſſity.

Now Dr. Weſt tells us, that this "is a diſtinction "without a difference," p. 8. But if the terms connected in theſe caſes be different, as Preſident Edwards ſuppoſes; if in one caſe "the cauſe, with which "the effect is connected, be ſome previous habitual diſ-"poſition, or ſome motive exhibited to the under-"ſtanding; and the effect be a volition or voluntary "action;" in the other, the cauſe be neither an habitual diſpoſition nor a motive exhibited to the underſtanding, and the effect be neither a volition nor a voluntary action; it is manifeſt, that there is that very difference in the two caſes, which Preſident Edwards's diſtinction ſuppoſes. To ſay, that this is a diſtinction without a difference, is to ſay, that an habitual diſpoſition* or a motive, is the ſame with ſomething, which is not an habitual diſpoſition or motive; and that a volition or voluntary action, is the ſame with what is not a volition or voluntary action.

But Dr. Weſt endeavours to ſupport his charge of a diſtinction without a difference. Let us attend to what he offers with this view: It is this, "That," according to Preſident Edwards, "the principal, if not the only "difference between natural——and moral neceſſity "and inability, is, that in the former caſe, the oppoſi-"tion and endeavour againſt what does take place, is "overcome and borne down by a ſuperiour force; but "in the latter kind of neceſſity and inability there is no "oppoſition and endeavour, that is overcome by any "ſuperiour force. But that Mr. Edwards's moral ne-"ceſſity and inability are attended with as much inſuf-"ficient oppoſition and endeavour, as his natural neceſ-

* Gentlemen may differ in their explanations of that habitual diſpoſition or bias, which is the cauſe or antecedent of volition or voluntary action; ſome ſuppoſing it to be a certain caſt or mould of the ſubſtance of the ſoul; others ſuppoſing it to conſiſt in a divine conſtitution, that volitions of a certain kind, ſhall, in a regular manner and on certain conditions, ſucceed each other in the mind. But it does not appear, that Preſident Edwards meant to decide this queſtion.

"fity and inability;" p. 8. Whether this, which is here ſaid to be, be indeed according to Preſident Edwards the only or the principal difference between natural and moral neceſſity and inability, I ſhall not at preſent ſtand to diſpute. It is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe to ſhow, that Preſident Edwards's moral neceſſity and inability are not, and cannot be attended with as much inſufficient oppoſition and endeavour, as his natural neceſſity and inability.

Natural neceſſity may compel a man to that, to which his whole will is entirely oppoſed, and againſt which he puts forth all the oppoſition, of which his ſtrength of body and mind admits: As when he is thrown from a precipice or is dragged to priſon. But a man's whole will is never oppoſed to the influence of that bias, diſpoſition or motive, or of any moral neceſſity, with which he complies. Whenever any of theſe influences a man to put forth a volition or a voluntary external action, it prevails on his will; his will therefore conſents, though it may be with ſome degree of reluctance occaſioned by the other bias or motive. Nothing is more common than ſuch oppoſition between reaſon or conſcience, and depraved appetite; between covetouſneſs and ambition; indolence and a wiſh for gain, &c. But whenever any of theſe principles becomes ſtronger than its oppoſite, the will conſents, and the man acts voluntarily under the influence of moral neceſſity; and though he may act with ſome degree of reluctance from the oppoſite principle, yet no man will ſay, that he is compelled to act againſt his *whole* will, or even againſt his ſtrongeſt inclination; for by the very caſe ſuppoſed, he acts agreeably to his ſtrongeſt inclination.* But by natural neceſſity he is or may be compelled to that, to which every inclination and act of his will, the ſtrongeſt as well as the moſt feeble, is moſt directly oppoſed. A man dragged to priſon may be compelled to enter it, in direct oppoſition to every

* By *inclination*, *diſpoſition* or *bias*, I mean ſomething diſtinct from volition. This diſtinction is made by Dr. Weſt, p. 13.

every act of his will. This is natural neceſſity. But an indolent man, who is influenced to labour by the proſpect of gain, is not compelled to labour in oppoſition to every inclination or act of his will, but complies with the ſtronger inclination and act, in oppoſition to the weaker, which would lead him to indulge himſelf in eaſe. This is an inſtance of moral neceſſity.——One difference between natural neceſſity and moral, is, that every inclination and act of the will does or may directly oppoſe natural neceſſity; but every act of will always coincides with that moral neceſſity, from which it ariſes, and when there is a ſtruggle between different inclinations or propenſities and their acts, the acts of that which prevails, never oppoſe the moral neceſſity by which they take place.

When Preſident Edwards ſays, that no voluntary inſufficient oppoſition or endeavour is ſuppoſable in the caſe of moral neceſſity; his evident meaning is, that it is not ſuppoſable, that an act of the will ſhould be oppoſed to that moral neceſſity, by which it takes place. For inſtance, if a man be under a moral neceſſity of chooſing a virtuous courſe of life, this choice is not oppoſed to the neceſſity, which is the ſource of it, nor is it ſuppoſable, that it ſhould be oppoſed to it or at all reſiſt it. The caſe is very different with regard to natural neceſſity. A man dragged to execution may in every reſpect oppoſe with his will, that neceſſity, by which he is carried on.

But though a man, who is determined by moral neceſſity to chooſe a virtuous courſe, cannot *in that act* oppoſe that choice or the cauſe of it; yet he may *in other acts* of his will oppoſe both this choice and the cauſe, and thus in different acts chooſe and act inconſiſtently. He may from prevailing motives and from moral neceſſity, chooſe virtue. He may at the ſame time from weaker motives and ineffectual temptations, chooſe vice, and ſo far feel reluctant or indiſpoſed to virtue. And this weaker choice is no more oppoſed to the moral neceſſity, which cauſes it, than the ſtronger

choice

choice of virtue is to the moral neceſſity which cauſes that. In both there is no ſuppoſable oppoſition to their reſpective neceſſities, which are their cauſes. This is true with reſpect to every choice whether ſtronger or weaker, whether prevailing to govern the heart and conduct, or not. Yet there is a mutual oppoſition between the forementioned different acts of choice, the choice of virtue and choice of vice. Indeed theſe two oppoſite choices cannot both prevail, ſo as to govern the heart and life at the ſame time. They may in particular caſes be equal, or ſo nearly equal, that neither of them at that inſtant appears to prevail, and the man "is in a ſtrait betwixt two." In other inſtances they may for a time at leaſt alternately prevail, and exhibit a man of very inconſiſtent conduct. In other inſtances one may generally prevail, and denominate the ſubject a virtuous or vicious man, accordingly as the choice and love of virtue, or of vice, prevails and governs him. Thus we ſhall have all thoſe four modes of inſufficient oppoſition to moral neceſſity, which Dr. Weſt ſays, p. 10, Preſident Edwards allows may take place, and from which he argues that Preſident Edwards's moral neceſſity may be attended with as much inſufficient oppoſition, as his natural neceſſity; and that therefore Preſident Edwards's diſtinction between natural and moral neceſſity is without a difference. 1. The weaker motives to vice may oppoſe the ſtronger motives to virtue. 2. The man may *now* have ſtrong and prevailing acts, deſires and reſolutions againſt thoſe acts of vice, to which he foreſees he ſhall in certain circumſtances be expoſed, and which he actually indulges, when the foreſeen circumſtances take place. 3. The will may remotely and indirectly reſiſt itſelf, not in the ſame acts, but in different acts; the depraved appetites may ſtruggle againſt the principles of virtue. 4. Reaſon pleading in favour of virtue, may reſiſt the preſent acts, which incline, and perhaps prevailingly, to vice. Nor is there any thing in all this, but what was long ſince obſerved by the poet, and has always

always been noticed by all attentive obſervers of human nature :

"*Video meliora, proboque ; deteriora ſequor.*"

Now, it will not be pretended, that this oppoſition of one act of the will, to another, is parallel to the entire oppoſition of the will which there is or may be, to natural neceſſity ; *e. g.* to falling when a man is thrown down a precipice, or to going to the gallows, when a man is forced thither. In the latter caſe, there is or may be an entire and perfect oppoſition of the whole will, to the neceſſity. In the former, there is a conſent of the will to the neceſſity, though there may be a degree of oppoſite choice ariſing from ſome other motive, bias, cauſe or neceſſity.

Dr. Weſt infers from this actual or poſſible oppoſition of the acts of one propenſity in human nature, to thoſe of another, acknowledged by Preſident Edwards, that all thoſe acts which admit of this oppoſition are neceſſary with natural neceſſity. If this inference be juſt, doubtleſs every act of the human will is neceſſary with natural neceſſity. If a man chooſe virtue, he doubtleſs does or may from temptation feel ſome inclination to vice. In this caſe then his choice of virtue is, according to the reaſoning of Dr. Weſt, the effect of natural neceſſity ; for natural neceſſity is, according to that reaſoning, that which admits of any voluntary oppoſition. And as there is no propenſity in human nature, which may not be oppoſed by ſome other propenſity ; and as the human mind is not capable of any act, which may not be attended with ſome degree of reluctance at leaſt ; therefore human nature is not capable of any act, which is not neceſſitated with a natural neceſſity, a neceſſity, which is equally inconſiſtent with praiſe and blame, as that by which a man falls, when he is thrown from an eminence.

This oppoſition of one propenſity in human nature to another, and of one act of the will to another, is abundantly granted by Dr. Weſt : So that if this prove or imply a natural neceſſity, he holds that the acts of the will are ſubject to natural neceſſity. P. 14. "A

"man

"man may *love* a perſon, whom he knows to be utterly "unworthy of his affections, and may really *chooſe* to "eradicate this propenſion from his mind; and yet he "may find this paſſion riſing in his breaſt, in direct op-"poſition to his *will* or *choice*. And the ſame obſerva-"tions may be made with reſpect to every other pro-"penſion in the human mind. *They may all be in di-"rect oppoſition to preſent acts of the will and choice.* "Were not this the caſe, there could be no ſtruggle in "the mind, to overcome wrong propenſions and vicious "habits. But common experience will teach us, that "there is frequently a very great ſtruggle in the mind, "to gain the victory over vile affections." Whatever diſtinction Dr. Weſt makes between propenſion and volition, he will doubtleſs grant, that there may be acts of the will agreeable to a propenſion, as well as in oppoſition to it; that there may be volitions and actions agreeable to a vicious propenſion, and yet there may be a ſtruggle of virtuous propenſion and volition in oppoſition to the vicious. On the other hand, there may be a ſtruggle of vicious propenſion and volition in oppoſition to the virtuous. Dr. Weſt will not deny that love to God, to his law and to virtue, is a voluntary exerciſe. Now he who has a degree of voluntary love to God and true virtue, and a degree of voluntary love to vice, has an oppoſition not only of propenſions, but of voluntary acts and exerciſes, *i. e.* of volitions. Yet would Dr. Weſt allow, that this love of virtue, which is oppoſed by a degree of love to vice, is neceſſitated by a natural neceſſity? This will follow from the principle of his argument to prove, that Preſident Edwards's moral neceſſity is really a natural neceſſity.

Dr. Weſt, p. 14, aſſerts, "that it is abſurd, that the "will ſhould directly oppoſe its own preſent acts;" and yet in p. 9, he ſays, "there may be will and en-"deavour againſt, or diverſe from *preſent acts of the "will.*" Theſe propoſitions ſeem incapable of reconciliation, unleſs on the ground of the diſtinction, which I have made between the will oppoſing itſelf

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in the ſame acts, and in different acts ariſing from different motives or propenſities.

Preſident Edwards conſtantly holds, that natural neceſſity and inability are inconſiſtent with blame in any inſtance. The reaſon of this is, that all our ſincere and moſt ardent deſires and acts of will, as well as external endeavours, may be reſiſted, oppoſed and overcome as to their effects. But this is not the caſe in moral neceſſity and inability; therefore they do not excuſe from blame. When under a moral neceſſity we will to do an action, our ſtrongeſt deſires and acts of will coincide with the moral neceſſity, and we voluntarily act agreeably to it. And if we have weaker wiſhes and deſires oppoſing the neceſſity and the ſtronger deſires and acts of our will, which follow from that neceſſity, we are not to be excuſed from blame on that account, becauſe on the whole we conſent to do the action. No man will pretend, that he who is influenced by the malice of his own heart, to murder his neighbour, is excuſable in that action, becauſe he has ſome weak and ineffectual reluctance ariſing from a knowledge of the divine law and from the dictates of his own conſcience.

It has been ſaid by ſome of our opponents in this diſquiſition, that they cannot find out what we mean by moral neceſſity, as diſtinguiſhed from natural or phyſical. If it be not ſufficiently plain from his own writings, what Preſident Edwards meant by it, I can only give my opinion concerning his meaning. But concerning my own meaning I have a right to ſpeak more peremptorily, that I mean all neceſſity or previous certainty of the volition or voluntary action of a rational being, whatever be the cauſe or influence, by which that neceſſity is eſtabliſhed, or the volition brought into exiſtence, and however great and efficacious that influence be. When "God's people are made willing in the day of his power," there is doubtleſs a neceſſity of their being willing. This neceſſity I call a moral neceſſity. Againſt this willingneſs, or the

the neceſſity, or the neceſſitating cauſe, from which it ariſes, the will of him who is made willing, does not and cannot poſſibly make entire and direct oppoſition. By the very ſuppoſition he is made willing, his will therefore coincides with the neceſſity and conſents to it; and ſo far as it conſents, it cannot diſſent or make oppoſition.

Some ſeem to imagine, that the difference between natural and moral neceſſity, is, that the former is the effect of a ſtrong and irreſiſtible cauſe; but the latter of a weak one, which may be reſiſted and overcome; and that entire oppoſition of will is ſuppoſable in both caſes; though with this difference, that in natural neceſſity it is ineffectual, but in moral it may be effectual. Whereas the truth is, that let the cauſe of a moral act be what it will, it involves a moral neceſſity only, becauſe it is not ſuppoſable, that the will ſhould be entirely oppoſed to it.

The perſons abovementioned object to the application of ſuch ſtrong epithets as *infallible*, *unavoidable*, *unalterable*, *unfruſtrable*, &c. to moral neceſſity and inability, ſuppoſing that they imply a natural neceſſity inconſiſtent with praiſe and blame. But when our Lord had given the prediction, was there not an infallible, unavoidable, unalterable and unfruſtrable certainty, that Judas would betray his Lord? And will it be pretended, that on that account he was not to be blamed for ſo doing? Yet this action of Judas was rendered no more unfruſtrably neceſſary by the prediction, than it was before, as it was before certainly foreknown. Nor was it more certainly foreknown, than every event and every moral action, which ever has or will come to paſs. Therefore all moral actions are unfruſtrably certain previouſly to their exiſtence; and all thoſe epithets are as properly applicable to them, as to the treachery of Judas, after it was divinely predicted.

It has been ſaid, that till the meaſure of influence implied in moral neceſſity, is diſtinctly known, it is impoſſible

impoſſible to tell, when or how far a perſon is rewardable or puniſhable. But this is ſaid, under a miſtaken idea of moral neceſſity, viz. that moral neceſſity implies a low degree of influence only. Moral neceſſity is the real and certain connection between ſome moral action and its cauſe; and there is no moral *neceſſity* in the caſe, unleſs the connection be real and abſolutely certain, ſo as to *enſure* the exiſtence of the action. And will it be pretended, that if the meaſure of influence be increaſed beyond this, the neceſſity ceaſes to be moral and becomes natural? That if a motive or a malicious temper be barely ſufficient certainly and infallibly to influence a man to murder his neighbour, the neceſſity is moral and the man is blamable; but if it become more than barely ſufficient for this, ſo as to excite him to perpetrate the action with great eagerneſs and with the overflowing of malice, that in this caſe the neceſſity is natural and the man entirely unblamable?——The truth is, that there is no inconſiſtence between the moſt efficacious influence in moral neceſſity and accountableneſs. Let the influence be ever ſo great, ſtill the man acts voluntarily, and there is no ſuppoſable entire oppoſition of will; and as he is a rational creature, he is accountable for his voluntary actions. The contrary ſuppoſition implies, that in order to accountableneſs a man muſt have a liberty of *contingence*, and it muſt be, previouſly to his acting, *uncertain* how he will act. A bare previous certainty of the voluntary action of an intelligent being is as inconſiſtent with liberty and accountableneſs, as any poſſible degree of influence producing ſuch an action. In either caſe there is an equal conſent of the will, and an entire oppoſition of the will is no more ſuppoſable in the one caſe, than in the other.

Some inſiſt, that moral neceſſity and inability are always of our own procuring; and whatever neceſſity is not cauſed by ourſelves is not moral neceſſity. But moral neceſſity is the previous certainty of a moral

moral action. Now as it was divinely foretold, ages before it came to paſs, that the Jews would crucify our Lord, and that the man of ſin would perſecute the ſaints, &c. &c. there was a moral neceſſity, that thoſe facts ſhould come to paſs: And as this neceſſity exiſted long before the perpetrators of thoſe facts exiſted, they did not cauſe the neceſſity. Therefore according to this account of moral and natural neceſſity, it was a natural neceſſity, and the Jews and the man of ſin were in thoſe actions, as innocent as they were in breathing or in any involuntary motion.——Further, as all the actions of rational creatures are foreknown by God, before the authors of them come into exiſtence, they are equally certain and neceſſary, as thoſe which are predicted. But this neceſſity, for the reaſon already given, cannot be the effect of thoſe, whoſe actions they are. Therefore either this is not a natural neceſſity, or there never was, is now nor can be any crime or ſin in the univerſe.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins gives a true account of moral neceſſity; p. 16. "By *moral neceſſity* conſiſtent writers never mean any more than to "expreſs in a figurative manner, the *certainty* of ſuch "an event." And he illuſtrates it by the impoſſibility, that the world ſhould come to an end this year, if God have promiſed that it ſhall continue another year. Yet in his diſpute with *Leibnitz* he gives a very different account of it; p. 289. "That a good "being, continuing to be good, cannot do evil; or a "wiſe being, continuing to be wiſe, cannot do unwiſely; or a veracious perſon, continuing to be veracious, cannot tell a lie; is *moral neceſſity*." This laſt account implies no other neceſſity, than that a thing muſt be when it is ſuppoſed to be; which is no more than the trifling propoſition, that *what is, is*. But the certainty implied in the divine prediction, that the world will continue to a particular period, is a very different matter.——Dr. Weſt, if I underſtand him, has adopted the laſt account given by Dr. Clarke of moral

al neceſſity. No doubt he and Dr. Clarke had a right to give their own definitions of moral neceſſity; but Dr. Weſt had no right to impute his idea to Preſident Edwards, and then diſpute againſt it as belonging to him. Dr. Clarke's laſt deſcribed moral neceſſity would exiſt, if human volitions came into exiſtence by a ſelf-determining power or by mere chance. On either of thoſe ſuppoſitions, *what is, is*, and muſt be, ſo long as it is. But Preſident Edwards's idea of moral neceſſity is utterly inconſiſtent with volitions' coming into exiſtence by chance, or by ſelf-determination, unleſs ſelf-determination be previouſly eſtabliſhed.

In all matters of diſpute, it ought to be conſidered how far the parties are agreed, and wherein they differ. As to natural and moral neceſſity, I believe both parties are agreed, in this, that all neceſſity inconſiſtent with moral agency, or praiſe and blame, is natural neceſſity; and that all neceſſity conſiſtent with praiſe and blame, is moral neceſſity. Therefore if all neceſſity of the volitions of rational beings, be conſiſtent with praiſe and blame; all ſuch neceſſity is moral neceſſity. But if any neceſſity of the volitions of a rational being, be inconſiſtent with praiſe and blame; then I have given an erroneous account of moral neceſſity. Therefore on this let us join iſſue. If an inſtance can be produced of the volition of a rational being in ſuch a ſenſe neceſſary, as to be on that account the proper object of neither praiſe nor blame; I will confeſs, that I am miſtaken in my idea of moral neceſſity. But until ſuch an inſtance can be produced, may I not fairly preſume, that my idea is right?—— If it ſhould be ſaid, that no volitions of rational creatures are in any ſenſe neceſſary, or that they are not previouſly certain; I recur to the inſtances of Judas's treachery, Peter's falſehood, Pharaoh's refuſal to let Iſrael go, and to every other voluntary action of a rational being divinely predicted or foreknown.

If any ſhould diſpute, whether this previous certainty of voluntary actions, be properly called *neceſſi-*

ty; this would be a merely *verbal* diſpute, which they who chooſe, may agitate to their full ſatisfaction. It is ſufficient to inform them, that it is what we mean by moral neceſſity.

I have already ſhown that Dr. Weſt grants the mutual oppoſition of different propenſions and volitions; it may be further obſerved that, though he ſo ſtrenuouſly diſputes againſt the diſtinction between natural and moral neceſſity, and ſays it is made without a difference; yet the ſame diſtinction is abundantly implied in his book, particularly in his third eſſay. He there holds forth, that a man may have a *phyſical power* to do an action, and yet *not exert* that power; that it may be *certain*, there may be *a certainty*, and it may be *certainly foreknown*, that a man will do ſomething, which he has a *phyſical* power not to do; p. 46. That a bare *certainty*, that an agent will do ſuch a thing, does not imply, that he had not a power to refrain from doing it; p. 45. Now by moral neceſſity we mean the previous certainty of any moral action. Therefore when Dr. Weſt, p. 46, holds, *that there may be a* CERTAINTY, *that a man will do ſuch a thing, though he may have at the ſame time a phyſical power of not doing it;* he holds, that there may be the very thing which Preſident Edwards calls a *moral neceſſity*, that the man will do the thing, though he may have at the ſame time a *phyſical* or *natural* power not to do it.——Thus Dr. Weſt makes and abundantly inſiſts on that very diſtinction, which he reprobates in Preſident Edwards, and which he declares to be made without any difference. Indeed it is impoſſible for any man to write ſenſibly or plauſibly on this ſubject, without going on the ground of this diſtinction.

It has been inquired concerning Preſident Edwards's moral inability, whether the man, who is the ſubject of it, *can remove* it? I anſwer, yes, he has the ſame phyſical power to remove it and to do the action, which he is morally unable to do, which the man, concerning whom Dr. Weſt ſuppoſes there is a certainty, that he will not do an action, has to do the action

and

and ſo to defeat or remove the ſaid certainty. I agree with Dr. Weſt, that he has a phyſical power ſo to do.

Perhaps after all ſome will inſiſt, that natural and moral neceſſity are the ſame. It is ardently to be wiſhed, that ſuch perſons would tell us, in what reſpects they are the ſame. We have informed them, in what reſpects we hold them to be different. We wiſh them to be equally explicit and candid. If they mean, that natural and moral neceſſity are the ſame in this reſpect, that they are or may be equally certain and fixed, and may equally enſure their reſpective conſequences or effects; I grant it. Still they may be different in other reſpects, particularly this, that natural neceſſity reſpects thoſe events or things only, which are not of a moral nature, while moral neceſſity reſpects thoſe only, which are of a moral nature; and there may be an entire oppoſition of will to the former, but not to the latter. If they mean, that they are the ſame as to virtue and vice, praiſe and blame, &c. this is not granted, and to aſſert it, is a mere begging of the queſtion. If they mean, that both thoſe kinds of neceſſity may ariſe from *nature;* meaning by this the fixed properties of beings and the eſtabliſhed courſe of things and events; this is granted. Still there may be the grounds of diſtinction before mentioned. If they ſay, that moral neceſſity is *natural* neceſſity, becauſe it is or may be *born with us;* I grant it. But this is mere quibbling on the word *natural.* Though volitions may be the effects of a bias of mind born with us, yet thoſe volitions are moral acts, and therefore the neceſſity from which they proceed, is a *moral* neceſſity. A man born with a contracted, ſelfiſh diſpoſition, ſtill has a phyſical power to be benevolent, and it is not ſuppoſable, that his will or diſpoſition ſhould be entirely oppoſed to ſelfiſhneſs, whenever he is the ſubject of it.

CHAPTER II.

Of Liberty.

DR. Weſt ſays, p. 16, "By liberty we mean *a* "*power* of acting, willing or chooſing; and by *a* "*power* of acting, we mean, that when all circumſtan- "ces neceſſary for action have taken place, the mind "*can* act or *not act*." This is not explicit: There is an ambiguity in the words *power*, *can*, *not act*. If by *power* and *can*, he mean *natural* power, as it has been explained in the preceding chapter; I agree that in any given caſe we have a power to act or decline the propoſed action. A man poſſeſſes liberty when he poſſeſſes a natural or phyſical power to do an action, and is under no natural inability with reſpect to that action. The word liberty ſuggeſts a negative idea, and means the abſence of certain obſtacles, confinement or reſtriction. A bird not confined in a cage, but let looſe in the open air, is free; a man not ſhut up in priſon, is in that reſpect, free; a ſervant delivered from the control of his maſter, is free; a man, who has diſengaged himſelf from the tie of a civil bond, is in that reſpect free. In all theſe caſes liberty implies ſome exemption, or ſome negation. In a moral ſenſe and with reſpect to moral conduct, a man is free or poſſeſſes liberty, when he is under no involuntary reſtraint or compulſion; *i. e.* when he is under no reſtraint or compulſion, to which his will does not conſent, or to which it is or may be entirely oppoſed. An exemption from this reſtraint or compulſion, is liberty, moral liberty, the liberty of a moral agent; and this is an exemption from natural neceſſity and inability as before explained. He who is thus exempted, has a natural power of acting, juſt ſo far as this exemption extends. Even though "all cir- "cumſtances neceſſary for action, have taken place," yet "then the mind can," in this ſenſe, "act" in any particular

particular manner, or decline that action. For inſtance, when all circumſtances neceſſary for Judas's betraying his Lord, had taken place, ſtill he had a natural power either to betray him or not betray him. He was under no compulſion to betray him, to which his will did not conſent. He was not, nor could he poſſibly be, under any ſuch compulſion to *chooſe* to betray him. It is a contradiction, that the mind ſhould *chooſe* to do a thing *involuntarily* and with an entire oppoſition of will.

If this be the liberty, for which Dr. Weſt pleads, he has no ground of controverſy on this head, with Preſident Edwards, or with any who embrace his ſyſtem. There is nothing in this inconſiſtent with the influence of motives on the will, to produce volition; or with the dependence of volition on ſome cauſe extrinſic to itſelf, extrinſic to the power of will, or to the mind in which it exiſts. What if motives do excite to volition? What if the connection between motive and volition be ſuch, that volition never takes place without motive, and always takes place, when a proper motive appears? What if volition be the effect of a cauſe extrinſic to the will? Still it is true, that volition never takes place without the conſent or with the entire oppoſition of the will. The will or mind then is ſtill free, as it is exempted from natural neceſſity and has a natural or phyſical power to act otherwiſe.

If it be ſaid, that it is not ſufficient to liberty, that the mind act *with* its own conſent, *in the act itſelf*; but it muſt in every free act, act *from* its own conſent *previous* to the free act; I obſerve, that this implies, that in order to any free act, there muſt be an infinite ſeries of free acts following one another. For inſtance, the objection ſuppoſes, that if I now freely chooſe to write remarks on Dr. Weſt, this free choice muſt *ariſe from* a *previous* conſent of my will, or from a previous choice, to write ſuch remarks. Again, this previous choice, in order to be free, muſt for

the ſame reaſon ariſe from another previous free choice; and ſo on *infinitely*, which is abſurd.

Or if it ſhould be ſaid, that liberty implies not only an exemption from all *natural* or *phyſical* neceſſity, but alſo an exemption from all *moral* neceſſity; then, as moral neceſſity is nothing but a previous certainty of the exiſtence of any moral act, it will follow that any act, in order to be free, muſt come into exiſtence without any previous certainty in the nature of things or in the divine mind, that it would exiſt; *i. e.* no act can be free, unleſs it come into exiſtence by *pure contingence* and *mere chance.*

But let us proceed to conſider what Dr. Weſt ſays in further explanation of his idea of liberty.

"To act," ſays he, "to will or to chooſe, is to be "free." P. 16. If this be liberty, ſurely Dr. Weſt could not imagine, that Preſident Edwards, or any man in his ſenſes, ever denied that we are free. It is to be preſumed, that no man ever denied, that we determine, that we will, or that we chooſe. However, though I allow all theſe things, yet I cannot allow, that this is a true account of liberty. Will Dr. Weſt pretend, that we are never free, but when we are in action? That we have no liberty to determine, beſide when we do actually determine? That we have no liberty to will or chooſe, but when we are in the exerciſe of volition or choice? Will he ſay, that he himſelf had no liberty to determine to write eſſays on liberty and neceſſity, before he actually determined to write them? Dr. Weſt, in p. 46, holds that there may be a certainty, that a man will do an action; yet that he may have a phyſical power of doing the contrary. He would therefore doubtleſs grant, that he is at liberty to do the contrary, though he actually does it not; and this whether the action be external or mental. Beſides; this definition of liberty is wholly inconſiſtent with the other favorite one of Dr. Weſt, viz. *a power to act or not.* If liberty be a *power*, ſurely it is not an *action*; but "to act, to will

"will or to chooſe," is an action. Eſpecially if liberty be a power to *not act*, it cannot be *an action*. And if a power of acting, be action; a power of willing be volition; and a power of chooſing be choice; then a power of walking or writing, and actual walking and writing is the ſame thing; and whoever is able to write, and ſo long as he is able, is actually employed in writing. Does Dr. Weſt find by experience, that this is true?

I know there is a claſs of divines, who have holden, that God is free to good only, becauſe he does good only; that the ſaints and angels in heaven are for the ſame reaſon free to good only; that Adam in paradiſe was free to both good and evil; that unregenerate ſinners and devils are free to evil only; and that the regenerate in the preſent life are free to both good and evil. But I preſume Dr. Weſt would not chooſe to rank himſelf in this claſs.

Dr. S. Clarke is equally inconſiſtent in his definition of liberty, as Dr. Weſt. "The whole eſſence of "liberty," ſays he, "conſiſts in the *power* of acting. "*Action* and *liberty* are *identical* ideas: And the true "*definition* of a free being, is one that is endued with "a *power* of acting." Remarks on Collins, p. 15. How true it is, that great men are not always wiſe! And how ſurpriſing, that Dr. Clarke, whom the advocates for ſelf-determination, ſet up as unequalled in metaphyſical acuteneſs, ſhould contradict himſelf twice in four lines, in what required ſo much accuracy, as the definition of liberty! 1. The whole eſſence of liberty is here ſaid to conſiſt in a *power* of acting. 2. *Action* and liberty are ſaid to be identical ideas; and therefore the *power* of action and liberty are not identical ideas, unleſs the *power* of action and *action* are identical ideas. 3. The true definition of a free being is ſaid to be one that is endued with the *power* of acting. Thus the Doctor ends where he began, forgetful of the middle.

But that part of Dr. Weſt's account of liberty, with which he ſeems to be moſt pleaſed, and on which he ſeems moſt to depend, remains yet to be conſidered. It is this, *a power to act or not act*, in all caſes whatever. On this I obſerve, that if by *acting or not acting*, the Doctor mean chooſing or refuſing, I grant, that we have a *natural* power to do either of theſe in any caſe. But refuſing is as real an act of the mind, as chooſing, and therefore is very improperly called *not acting*. I grant, that we have a *natural* power to chooſe or refuſe in any caſe; but we have no *moral* power, or power oppoſed to *moral neceſſity*: For moral neceſſity is previous certainty of a moral action; and a power oppoſed to this muſt imply a previous uncertainty. But no event moral or natural is or can be uncertain previouſly to its exiſtence.——But if by a power to act or not act, the Doctor mean a power either to chooſe an object propoſed, or to refuſe it, or to do neither; this is an impoſſibility. Whenever an object is propoſed for our choice, if there be any medium between chooſing and refuſing, it is a ſtate of perfect blockiſh inaction and inſenſibility or *torpor*; and this inaction muſt be *involuntary*; as a *voluntary* inaction implies an act or volition, which is inconſiſtent with perfect inaction. A voluntary ſtate of inaction and torpor is a contradiction in terms: It implies, that the mind is the ſubject of no act at all, and yet at the ſame time is the ſubject of a volition, by which it conſents to inaction. Or if it ſhould be ſaid, that a voluntary ſtate of inaction means a ſtate, to which the mind is indeed reduced by an act of volition, and that the volition having accompliſhed a ſtate of inaction, ceaſes itſelf to exiſt, and thus perfect and univerſal inaction follows; I obſerve, (1) That ſtill this plea does not rid the matter of the contradiction. The cauſe of the perfect inaction is a volition. This cauſe muſt continue in exiſtence and in operation, till the effect is accompliſhed; *i. e.* till entire and perfect inaction has actually taken place. And yet ſo long as this

this cauſe continues to exiſt, it is a contradiction, that perfect and entire inaction ſhould take place. (2) Beſides this contradiction, if the mind could by an act of volition or by other means be reduced to a ſtate of entire inaction and torpitude, this ſtate would be utterly inconſiſtent with the exerciſe of any liberty. The man in this ſtate can no more exerciſe liberty, than if he were under ever ſo great *natural* neceſſity, or than if he were turned into a ſtock or ſtone. During this ſtate he cannot poſſibly put forth any act, to arouſe himſelf from this *torpor*. It is in the power of no man, to reduce himſelf to this ſtate, with reſpect to any object propoſed to his choice; or when he is reduced to it, to recover himſelf from it.

If to this it ſhould be objected, that we are entirely indifferent with regard to many objects; we neither chooſe nor refuſe them: I anſwer, be this as it may with reſpect to objects not propoſed for our choice; it is not true with reſpect to thoſe, which are propoſed for our choice; and this is all that I have aſſerted, and all that the ſubject requires me to aſſert; for Dr. Weſt's account of liberty is "a power of act-"ing; and by a power of acting, we mean, that when "all circumſtances neceſſary for action have taken "place, the mind can act or not act;" *i. e.* when an occaſion for volition, choice or determination, is preſented; or when an object of choice, or an object, with reſpect to which we are to will or determine, is exhibited.

Mr. Locke's obſervations on this point are very pertinent and convincing: They are as follows; "A "man in reſpect of willing, or the act of volition, when "an action in his power is once propoſed to his "thoughts as preſently to be done, cannot be free. "The reaſon whereof is manifeſt —— he cannot "avoid willing the exiſtence or not exiſtence of that "action; it is abſolutely neceſſary, that he will the "one or the other, *i. e.* prefer the one to the other, "ſince one of them muſt neceſſarily follow; and that

"which

"which does follow, follows by the choice and deter-
"mination of his mind, that is, by his willing it. For
"if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in re-
"ſpect of the act of willing, a man in ſuch a caſe is
"not free: Liberty conſiſting in a power to act or not
"act, which in regard of volition, a man upon ſuch a
"propoſal has not. For it is unavoidably neceſſary
"to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in
"a man's power, which is once propoſed to a man's
"thoughts. A man muſt neceſſarily will the one or
"the other of them, upon which preference or voli-
"tion the action or its forbearance certainly follows
"and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition or
"preferring one of the two, being that, which he can-
"not avoid, a man in reſpect of that act of willing is
"under a neceſſity.——This then is evident, that in
"all propoſals of preſent action, a man is not at liber-
"ty to will or not to will; becauſe he cannot forbear
"willing."——"A man that is walking, to whom it is
"propoſed to give off walking, is not at liberty,
"whether he *will* determine himſelf to walk or give
"off walking, or no. *He muſt neceſſarily prefer one or*
"*t'other of them*, walking or not walking."——"The
"mind in that caſe has not a power to forbear willing:
"It cannot avoid *ſome* determination.——It is man-
"ifeſt, that it orders and directs one in preference to,
"or in the neglect of the other." Dr. Weſt himſelf
gives up his favourite power of *not acting*, in the fol-
lowing paſſage: "As ſoon as ideas are preſented to
"the mind its active faculty is exerted, and the mind
"continues conſtantly acting, as long as it has ideas,
"juſt as the act of ſeeing takes place the very inſtant
"the eye is turned to the light, and continues as long
"as the light ſtrikes the eye." Part II. p. 9. "The
"mind is always acting." P. 10. If it continue to
act as long as it has ideas, as the eye continues to ſee
as long as the light ſtrikes it; then the mind has no
power of not acting, while it has ideas. And I think
it will not be pretended that the mind has a power to
baniſh

baniſh from itſelf, all ideas at pleaſure. This would be a *torpor* indeed! a torpor of the underſtanding as well as of the will! And if the mind be always acting, it never exerciſes the power of not acting.

Doctor Weſt thinks it ſtrange, that his private correſpondent does not know what the Doctor means by *a power to act or not act;* and the Doctor proceeds to give ſeveral inſtances of it, as of a man, who had been confined in priſon, ſet at liberty to go out or ſtill to tarry in priſon; and of an huſbandman, who has the offer of a farm, on certain conditions, and he is at liberty to take the farm or not. But neither of theſe is an inſtance of *a power to act or not act;* they are mere inſtances of a natural power to act differently, to act one way or another. If the man who has the offer to go out of the priſon, chooſe to tarry in it; he as really acts as if he had choſen to go out. If the huſbandman chooſe to decline the farm offered him, this is as real and poſitive an act, as if he had choſen to take it. And the Doctor, though he has attempted to give an inſtance of a power to act or not act, has not given one. For this reaſon, as well as from the nature of the caſe, I believe it is not in his power to give an inſtance of it. If it be in his power, I wiſh him to do it. He acknowledges this to be "the "main point, on which the hinge of the whole contro-"verſy turns." A power to act or not act, is his definition of that liberty, for which he contends, and in ſupport of which he has written his two books. And if he be not able to give a ſingle inſtance of ſuch a power, it is high time for him to give it up, and the whole controverſy, of which this is the hinge. No wonder Dr. Weſt's correſpondent did not underſtand what the Doctor meant by this power, if the Doctor himſelf did not underſtand it ſo far as to be able to give an inſtance of it.——*A power to act or not act* muſt either mean a power to chooſe or refuſe; or a power to act, or to ceaſe from all action in either chooſing or refuſing. If the former be the meaning,

it

it is no more than we all grant, provided by power be meant *natural* power. But if in this caſe *moral* power be intended, a power oppoſed to moral neceſſity, which is the previous certainty of a moral action; this we utterly deny, becauſe it implies, that there is a previous perfect uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether we ſhall chooſe or refuſe the propoſed object.——If the laſt be the meaning of *a power to act or not act*, as this is a power to ſink ourſelves into a ſtate of unfeeling and blockiſh torpor, I appeal to the reader, whether Dr. Weſt, or Limborch, or any other man, has ever had or can have any idea of ſuch a power; or if they have, whether it would be any deſirable liberty, or would imply any qualification for moral agency.

I am ſenſible, that Dr. Weſt tells us, that he has given a definition of "a power to act or not act," and that this definition is, "that there is no infallible connection between motive and volition." But this, which he calls a definition, does not at all relieve the difficulty. If it mean, that when motives are preſented, the perſon can comply with them, or can refuſe to comply, or can neither comply nor refuſe; I deny it, declare it to be an impoſſibility, and call on Dr. Weſt to ſhew the poſſibility of it. If when he ſays, there is no infallible connection between motive and volition, he mean, that the mind may act, whether in chooſing or refuſing, without motive; this is contrary to Dr. Weſt himſelf.

The Doctor, in p. 86 and 87, Part II, reſumes the queſtion of acting or not acting, and mentions ſeveral caſes, which he conſiders as inſtances of not acting; *e. g.* when of two objects one is choſen and the other not; when of the ſpots on a cheſs-board, A is touched and B not, &c. But not one of theſe is a better inſtance of not acting, than there always is, when any one thing is choſen and not another, or in preference to another. Suppoſe a man to offer a beggar a ſhilling and a guinea, of which he may have his

his choice, and he take the guinea; will it be ſaid, that his leaving the ſhilling is an inſtance of not acting? Then we never do any thing, without at the ſame time not acting; *i. e.* while we do one thing, we omit many other things, which we might do. If this be what Dr. Weſt means by not acting, it is readily granted; but it comes to little or nothing; it is a mere power to do ſome things and to refuſe or omit ſome other things. This power is conſiſtent with the moſt infallible connection between motives and volitions. Whenever under the influence of motives, we do ſome things, we certainly have a power to do thoſe things, and to omit other things, which in fact we do not.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins, p. 6, ſays, "All power of acting eſſentially implies, at the ſame "time, *a power* of not acting: Otherwiſe it is not *act-* "*ing*, but barely a *being acted upon* by that power, which "cauſes the action." If he mean by *power*, *natural* or *phyſical* power, as before explained; and if by *not acting* he mean, *refuſing* or *voluntary forbearing* to act in a certain propoſed manner; I agree with Dr. Clarke. But if by *power* to act, he mean ſomething oppoſed to moral neceſſity or inability, which is a previous certainty, that the action will or will not take place, in this caſe power to act will be a previous uncertainty concerning the exiſtence of the action: And in this ſenſe of the words, the Doctor's propoſition, that a "power of acting eſſentially implies a power of "not acting," will amount to this merely, that a previous uncertainty concerning the exiſtence of an action, eſſentially implies a previous uncertainty concerning the non-exiſtence of the ſame action: Which is mere trifling.——If the Doctor mean by *not acting*, entire inaction, I deny that a natural power to act implies a power to fall into entire inaction and torpitude. Nor does an uncertainty whether we ſhall act in any particular manner, imply an uncertainty whether we ſhall be perfectly inactive and torpid.

Dr.

Dr. Weſt, ſuppoſes *ſelf-determination* is eſſential to liberty ; but his account of ſelf-determination is equally inexplicit, as his account of liberty. "We "uſe ſelf-determination," ſays he, "not to ſignify, that "ſelf acts on ſelf and produces volition ; or that the "mind ſome how determines to will ; *i. e.* wills to "will, or chooſes to chooſe. But the ſenſe in which "we uſe ſelf-determination is ſimply this, that we our-"ſelves determine ; *i. e.* that we ourſelves will or "chooſe ; that we ourſelves act ; *i. e.* that we are "agents and not mere paſſive beings ; or in other "words, that we are the determiners in the active "voice, and not the determined in the paſſive voice." P. 17.——Now one would expect, that in all this profuſion of words, in this variety of expreſſion, with the help of three *i. e's.* we ſhould have a moſt clear and explicit account of ſelf-determination. But the account is entirely inexplicit, and equally conſiſtent with Preſident Edwards's ſcheme of neceſſity, as with the oppoſite ſcheme. He holds, that we ourſelves determine ; but he does not hold, that we are the efficient cauſes of our own determinations. Nor can Dr. Weſt conſiſtently hold this ; as this would imply, that our determinations or volitions are effects, which Dr. Weſt denies. Preſident Edwards holds, that we ourſelves will or chooſe ; that we ourſelves act and are agents : But he does not hold, that we efficiently cauſe our own mental acts : Nor for the reaſon already given, can Dr. Weſt conſiſtently hold this. Beſides, this would imply, that "ſelf acts on ſelf and produces "volition," or that "the mind ſome how determines to will ;" *i. e.* "wills to will, or chooſes to chooſe," which the Doctor renounces. Preſident Edwards does not hold, that we are *mere* paſſive beings, unleſs this expreſſion mean, that our volitions are the effects of ſome cauſe extrinſic to our wills.* If this be the meaning of it, he does hold it, and the believers in his

* In cauſes extrinſic to the will I include both original and acquired taſte, bias, propenſion, or whatever it be called.

his ſyſtem are ready to join iſſue with Dr. Weſt, on this point. Though we hold that our volitions are the effects of ſome extrinſic cauſe, and that we are paſſive, as we are the ſubjects of the influence of that cauſe; yet we hold, that we are not *merely* paſſive; but that volition is in its own nature an act or action, and in the exerciſe of it we are active, though in the cauſation of it we are paſſive ſo far as to be the ſubjects of the influence of the efficient cauſe. This we concede; and let our opponents make the moſt of it: We fear not the conſequence. In this ſenſe we hold, "that we are determiners in the active voice, "and not *merely* determined in the paſſive voice." We hold, that we are determiners in the active voice, in every ſenſe which does not imply, that "ſelf acts on "ſelf and produces volition; or that the mind ſome "how wills to will, and chooſes to chooſe," which Dr. Weſt utterly denies; and "he entirely joins "with Mr. Edwards in exploding the idea, that the "will determines all the preſent acts of the will."

Though we are determiners in the active voice, and not *merely* determined in the paſſive voice; yet our determination may be the conſequence of ſufficient motive or the effect of ſome other extrinſic cauſe. We ſee, hear, feel, love and hate, in the active voice; yet we are or may be cauſed to ſee, hear, &c. And when we are cauſed to love or hate, we are indeed the ſubjects of the agency or influence of ſome cauſe extrinſic to our own will, and ſo far are paſſive: Still the immediate effect of this agency is our act, and in this act we are certainly active. So that we are not *merely* in the paſſive voice cauſed to love, but we alſo in the active voice *love*. Dr. Weſt will not ſay, that becauſe a man is influenced or perſuaded by proper motives to the love of virtue, he does not love it at all in the active voice. Yet it is often ſaid by men of his claſs, that if we be influenced to will or chooſe an object, it is no action at all. It is indeed no action in their ſenſe

of

of the word, as they mean by action, *ſelf-determination*: But inſtead of taking it for granted, that this is the true ſenſe of the word *action*, they ought to ſhow the reality and poſſibility of ſuch an action, and remove the abſurdities, which are ſaid to be inſeparable from it.——To ſay, that we are ſelf-determined or ſelf-moved, becauſe we ourſelves determine and move, is as improper and groundleſs, as to ſay, that a body is ſelf-moved and ſelf-determined in its motion, becauſe the body itſelf moves. Extrinſic cauſality is no more excluded in the one caſe, than in the other.

The Doctor puts the caſe of his chooſing coffee, when that, tea and chocolate were offered him, and all appeared equally eligible; and ſays, "I believe, that "it will be impoſſible in this and a multitude of ſimi- "lar inſtances, to aſſign any accident or circumſtance, "which determines the mind to its choice among things, "which appear equally fit and eligible. Conſequently "here is an undeniable proof of the liberty for which "we contend." The liberty for which he here contends, is a power to chooſe one of ſeveral equally eligible things. If by *power* he mean *natural* or *phyſical* power, I grant, that we have ſuch a power to chooſe not only one of ſeveral things equally eligible, if any ſuch there be, but one of things ever ſo unequally eligible, and to take the leaſt eligible. A man may be under no involuntary reſtraint from taking an object ever ſo ineligible. But if by power to chooſe one of ſeveral equally eligible things, he mean a power oppoſed to moral neceſſity, it is a previous uncertainty which he will chooſe. But there is in this caſe no more previous uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, than in any caſe whatever.

The Doctor denies, that "any accident or circum- "ſtance," or any extrinſic cauſe, "determines the mind "to its choice among things which appear equally eli- "gible." If this were granted, though it is not, what would follow? Doubtleſs either that the choice is determined and cauſed by the mind itſelf, or that it comes

comes into exiſtence without cauſe. But Dr. Weſt cannot with conſiſtency hold either of theſe. To hold that choice or volition is cauſed by the mind, is to hold, that it is an effect and has a cauſe, which Dr. Weſt denies, and has written an eſſay to prove it. It is alſo to hold, that "ſelf acts on ſelf and produces "volition; or that the mind ſome how determines to "will, *i. e.* wills to will or chooſes to chooſe," and that "the will determines the preſent acts of the will;" all which are denied by Dr. Weſt. On the other hand, that volition comes into exiſtence without cauſe, though this is maintained by the Doctor, in that he maintains, that "volition is no effect and has no cauſe;" yet it is alſo denied and renounced by him, in that he ſays, p. 27, "We cannot be charged with holding, that e-"vents take place without cauſe."

In p. 19, he ſays, "All who believe there is a De-"ity, muſt grant, that he has a ſelf-determining power: "For he being the firſt cauſe, his volitions cannot be "determined by any cauſe antecedent or extrinſic to "himſelf." If by ſelf-determining power here be meant, what Dr. Weſt ſays he means *ſimply*, That the Deity himſelf has a power to determine; that he himſelf has a power to will or chooſe; we grant, that not only the Deity, but all intelligent beings have a ſelf-determining power. A ſelf-determining power according to this definition, is nothing but a power of will, which we all grant belongs to every intelligent and moral agent. Nor does this imply any thing inconſiſtent with the idea, that the Deity and all other intelligent beings are governed by motives, in the only ſenſe in which we hold government by motives; which is, that the Deity does every thing which he does, becauſe there is a motive to do it, ariſing from his own infinite wiſdom and goodneſs.——But if by ſelf-determining power, be meant a power by which God produces volition in himſelf, by which "ſelf acts on ſelf "and produces volition," we join with Dr. Weſt in reprobating ſuch a power. He expreſsly ſays, "The

"divine volitions are no effects produced by the Dei-
"ty." P. 28.——If any thing elſe be meant, when-
ever Dr. Weſt will inform us what it is, (as we cannot
imagine any beſide one or other of the forementioned
ſenſes) we will inform him, whether we allow or deny
it, and will give our reaſons.

As to the argument, that "The Deity being the firſt
"cauſe, his volitions cannot be determined by any
"cauſe antecedent or extrinſic to himſelf;" it may be
anſwered, Still he may will as he does, becauſe of mo-
tives and reaſons ariſing from his own infinite wiſdom
and goodneſs. It may be further ſaid, that the ſame
argument, which Dr. Weſt here uſes to prove, that
God determines himſelf, will prove, that God created
himſelf: Thus, All who believe that there is a Deity,
muſt grant, that he has a ſelf-creating power and did
create himſelf. For he being the firſt cauſe, his exiſt-
ence cannot be cauſed by any thing antecedent or ex-
trinſic to himſelf. But it no more follows from the
conſideration, that God's *volitions* were not cauſed by
any thing antecedent or extrinſic to God, that they
were cauſed by God, than from the conſideration, that
his *exiſtence* was not cauſed by any thing antecedent
or extrinſic to himſelf, it follows, that it was cauſed by
himſelf. The truth is the divine volitions were no
more cauſed, whether by God himſelf or by any other
cauſe, than the divine exiſtence was. The divine vo-
litions are the divine holineſs uncreated and ſelf-exiſt-
ent. And one attribute of God is not more cauſed or
created, than all his attributes, or than his exiſtence.

An exemption from extrinſic cauſality, in the acts
of the mind, is eſſential to Dr. Weſt's idea of liberty.
Suppoſe then, that a free volition is one that comes
into exiſtence without any dependence on a cauſe ex-
trinſic to the mind, which is the ſubject of that voli-
tion; the conſequence is, that either ſuch a volition
is cauſed by the mind itſelf, and "ſelf acts on ſelf and
"produces volition;" or it is abſolutely without cauſe,
and comes into exiſtence by mere chance; neither of
which

which will Dr. Weſt avow: Indeed he has already expreſsly diſavowed them both. And if he either expreſsly, or by neceſſary implication, avows them both, that does not help the matter; to be inconſiſtent relieves no difficulty.

Liberty is by ſome writers diſtinguiſhed into external and internal. Internal or the liberty of the mind, is the principal ſubject of the preſent inquiry; and this, as is implied in what has been ſaid already, conſiſts in the power or faculty of will. Every intelligent being who has this power, is free, or has internal liberty, and ſo long as he retains this power, cannot be diveſted of liberty. I am ſenſible, that our opponents ſuppoſe, that ſomething further, viz. a ſelf-determining power is neceſſary to liberty: And to this I ſhall particularly attend in the next chapter. As internal liberty conſiſts in the very faculty of the will, ſo that which is external conſiſts in opportunity externally to execute our determinations and wiſhes. To define internal moral liberty to be, "an opportu-"nity and capacity of chooſing and acting otherwiſe "than the ſubject in fact does," is nothing diſtinguiſhing between the ſyſtem of thoſe who hold, that all moral actions are morally neceſſary, and that of thoſe who deny it. "Opportunity and capacity of chooſ-"ing otherwiſe," may mean mere *natural* power, as before explained. When Pharaoh choſe to retain the Iſraelites, he was under no natural inability of chooſing to let them go. Still it was a matter of previous abſolute certainty, that he would for a time refuſe to let them go, and had been divinely foretold.——If "opportunity and capacity of chooſing otherwiſe, than "the ſubject in fact does," mean any thing inconſiſtent with the moſt abſolute moral neceſſity, it muſt mean a previous uncertainty how he will chooſe: And if this be the meaning in the aforeſaid definition of moral liberty; I deny that any man has in this ſenſe opportunity to chooſe otherwiſe than he does. Every event and conſequently every act of choice, is previ-

ouſly foreknown by God and therefore is previouſly certain: And to take it for granted, that any is previouſly to its exiſtence, uncertain in the divine mind and in reality, is an intolerable begging of the queſtion.

The following account has been given of liberty, as oppoſed to moral neceſſity: "I find I can abſtain "from any particular good; I can defer uſing it; I "can prefer ſomething elſe to it; I can heſitate in "my choice; in ſhort, I am my own maſter to chooſe, "or which is the ſame thing, I am *free*." Perhaps this is as popular a repreſentation of liberty and as agreeable to the ideas of thoſe who are the moſt zealous advocates for liberty as oppoſed to moral neceſſity, as can be given.——But all this is talking in the dark and confounding the ſubject by the uſe of ambiguous words; particularly the word *can*. To ſay, "I *can* abſtain from any particular good," is the very ſame as to ſay, I have *power* to abſtain, &c. But there are two ſenſes to the words power and inability already noticed and explained. In one ſenſe Pharaoh had power to let the Iſraelites go; he was under no *natural* inability in the caſe. Still there was an abſolute previous certainty, that he would not for a time let them go. Therefore there was a moral neceſſity, that he ſhould not let them go, and he was morally unable to let them go; and in this ſenſe he was not free; it was not a matter of uncertainty whether he would let them go or not.——This account of liberty reminds me of the argument, by which a certain man endeavoured to convince his neighbour, that there were no divine abſolute decrees. The argument was, that having a child newly born, he felt himſelf at liberty to call it by what name he pleaſed, without regard to any divine decree. As if God had decreed, that he ſhould call his child by a particular name, whether with or without his own conſent.

Liberty or freedom muſt mean freedom from ſomething. If it be a freedom from coaction or natural neceſſity, this is what we mean by freedom. The mind

mind in volition is in its own nature free. But our opponents mean by freedom an exemption from all extrinſic cauſal influence, and from all previous certainty. And when they hold, that the mind cauſes its own volitions, they muſt, to be conſiſtent, hold that it cauſes them contingently and without any previous certainty that it would cauſe them; and they muſt deny that the mind's cauſation of them is determined, fixed or limited by any cauſe whatever. For that the mind ſhould cauſe them according to a previous eſtabliſhment, would be as inconſiſtent with liberty, as that it ſhould not cauſe them at all, as it implies an entire limitation of the mind in its operations.

The very inquiry, whether the mind in the exerciſe of the will, or as poſſeſſed of the power of will, be free, is apt to lead into error. It ſeems to imply, that freedom is ſomething elſe than the freedom of the will. To inquire whether the mind as poſſeſſed of will be free, is to inquire whether the mind as poſſeſſed of freedom be free; or whether freedom be freedom.

Men in general have no other idea of freedom, than a power of will, or an exemption from coaction or natural neceſſity, as their language on the ſubject implies no more than this. With them to act *freely*, and to act *voluntarily* is the ſame thing, and they never once think of propagating one free act by an antecedent free act, or that in order to freedom it is requiſite, that the acts of their wills ſhould come to paſs without cauſe and by mere chance: Nor do they once imagine, that in order to freedom, there muſt be no previous certainty what their acts will be; or that the divine foreknowledge or prediction is inconſiſtent with liberty.

Liberty in the ſenſe of our opponents, is not poſſible or conceivable. By liberty they mean a power to cauſe all our own volitions, and to cauſe them freely. But that we ſhould thus cauſe them, is neither poſſible nor conceivable. If we ſhould thus cauſe a volition, we ſhould doubtleſs cauſe it by a cauſal act:

It is impoſſible, that we cauſe any thing without a cauſal act. And as it is ſuppoſed, that we cauſe it freely, the cauſal act muſt be a *free* act, *i. e.* an act of the will or a volition. And as the ſuppoſition is, that all our volitions are cauſed by ourſelves, the cauſal volition muſt be cauſed by another, and ſo on infinitely: Which is both impoſſible and inconceivable. It is no more poſſible or conceivable, that we ſhould cauſe all our own volitions, than that all men ſhould beget themſelves.

Some have ſaid, that volition or voluntary exerciſe is *liberty*. It is undoubtedly a *free act* and liberty is a property of that act; but it is not more proper to call it *liberty* itſelf, than to call the apprehenſion of the equality between the three angles of a triangle and two rights, *intellect*, becauſe it is an act of intellect. The flying of a bird at large in the open air is a *free act*, but not *liberty* itſelf.

Our opponents ſay, they plead for *that liberty, in men to do as they pleaſe*. By this with reſpect to the mind, they muſt mean, either that the mind cauſes its own volitions, or that it acts voluntarily. As to the firſt, it has been in part conſidered already, and ſhall be further attended to in the next chapter. The laſt is no more than we all allow; and for our opponents to mean this only, is to give up the diſpute.

It is generally if not univerſally granted by our opponents, that God is *neceſſarily holy*; and to be ſure, the ſcripture aſſures us, that "he cannot lie," and "cannot deny himſelf." And Dr. Weſt grants, that he is *perfectly holy*, p. 38; and that he is *immutable*, ibid. Therefore he is *immutably* and *neceſſarily* holy. Yet the Doctor ſuppoſes God to poſſeſs a ſelf-determining power. And although his *definition* of ſelf-determination, as obſerved before, is not at all inconſiſtent with the neceſſity which we hold; yet it is manifeſt, that he ſuppoſes ſelf-determination to be inconſiſtent with that neceſſity. And did he mean, in aſcribing ſelf-determination to the Deity, to aſcribe

ſomething

ſomething to him inconſiſtent with *immutable* and *neceſſary* holineſs? Does he believe, that it is not *abſolutely certain*, that God will for ever continue to be holy? Yet abſolute *certainty*, as I have often ſaid, is all the neceſſity for which we plead. The Doctor therefore has fallen into a dilemma, or rather a trilemma, and he may make his choice, whether to concede, that there is no ſelf-determination in God, and that therefore it is not neceſſary to liberty; or that ſelf-determination is not at all inconſiſtent with abſolute moral neceſſity, and then he will give up the diſpute; or to hold that God is not neceſſarily holy, and that he *can lie* and *can deny himſelf*. I wait for the Doctor's deciſion or explanation.

It is well known, that Dr. S. Clarke places liberty in ſelf-determination or ſelf-motion; and he holds, that "liberty in the higheſt and completeſt degree is "in God himſelf;" and "that God is a moſt perfect-"ly free agent;" yet he immediately adds, that "he "*cannot but* do always what is beſt and wiſeſt in the "whole. The reaſon is evident; becauſe perfect "wiſdom and goodneſs are as *ſteady* and *certain* prin-"ciples of action, as *neceſſity* itſelf." Perfect wiſdom and goodneſs therefore imply a *certainty* of action. But *certainty* is the *neceſſity* in queſtion. How then can any liberty or ſelf-determination inconſiſtent with abſolute moral neceſſity, coexiſt in the Deity with that neceſſity?——Thus the moſt able advocates for ſelf-determination, and Dr. Clarke as much as any of them, are neceſſitated by their abſurd and contradictory ſyſtem, perpetually to contradict themſelves.

Moſt of our opponents hold, that we are the efficient cauſes of our own volitions, and that in this our liberty conſiſts. But Dr. Weſt expreſsly denies this with regard to the Deity; p. 28; "The divine vo-"litions are no effects, either produced by the Deity, "or by any extrinſic cauſe." Indeed that volitions are no effects of any cauſe, is a favourite and principal doctrine of Dr. Weſt. Therefore the ſelf-deter-

mination which he aſcribes to both God and man, produces no volition in either. What then does it? How does it contribute at all to liberty? In the Deity it is conſiſtent with abſolute moral neceſſity, as we have juſt ſeen; and what reaſon can be given, why it is not as conſiſtent with the like neceſſity in man?

Or does liberty in God conſiſt in a contingence or previous uncertainty of his volitions? This, it is preſumed, will not be pretended; as it overthrows the divine immutability, and is directly contradictory to what our opponents, particularly Dr. Clarke and Dr. Weſt, hold, of the *neceſſity* of God's moral perfections. And if liberty in God do not require ſuch contingence and uncertainty, let a reaſon be given why it ſhould in man.——We deny, that cauſing our own volitions and acting by chance are either realities or poſſibilities; but if they were both poſſible and real; ſince they do not belong to the liberty of God, need we wiſh for any more liberty or higher kind of liberty and power, than God has? Or ſhall we vainly imagine, that we poſſeſs it?

Liberty is no *poſitive* exiſtence. Exiſtence or being is divided into *ſubſtance* and *mode*. But liberty is certainly no *ſubſtance*. Modes are divided into abſolute or poſitive, and relative. Liberty, as it is a power, falls into the latter claſs; it is a relative mode. All powers are relations or relative modes. It is then, as I ſaid, no *poſitive* exiſtence.

I have long ſince thought, that this controverſy concerning *liberty* and neceſſity, ſo long agitated, might be eaſily ſettled to mutual general ſatisfaction, if the diſputants would but fully explain their own ideas of the ſubjects of the diſpute. But till this is done, what proſpect or poſſibility is there of ſettling it? Our opponents accuſe us of denying the liberty of moral agents. Now the truth or falſehood of this charge depends on the ideas they affix to the word *liberty*. If by *liberty* be meant what Law in his notes on King, p. 248, defines it to be, "A certain phyſical "indifference

"indifference or indeterminateneſs in its own exer-
"ciſe;" then we do deny liberty. We deny that a man is or can be indifferent in the exerciſe of his liberty or his will.——Or if by liberty be meant, an exemption from all previous certainty, ſo that it is a matter of uncertainty and mere chance, what our volitions are to be; in this ſenſe alſo we deny liberty.——Further, if by liberty be meant, an exemption from all extrinſic cauſality or influence, ſo that our volitions are efficiently cauſed by ourſelves; this alſo we deny.——But if by liberty be meant a power of willing and chooſing, an exemption from coaction and natural neceſſity, and power, opportunity and advantage to execute our own choice; in this ſenſe we hold liberty.

We wiſh our opponents to tell us with the ſame preciſion, what *they* mean by liberty and in what ſenſe they contend for it. Unleſs they do this, it ſignifies nothing for them to tell us, that we deny all liberty, and that they are contending for liberty againſt neceſſity; and as Dr. Weſt has done, to give ſuch general and vague definitions of liberty, of ſelf-determination, &c. as are perfectly conſiſtent with our ideas of liberty and free action.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER III.

Of Self-Determination.

LIBERTY and ſelf-determination are ſo blended by our opponents in this controverſy, that it is impoſſible to write a chapter on one of theſe ſubjects, with proper attention to the ſentiments of our opponents, without running into the other. Therefore in the laſt chapter I was neceſſitated to ſay many things concerning ſelf-determination. Yet I wiſh to make ſome further obſervations on the ſame ſubject.

All our opponents agree, that ſelf-determination is eſſential to liberty. Let us firſt attend to what Dr. Weſt ſays on this ſubject; then we ſhall make ſome remarks on what Dr. Clarke and others have ſaid.

Dr. Weſt tells us, that "determining, when we apply it to the active faculty, is the ſame with volition." P. 16, 17. And "the ſenſe in which we uſe *ſelf-determination* is ſimply this, that we ourſelves determine; *i. e.* that we ourſelves will or chooſe." Now I cannot believe, that Dr. Weſt imagined, that Preſident Edwards, or any of his followers, would deny, that we ourſelves determine, will and chooſe. We doubtleſs will and chooſe as really as we think, ſee, hear, feel, &c. But who or what is the efficient cauſe in either caſe, remains to be conſidered. To ſay, that we are determiners in the active voice, and not the determined in the paſſive voice, gives no ſatisfaction. We grant, that we are determiners in the active; and yet aſſert, that we are determined, or are cauſed to determine, by ſome extrinſic cauſe, at the ſame time, and with reſpect to the ſame act: As when a man hears a ſound, he is the hearer in the active voice, and yet is cauſed to hear the ſame ſound, by ſomething extrinſic to himſelf. It will not be pretended, that a man is the efficient cauſe of his own hearing, in every inſtance in which he hears in the active voice.

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Though Dr. Weſt in general maintains, and has written an eſſay to prove, that volition is no effect and has no cauſe; yet he ſometimes forgets himſelf and falls in with the generality of the defenders of the ſelf-determining power, who hold, that the mind is the efficient cauſe of its own volitions. He every where maintains, that volition is not the effect of an *extrinſic* cauſe? Why does he expreſs himſelf thus, if he do not ſuppoſe it to be the effect of an *intrinſic* cauſe? The expreſſion implies this. This is not all. In p. 24, he puts the queſtion, "whether the mind in chooſ-"ing or acting, do not modify itſelf?" which he anſwers in the affirmative, and ſays, that this "modifi-"cation is the effect of the mind willing or chooſ-"ing." The mind then in willing modifies itſelf, *i. e.* brings itſelf into the mode of willing. This mode then is volition; and this volition is the effect of the mind willing, or the effect of volition. So that Dr. Weſt here, in direct contradiction to his general doctrine, aſſerts, agreeably to Dr. Clarke and moſt writers of his claſs, that volition is an effect and has a cauſe; is the effect of the mind whoſe volition it is, and is the effect of the mind willing or of a volition of that mind. Agreeably to this he ſays, p. 28, "No agent can bring "any effects to paſs, but what are *conſequent* upon his "acting; *i. e.* that all effects are in conſequence of "the activeneſs or operativeneſs of ſome being:" And p. 22, "No being can become a cauſe, *i. e.* an effi-"cient, or that which produces an effect, but by FIRST "*operating*, *acting* or *energiſing*:" And in the ſame page, "Volition, when uſed intelligibly —— is real-"ly an efficient cauſe." Volition then is an efficient cauſe, and an efficient cauſe of a modification of the mind, which is another volition, and this by *firſt* operating, acting or energiſing: And doubtleſs this operation, act or energiſing is a volition. So that here we have three volitions in train, all neceſſary to the exiſtence of one volition and of every volition. The *firſt* volition is an efficient cauſe of a *ſecond*, called by Dr. Weſt

Weſt a modification of the mind; and it produces this effect by a *third* volition, which is the *operation, act*, or *energiſing of the firſt*.——What is this, but "ſelf act-"ing on ſelf and producing volition," and this by the inſtrumentality of an intermediate volition. Dr. Weſt cannot conſiſtently deny any of theſe abſurdities of his ſcheme. He cannot ſay, that one volition, as an efficient cauſe, does not produce a ſecond; as he holds, that "the mind in willing modifies itſelf." But according to him volition is the mind willing. He alſo holds, that the ſaid "modification is the effect c. "the mind willing;" *i. e.* by his own definition, the effect of volition; volition then is the *efficient cauſe* of the ſaid modification. That this modification is volition he will not deny. Then we have one volition as an efficient cauſe, producing another volition as its effect. But he grants that "no being can produce an "effect, but by *firſt, acting* or *energiſing*." This gives us the intermediate volition.

It has been long ſince charged on the advocates for ſelf-determination, that their doctrine involves the abſurdity of one volition before every volition, and even before the firſt. But Dr. Weſt has made improvement in the ſcheme: He has taught us, that ſelf-determination implies *two volitions* before every volition and before the *firſt*.

That volition is produced by the mind, as the efficient cauſe, is implied, however inconſiſtently with himſelf, in various other paſſages of Dr. Weſt's books; as p. 25, "If volition or internal action be the effect "of an extrinſic cauſe, our reflections could never af-"ford us an example of an efficient cauſe." "As we "are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are "not the effects of an *extrinſic* cauſe, but that we are "*ſelf-determined*." "Conſcious, that we ourſelves "are the determiners and not the determined —— we "have the idea of our independence in willing and "chooſing." Our volition muſt either be the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, or of an intrinſic one, or it muſt happen

pen without cauſe. If it happen without cauſe, our reflections could no more afford us an example of an efficient cauſe, than they would on the ſuppoſition, that it is the effect of an extrinſic cauſe. So that the Doctor's argument neceſſarily implies, that volition is produced by the mind as the efficient cauſe. In the ſecond quotation above, he ſpeaks of our being ſelf-determined, as in direct oppoſition to our volitions being effects of an extrinſic cauſe. But there is no ſuch oppoſition unleſs by our being ſelf-determined be meant, that our volitions are the effects of an intrinſic cauſe. If ſelf-determination here mean no more than that we are the *ſubjects* of a determination, or that we ourſelves determine, as we ourſelves think, feel, &c. this may be, and yet that determination may be the effect of an extrinſic cauſe. So that there appears to be no meaning in this paſſage, unleſs, in direct contradiction to what Dr. Weſt elſewhere holds, it mean, that our volitions are *effects* and have an *efficient cauſe*; that this cauſe is our own mind; and this efficient cauſe, as the Dr. declares all efficient cauſes do, produces its effect, "by *firſt* ope-"rating, acting or energiſing;" and thus ſelf would act "on ſelf and produce volition," by an efficient operation.——Again; if we were "conſcious, that we "ourſelves are the determiners, and not the determin-"ed," we ſhould thence derive no "idea of our inde-"pendence in willing and chooſing," if our willing and chooſing either were the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, or happened without cauſe; or unleſs we were the efficient cauſes of our own willing and chooſing.

Though all this is abundantly denied and renounced by Dr. Weſt, as appears by quotations already made; yet it is the real ground work of his book, and the only ground, on which he could conſiſtently oppoſe the doctrine of moral neceſſity and extrinſic cauſality of volitions: And this is the common doctrine of the advocates for ſelf-determination. Thus Dr. Clarke, in Papers between him and Leibnitz, p. 289, tells us, "The true and only queſtion concern-

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"ing liberty, is, whether the immediate phyſical cauſe "or principle of action be indeed in him, whom we "call the agent; or whether it be ſome other reaſon "ſufficient, which is the real cauſe of the action, by "operating upon the agent and making him to be, "not the agent but a mere patient." I underſtand the Doctor by phyſical cauſe, to mean efficient, producing cauſe; otherwiſe it is not to the purpoſe.

Dr. Chauncy is ſtill more explicit. "Self-determination *gives riſe* to our volitions ——— and is "the cauſe of them." *Benevolence of the Deity*, p. 128. "A power in man, that ſubjects *his volitions to his* "*command*, is the only bottom, upon which agency "can be founded." Ibid, p. 129. And in the next page he ſays, the ſame power "conſtitutes us agents, "or beings that are *efficiently the cauſes* of their own "volitions."

Now this ſelf-determination, which "gives riſe to our volitions," and in which we are "the efficient "cauſes of our own volitions," is a determination or act either of the will, or of ſome other faculty. If it be an act of the will, it is a volition. So that here we have one volition cauſed by another: And as the doctrine is, that all our volitions are the effect of ſelf-determination, they are all the effect of volition, the cauſing act the effect of a preceding act, and the firſt the effect of one before that. This abſurdity attending the ſcheme of ſelf-determination, has been long ſince pointed out; nor have the advocates of that ſcheme been able to ſhow, that their ſcheme does not really labour under that abſurdity, if by that ſelf-determination, which is the cauſe of volition, they mean an act of the will.

But if this ſelf-determination be an act of the underſtanding; then it ſeems, that the will or mind willing, is influenced to volition by a dictate of the underſtanding, or by a motive. Then we are at once involved in what is ſo hideous to Dr. Weſt, and all other believers in ſelf-determination, the government by

by motives and the moral neceſſity implied in it: Alſo our volitions are determined by extrinſic cauſes and we are the paſſive ſubjects of the operation of thoſe cauſes.

Or if we ſuppoſe the determining act to proceed from any other faculty, if other there be, the difficulty will remain. Dr. Weſt holds, "that there are three eſſential faculties of the mind, which ought always to be "conſidered diſtinctly; and theſe are *perception*, *propenſion* and *will*;" and that "the laſt only is properly the active faculty." Then doubtleſs that ſelf-determination, which is an *action*, and which gives riſe to volition, is an act of this active faculty. In this caſe we have will putting forth ſelf-determination, in order to give riſe to volition; as we had before volition as an efficient cauſe, firſt operating, acting or energiſing, in order to produce the effect volition. As the will is, according to the Doctor, "the "only active faculty," he will not pretend, that volition produced by ſelf-determination, is the effect of either of the other two faculties, as he reckons them, perception and propenſion. If he ſhould ſay, that it is the effect of *perception*; this it ſeems is a paſſive faculty; and then ſelf-determination and all volition are the effects of a paſſive faculty and of paſſion, of which alone that faculty is by the terms capable; and therefore, it ſeems, ſelf-determination and volition muſt themſelves be paſſions or mere impreſſions, and we are paſſive in them. Beſides, perception conſidered as a faculty, as Dr. Weſt ſingularly conſiders it, appears to be nothing elſe, than intellect or the power of underſtanding. And if ſelf-determination proceed from this, the conſequence is, that the will is governed by the underſtanding and by the dictates and motives which it ſuggeſts; which brings us where we were before, into the midſt of neceſſity. The ſame conſequence will follow, if we ſuppoſe, that ſelf-determination proceed from *perception* in the common ſenſe of the word, meaning *an act* of the underſtanding

ing.——If Dr. Weſt ſay, that ſelf-determination proceeds from *propenſion*; then he entirely coincides with Preſident Edwards, who aſcribes a great part of our volitions to diſpoſition, inclination, paſſion and habit, meaning certain biaſes of the mind diſtinct from volition and prior to it.——Beſides; as propenſion is according to the Doctor a paſſive faculty, if volition and ſelf-determination proceed from this they are paſſions or impreſſions, they proceed from an extrinſic cauſe and we are paſſive in them.

The cauſing of one act of volition by another is attended with this abſurdity alſo, it ſuppoſes the cauſing act in this caſe to be diſtinct from the act cauſed; when in reality they coaleſce and are one and the ſame. For inſtance, to chooſe to have a choice of virtue, is nothing but a choice of virtue; to chooſe the choice of an apple, is to chooſe an apple: So that we have the volition before we have it, and in order that we may have it.

Some ſenſible of the abſurdity of ſuppoſing, that the mind determines one volition by another, as this runs into an infinite ſeries of volitions, and implies that there is volition before the firſt volition, have renounced this idea of ſelf-determination. Among theſe we may reckon Dr. Weſt. But at the ſame time he gives up ſelf-determination in every ſenſe in which we diſpute it, and in every ſenſe inconſiſtent with the moſt abſolute moral neceſſity. This has been already illuſtrated.——Others, to avoid the ſame difficulty expreſs themſelves differently: They profeſs to mean, that volition is cauſed not by a preceding volition, but by *the man* or *the mind*, whoſe volition it is. But this gives no ſatisfaction. Suppoſing it ſhould be ſaid, that a certain carpenter himſelf was the efficient cauſe or builder of ſuch a ſhip; and it ſhould be thence inferred, that he built it by working, labouring or exerting himſelf to the end of building the ſhip; would not this be a natural and a neceſſary inference? Would not the man, who ſhould aſſert,

aſſert, that the carpenter did indeed himſelf immediately build the ſhip, but not by any labour or exertion, whether of body or mind, be univerſally conſidered as talking abſurdly and contradictorily? And does not the man talk as abſurdly and contradictorily, who aſſerts, that a man is the efficient cauſe of his own volition, yet puts forth no exertion, in order to cauſe it? If any other way of efficiently cauſing an effect, than by act or exertion previous to the effect, be poſſible or conceivable, let it be pointed out: Till this be done, we who conceive ſuch a way to be impoſſible and inconceivable, have a right to ſay ſo, and to preſume, that our opponents, who aſſert that there is ſuch a way, are unable to point it out, and have no more idea of it, than we have. If upon trial, they ſhall find, that they are unable to point out the way, let them honeſtly confeſs, that all they mean by ſelf-determination is what we and all allow, that they are the *ſubjects* of volition, and as Dr. Weſt expreſſes it, that *they themſelves will and chooſe.*

I perfectly agree with Dr. Weſt when he ſays, p. 22, "No being can become an efficient cauſe, but "by FIRST *operating*, *acting* or *energiſing*." Operation, act or energiſing is as much preſuppoſed in order to an effect, as an efficient cauſe is preſuppoſed in order to it. To ſuppoſe an efficient cauſe to produce an effect without any act by which he produces it, is the ſame as to ſuppoſe the ſame cauſe produces the effect, without any *efficiency*: It is as abſurd, as it would be to ſuppoſe, that Dr. Weſt wrote his eſſays without any exertion in order to the production of them, or that God created the world, without any creating act. If this be not true, let the falſehood of it be made to appear. Let any man ſhow, that an effect cannot as well come to paſs without an efficient cauſe, as without a cauſing act; and that the world could not as well have come into exiſtence without a Creator, as without a creating act.

Some of the advocates for ſelf-determination hold, that the mind is the efficient cauſe of its own volitions, yet not by any *act* or *exertion* of the mind, but by the *power* or *faculty* of the will. And how can this power or faculty produce volition, unleſs it be exerted *firſt* in order to the effect? The man, who is the ſubject of a certain volition, had the power of will long ſince; yet it never produced that volition, we may ſuppoſe, till this moment. What is the cauſe or reaſon, that it produces it now and not before? To ſay, it does, becauſe it will, is to ſay either, that this volition is produced by another preceding, which runs into the infinite ſeries; or that the power of will, or rather the man in the exerciſe of that power, is the ſubject of volition, becauſe he is the ſubject of it, which is mere trifling.—— On the whole the exiſtence of a power of will in a man, will no more account for any particular volition, of which he is the ſubject, than the exiſtence of the *man* will account for the ſame volition, or the exiſtence of a ſhip-carpenter will account for the building of a certain ſhip; or than Dr. Weſt's having a power to write eſſays of Liberty and Neceſſity, will account for his actually writing them at the preciſe time, at which he did write them, or than his having an ear will account for his hearing a particular ſound at a certain time.

That we have a power of will or of determining is granted on all hands: But that we ſhould efficiently cauſe our power of will, to put forth a volition, without exerting any efficiency to this effect; only wants proof to make it credible, and explanation to make it intelligible or conceivable. Merely the circumſtance, that we have a power to will and determine, no more proves, that without motive or any influence from without; and without any cauſing act within, we cauſe that power to exert itſelf; than the circumſtance, that we have a power of hearing proves, that without any pulſation in the air, any cauſation from

from without or from within, we cauſe ourſelves to hear a particular ſound.

Some others, as well as Dr. Weſt, have denied, that by ſelf-determination they mean the cauſing of one act of the will by another. We have no objection to their denying this: But then we wiſh them to inform us explicitly, what they do mean. If they have any meaning they doubtleſs can expreſs it intelligibly: And ſo long as they do not expreſs a meaning different from what we mean by willing or chooſing; and ſo long as their definitions of ſelf-determination expreſs, either bare volition, or the cauſing of one volition by another, though they inſiſt, that they mean ſomething different from either of theſe; I leave the reader to judge, whether they have any clear meaning to that word at all.

In converſation once with a gentleman of eminence among the advocates for ſelf-determination he told me, that Preſident Edwards had abuſed thoſe who write in favour of ſelf-determination, in repreſenting them as holding, that the mind cauſes one act of volition by another. On my inquiring of the gentleman what then they did mean; his anſwer was, "They mean, that in determining the mind determines." Whether this anſwer at all explained the matter; or whether it convey any other idea, than that *the mind does determine, and has a volition*, without touching the queſtion concerning the cauſe, extrinſic or intrinſic; I ſubmit to the reader. If a man ſhould ſay, that in walking, he walks; in writing he writes; in hearing he hears; it is preſumed, that no man could certainly hence conclude, that the ſpeaker meant, that he was not influenced to walk or write, by motive or by ſome extrinſic cauſe; or that his hearing was ſelf-determined.

If we cauſe our own volitions at all, we cauſe them either by a previous volition, or without ſuch volition. If we cauſe them by a previous volition, this is what I have been particularly conſidering, and ſhall ſay no more upon it. If we cauſe them without ſuch voli-

tion, we cauſe them involuntarily, without any deſign, any motive or agency. Now I wiſh it may be inquired, whether ſuch a cauſation of volition as this, if it be poſſible or conceivable, as I contend it is not, be at all more favourable to liberty, than that volition ſhould proceed from the influence of motive or ſome other extrinſic cauſe; and whether it would be any advantage or privilege in any reſpect; and whether it would not be a great diſadvantage and calamity to mankind, and an inſupportable incumbrance on the influence of reaſon, revelation, virtue, duty and happineſs both here and hereafter. For whatever any of theſe may dictate, and with whatever motives they enforce thoſe dictates; whatever virtue and our own happineſs may require, ſince the ſelf-determining power is not influenced by theſe or any other motives; and ſince, as Dr. Clarke ſays, "There is no connec-"tion at all between the perception of the underſtand-"ing and the exertion of the active faculty;" all thoſe dictates and motives would be in vain; the ſelf-determining power is a ſovereign, ungovernable principle, perfectly deaf and unmoved by any motive, reaſon, argument or repreſentation whether of duty or intereſt. It therefore deſtroys the very uſe not only of our reaſon, of revelation and of the motives of both; but of our affections, paſſions, appetites and ſenſes, in every part of our conduct as moral agents. For ſo far as we are influenced by any of theſe, we are not ſelf-determined, and therefore, according to our opponents, we are incapable of moral action; and eſpecially are we not ſelf-determined in the ſenſe now particularly under conſideration; cauſing our own volitions involuntarily and without a previous volition.

Self-determination uninfluenced by motive, is inconſiſtent with all religion and morality and with all virtue and vice. To love God without motive, principle, aim or end, is no religion. To love and do good to mankind in like manner, is no virtue. To hate God or mankind in like manner, is no irreligion

ion or vice. Juſt ſo as to ſtealing, robbing, killing, &c.

The ſelf-determining power is, as I ſaid, an ungovernable principle. It not only cannot be governed by reaſon, revelation, &c. But not by any laws human or divine; for theſe are only motives. Nay, it cannot be governed by God, his providence or his grace. To be governed by either of theſe would be to be governed by an extrinſic cauſe, and under ſuch government men would be paſſive. If God in his providence govern and control them and their actions, they are limited, and act only by permiſſion, and have no power to act or not act, no liberty to either ſide, but are confined to one ſide. Where then is ſelf-determination?——On the other hand, if men determine and control all their own actions, none of their actions are controlled by God.

Dr. Reid, a late ſtrenuous advocate for ſelf-determination ſays, "The name of a cauſe and of an agent, "is properly given to that being only, which by its "active power, produces ſome change in itſelf, or in "ſome other being. The change, whether it be of "thought, of will, or of motion, is the effect. Active "power therefore is a quality in the cauſe, which en-"ables it to produce the effect. And the *exertion of* "*that active power* in producing the effect, is called "action, agency, efficiency. In order to the produc-"tion of any effect, there muſt be in the cauſe, *not on-*"*ly power*, but the *exertion* of that power: For power "that is not exerted produces no effect." Eſſays on the Active Powers, p. 259. Therefore if we be the efficient cauſes of our own volitions, as Dr. Clarke, Dr. Chauncy, &c. held, we muſt not only have *a power* to produce them, but there muſt be an *exertion* of power in order to the production of volition. This exertion is doubtleſs an exertion of the will. Thus we run into the infinite ſeries ſeveral times mentioned. And however others attempt to evade the abſurdities

of this infinite ſeries, Dr. Ried and his followers muſt fall into them.

"All our power," ſays Dr. Reid, ibid, 299, "is direct-
"ed by our will; we can form no conception of power,
"properly ſo called, that is not under the direction of
"our will." Then we have no power to direct or determine our will, unleſs we go round in a circle. If our will direct *all* our power, as the Doctor aſſerts; and our ſelf-determining power direct and determine our will, then we go round in a circle, our will directing all our power, and our ſelf-determining power directing our will. Glorious liberty this! And this muſt be an age of glorious improvement and illumination, or we ſhould never have made ſuch diſcoveries as theſe! Yet Dr. Reid had great reaſon to ſay, that all our power is directed by our will, otherwiſe ſome of our power might act involuntarily and our ſelf-determining power (if we have any) might direct and govern us without our conſent; with which Dr. Reid's ſcheme would very ill agree. Still the Doctor in this gives up a point, which he had before poſitively aſſerted and had laboured hard to eſtabliſh, "that if the will be not, "nothing elſe is, in our power;" p. 258. Now if the will be in our power, it is under our direction, or is directed by our power. So that we have the circle complete; all "our power is directed by our will;" and yet our will is directed by our power. Into what glaring inconſiſtences will not men run, rather than give up a favourite and indefenſible hypotheſis! Yet they are ſo blinded by their attachment to that hypotheſis, that they ſee no inconſiſtency attending it.——The truth is, that both theſe principles, *that all our power is directed by our will*; and that *our will is directed by our ſelf-determining power*, are eſſential to the Doctor's ſcheme, and to the ſcheme of all who hold a ſelf-determining power. To reconcile theſe two principles deeply concerns them. But they have never yet been able to do it; nor, it is preſumed, ever will be able.

Some

Some of the writers in favour of ſelf-determination ſeem to be ſenſible of the *myſtery* in it; particularly Dr. Chauncy. "It is readily allowed," ſays he, "liberty in man, in oppoſition to neceſſity, is one of *the* "*great wonders of God.* The power in our nature, "that conſtitutes us free agents, is an *amazing* contrivance of infinite wiſdom. The modus of its operation is *too great a deep* for us to fathom. It has *tried* and *puzzled* the greateſt geniuſes in all parts of "the world." *Benevolence of the Deity*, p. 135. No wonder then, that nobody has ever been able to give a conſiſtent or intelligible account of this power. So long as thoſe who believe in it, are puzzled with it, we may expect, that their accounts of it will be confuſed, unintelligible and contradictory. But the account of no one of them appears to be more contradictory than that of Dr. Weſt. He gives up the idea of Dr. Clarke and Dr. Chauncy, that the mind is the efficient cauſe of its own volitions; yet he falls into the ſame, in holding, that the mind in willing modifies itſelf, and that this modification is *the effect* of the mind willing, p. 24; and that we are independent in willing, p. 25. He holds that volition has no cauſe; yet holds, that the modification made of the mind by itſelf in willing, is *the effect* of the mind willing. He holds that volitions have no cauſe; yet denies, that he can be juſtly charged with holding, that events take place without a cauſe; p. 27. Surely the Doctor can never expect, that his unbiaſed readers will receive his ſyſtem, until he ſhall have removed theſe inconſiſtences.

Archbiſhop King is groſsly inconſiſtent with himſelf, in holding, that the will determines itſelf to chooſe certain objects, without the influence of motive or any cauſe out of the will; and yet holding, that the will is determined to chooſe thoſe objects, becauſe of the pleaſure which will be in conſequence of that choice. Law's *edition*, p. 276. In ſuch a caſe the will is as much determined by motive, as if a man

were determined to go to a debauch, in the proſpect of the ſenſual pleaſure, which he expected there.

Dr. Weſt ſays, p. 23, "Every effect is wholly paſ- "ſive with regard to the cauſe, which produces it." And this equally holds, whether the cauſe be extrinſic or intrinſic. "Conſequently, if human volition "be an effect" even of an intrinſic cauſe, "the man "muſt be paſſive in willing. But if man be paſſive "in willing, he can be active in nothing elſe; *i. e.* he "is no agent, but a mere paſſive machine." What then is the great advantage, which the advocates for ſelf-determining power and the intrinſic cauſation of volition, would gain, could they eſtabliſh their favourite doctrine? According to their own ſcheme, every volition would be an *effect*, a *paſſive* effect, and "man "muſt be paſſive in willing. But if man be paſſive "in willing, he can be active in nothing elſe: *i. e.* he "is no agent, but a mere paſſive machine." Ibid. More than this cannot be ſaid on this head, if we ſuppoſe volition to be the effect of an *extrinſic* cauſe. Therefore they are groſsly inconſiſtent with themſelves in rejecting one of two hypotheſes, on account of ſuppoſed abſurdities, which equally attend the other, and yet retaining that other.

Although Dr. Clarke and others aſſert, that the true and only queſtion concerning liberty, is, whether we be the efficient cauſes of our own volitions; yet they themſelves would not abide by this conceſſion. For if it were previouſly fixed and eſtabliſhed, what particular volitions we ſhould efficiently cauſe in ourſelves, this would be as inconſiſtent with their ideas of liberty, as the ſuppoſition, that they are produced by an extrinſic cauſe. Gentlemen of that claſs univerſally hold, that abſolute decrees are inconſiſtent with liberty, becauſe they eſtabliſh the actions decreed. Therefore if God have decreed that we ourſelves ſhall efficiently cauſe ſuch and ſuch volitions in our own minds; this as effectually eſtabliſhes and ſecures the exiſtence of thoſe volitions, as if he had decreed,

that

that they ſhould be effected by any other cauſe. Therefore not only does their idea of liberty require ſelf-determination, but it equally requires perfect previous uncertainty and chance, and an entire exemption from all rule, limitation or confinement, ſo that the mind not only produces its own volitions; but produces them at random and by mere chance, without the influence of motive and without any previous certainty, what particular acts it ſhall produce, and whether any. Thus according to them ſelf-determination is acting by chance and becoming the ſubject of volitions without any proper cauſe at all: For a cauſe that acts by chance and ſtupidly, without motive or deſign, is no proper efficient cauſe at all.

Dr. Weſt ſays, p. 17, "We have ſet aſide the no-"tion, that the will determines all the preſent acts of "the will: For we entirely join with Mr. Edwards "in exploding that idea." What myſtery there may be couched under the *will*, I will not pretend to ſay. But as he "entirely agrees with Mr. Edwards in ex-"ploding that idea," Dr. Weſt muſt hold not only, that the will as a diſtinct power of the mind does not determine the preſent acts of the will; but that the *mind* in the exerciſe of the power of will, does not determine thoſe acts. For this is equally exploded by Mr. Edwards, as the other. The Doctor ſays, that "the will does not determine *all* the *preſent* acts "of the will." But does it determine *any* of the acts of the will, whether *preſent*, *paſt* or *future*? As he agrees in this particular with Mr. Edwards, he muſt anſwer in the negative. All *paſt* acts of the will were once preſent; and when they were preſent Dr. Weſt denies, that the will determined them: And he will not ſay, that the will determines them now that they are paſt. Alſo all future acts of the will erelong will be preſent; and when they ſhall be preſent, they will not, according to Dr. Weſt's conceſſion, be determined by the will. Therefore he will not ſay, that they are determined by the will now, before they come in-

to exiſtence. Doubtleſs by whatever they are determined, they are determined by it at the very inſtant of their coming into exiſtence. No cauſe produces an effect, at a time before or after the exiſtence of that effect: Therefore by this conceſſion of Dr. Weſt it ſeems he holds, that no volition, paſt, preſent or future is determined by the will, or by the mind in the exerciſe of the will. Yet Dr. Weſt ſtrenuouſly pleads for a ſelf-determining power: But what good purpoſe does this power anſwer, ſince it determines no act of will? It ſeems it is a very innocent and harmleſs thing, becauſe it is very inefficacious and dormant, doing neither good nor hurt.

Dr. Clarke, in papers between Leibnitz and himſelf, p. 73, grants, that "nothing *is*, without a ſuffi-"cient reaſon why it is, rather than not; and why it "is *thus*, rather than otherwiſe. But" ſays, that "in "things in their own nature indifferent, *mere will*, "without any thing external to influence it, is alone "that ſufficient reaſon." By *will* the Doctor muſt mean either an *act* of volition, or the *power* of the will. If he mean that the former is the reaſon or ground of our acts of the will, he runs into the infinite ſeries. If he mean the latter it is as abſurd as to ſay, The ability of Dr. Clarke to write his replies to Leibnitz, was *alone* the ſufficient reaſon why he wrote them.

Dr. Price in his correſpondence with Dr. Prieſtly, p. 136, ſays, "It cannot be juſtly ſaid, that ſelf-deter-"mination implies an effect without a cauſe. Does it "follow, that becauſe I am myſelf the cauſe, there is "no cauſe?" To this I anſwer, that though it does indeed not follow, that becauſe I am myſelf the cauſe of a volition, there is no cauſe; as it is taken for granted, that there is a cauſe, and that I am that cauſe; yet from the ſuppoſition, that volition is not the effect of a cauſe extrinſic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no cauſe of it; becauſe it is abſolutely impoſſible, that the mind itſelf

itſelf ſhould be the cauſe of it. The impoſſibility of this has been already ſtated in the preceding diſcourſe, and more largely illuſtrated by other writers: And if any man will ſhow the poſſibility of the mind's cauſing its own volitions, and will remove the abſurdities attending that ſuppoſition; *erit mihi Magnus Apollo*: It will then, and not till then, be incumbent on us to ſpeak of ſelf-determination in a very different ſtrain.

In fine; thoſe who plead for a ſelf-determining power, either mean what Dr. Weſt declares he means, that we ourſelves determine whenever we do determine; which is no part of the ſubject of this controverſy, is diſputed by none and is nothing oppoſite to moral neceſſity, extrinſic cauſality of volition, &c. but amounts to this merely, that we are the ſubjects of volition: Or they mean, that we are the efficient cauſes of our own volitions. But theſe men ſeem never to have reflected ſo far on the ſubject, as to ſee, that this idea of ſelf-determination runs into what has been ſo often charged upon them, an infinite ſeries of volitions cauſing one another: And therefore when this difficulty is ſuggeſted to them, they are either ſilenced and have nothing to anſwer, or elſe anſwer in ſuch a manner as to ſhow, that by efficiently cauſing our own volitions they mean merely what Dr. Weſt profeſſes to mean, that we *will* or are the ſubjects of volition, which no more implies, that we cauſe them, than that we cauſe all our own perceptions and feelings follows from our being the ſubjects of them.

"I take it to be an important truth," ſays the Doctor, Part II, p. 19, "that wherever neceſſity begins, "liberty ends; and that a neceſſary agent is a contra-"diction." What a pity, that the Doctor ſhould undertake the defence of a propoſition, which he is neceſſitated perpetually to beg! Or if he be not neceſſitated to beg it, what a pity that he ſhould do it without neceſſity! He knows or ought to have known, that this which he here takes for granted, is not conceded; that Preſident Edwards and all his followers hold, that the

the moſt abſolute moral neceſſity is conſiſtent with perfect liberty, and that an agent acting under moral neceſſity, is ſo far from a contradiction, that neither God nor creature is or can be any other agent. If Dr. Weſt ſhould ſay, that a neceſſary agent is a contradiction according to *his idea* of agent, *i. e.* a ſelf-determinate agent or one acting by chance: Be it ſo; he ought to prove, and not aſſume, that his idea is poſſible and according to truth.

"When a man conſiders," (ſays Dr. Weſt, p. 23, Part II,) "that he is not moved by any extrinſic "cauſe to do evil, but that his wickedneſs has *originated wholly from himſelf*, he muſt feel himſelf exceedingly vile and unworthy of any divine favour." This is talking altogether in the clouds: What does he mean by wickedneſs originated from a man's ſelf? He cannot conſiſtently mean, that "ſelf acts on ſelf "and produces wickedneſs;" for this he rejects as abſurd. If he mean, that a man is himſelf the ſubject of wickedneſs, wicked volitions or actions; this is granted; but it is not at all oppoſed to his being moved by an extrinſic cauſe to that wickedneſs, any more than a man's being the ſubject of pain is inconſiſtent with the pain's being effected by an extrinſic cauſe. If there be any ſenſe beſide theſe two, in which wickedneſs can be originated from a man's ſelf, let it be pointed out.

"If men have an exiſtence diſtinct from Deity," ſays the Doctor, "endowed with a conſciouſneſs diſ"tinct from Deity, then they have a ſelf-active prin"ciple diſtinct from Deity; *i. e.* they have a ſelf-de"termining power;" ibid, p. 24. That men have an exiſtence and conſciouſneſs diſtinct from Deity, is granted; but that it thence follows, that they have a ſelf-determining power, if by that be meant any thing diſtinct from a faculty of will influenced by extrinſic motives and cauſes is not granted, and ought not to have been taken for granted, nor aſſerted without proof. From the ſame premiſes it would follow, that

brutes

brutes have a ſelf-determining power; which is not generally allowed by the advocates for that power. For brutes have both an exiſtence and a conſciouſneſs diſtinct from the Deity.

"He that cannot govern his own mind; but is "conſtantly determined by an extrinſic cauſe, is cer- "tainly the ſubject of mere chance and accident;" ibid, p. 28. Indeed! and is the planetary ſyſtem the ſubject of mere chance and accident? The material world cannot govern itſelf, yet not an hair of our head eſcapes the notice or the diſpoſal of our heavenly Father.——Surely the Doctor aſſerted this without conſideration.

"Our doctrine of ſelf-determination implying, that "when the mind acts, it always has an object in view, "and that there is always a reaſon for acting, is as "fully conſiſtent with our being the ſubjects of com- "mands and promiſes, prohibitions and threatenings, "and eſtabliſhes as ſure a connection between means "and ends, as he" [Preſident Edwards] "can ſuppoſe "to ariſe from the doctrine of Neceſſity." Ibid, p. 29. Yet the Doctor's doctrine is, "that men are not "always governed by the ſtrongeſt motive," and that there is no ſure connection between motives and action. Ibid, p. 6. Now the Doctor is ſpeaking of the means and ends of moral agents and moral actions; and particularly of commands and promiſes, prohibitions and threatenings, conſidered as motives and means of action. And does that doctrine which teaches that there is no ſure connection between the ſtrongeſt motive, or even any motives, whether ſtronger or weaker, and action, eſtabliſh as ſure a connection between ſuch means and their ends, which are moral actions, as that doctrine which teaches, that there is a ſure and infallible connection between ſuch means and their ends? Is it not ſurpriſing, that the Doctor ſhould aſſert ſuch a thing?

He tells us, ibid, p. 29, "That he holds no ſuch "kind of ſelf-determination, as a power to act without

"and

"and againſt every kind of reaſon or argument." But he does hold a power to act without and againſt the *ſtrongeſt* reaſons and arguments: Therefore he ought much more to hold a power to act without and againſt the weaker; and conſequently a power to act without and againſt every kind of reaſon and argument. Nay, the Doctor does expreſsly hold a power to *reſiſt* all motives, reaſons and arguments, and a power to remain *inactive* notwithſtanding the ſolicitations of them all. And is it not ſtrange, that he who poſſeſſes a power to reſiſt and remain inactive, without and againſt every kind of reaſon and argument; has not alſo a power to reſiſt them in acting againſt them?

CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV.

Of Motives and their Influence.

DR. Weſt has given his definition of a motive, p. 17; "It is the occaſion, reaſon, end or deſign, "which an agent has in view, when he acts." And he grants, ibid, "that the mind acts upon motives; "*i. e.* when the mind acts or chooſes, it always has "ſome end, deſign or reaſon, which is the occaſion of "its acting or chooſing. Therefore motives, in our "ſenſe of the term, are the previous circumſtances, "which are neceſſary for action." And, Part II, p. 93; "Action *cannot* take place without ſome object, rea-"ſon or motive; and the motive or reaſon for acting *muſt* "*be prior* to the action of the mind, and be *perceived* by "it, before it *can act*." "Nothing *can* become an object "of choice, except it appears to be eligible;" p. 95, Part II. Yet he maintains, "that there is no infallible connec-"tion between motive and action;" and that "when mo-"tives have done all that they can do, the mind may "act or not act." The reaſon which he aſſigns for this, is, "that though the mind never acts without "ſome reaſon or deſign in acting; yet there is no "need of aſſigning a reaſon for *not acting*." P. 17, 18.——If by *acting or not acting* he mean a voluntary acting or not acting, or a chooſing or refuſing of the motives preſented; it is to be obſerved, as I have already obſerved, that refuſing is as real an action as chooſing; and a voluntary not acting is a *voluntary* refuſal to act and to comply with the motives propoſed, and is as real a volition as any other; and therefore by his own conceſſion, "motive is neceſſary to "it," equally neceſſary as for any other volition or action.—— Or if by *not acting* Dr. Weſt mean no act of either chooſing or refuſing, but a perfect inaction; then what he ſays, will come to this, That when motives

tives are propoſed, the mind may chooſe to comply with them, or it may refuſe to comply with them, or it may do neither. But the impoſſibility of this I endeavoured to illuſtrate in the ſecond chapter, and ſhall ſay no more on it at preſent.

But if it were poſſible, that on the propoſal of motives, the mind ſhould *not act at all*; how would it follow, as Dr. Weſt ſays, that there is no infallible connection between motive and *action?* It is granted by Dr. Weſt that motive is neceſſary to every action, whether of choice or refuſal; and to ſay as the Doctor does, that it is not neceſſary for *not acting*, amounts to this merely, that it is not neceſſary for involuntary, blockiſh inaction or torpitude.——By infallible connection we mean no more than conſtant invariable connection, ſo that whenever the mind acts, whether in choice or refuſal, it is under the perſuaſive influence of ſome motive, which, as Dr. Weſt grants, "is the reaſon "and occaſion of its acting," and "a circumſtance "neceſſary for action." We pretend not but that the man, when motives are preſented, may poſſibly fall into a ſwoon or other ſtate of involuntary ſtupidity. If this ſhould be the caſe, it would be nothing to the preſent purpoſe. For the queſtion before us is, whether volition be or be not in all caſes according to motive in the large ſenſe of Preſident Edwards, including reaſons, and external objects, with the taſte and bias of the mind. This is what is meant by a determination by motive. Let what will be the cauſe of involuntary and torpid inaction; ſo long as it is granted, as Dr. Weſt does grant, that motive is neceſſary to volition, and that every volition, whether choice or refuſal, is occaſioned by motive, and never exiſts without it, every thing is granted on this head, for which we contend.

Dr. Weſt ſays, "We cannot agree with Mr. Ed"wards in his aſſertion, that motive is the *cauſe* of voli"tion;" p. 17. Mr. Edwards has very particularly informed us in what ſenſe he uſes the word *cauſe*. Thus,

p. 41;

p. 41 ; " I ſometimes uſe the word cauſe in this *In-*
" *quiry*, to ſignify *any antecedent* either natural or mor-
" al, poſitive or negative, on which an event, either a
" thing or the manner and circumſtance of a thing,
" ſo depends, that it is the ground and reaſon, either
" in whole or in part, why it is rather than not ; or
" why it is rather than otherwiſe. Or in other words,
" any antecedent with which a conſequent event is
" ſo connected, that it truly belongs to the reaſon
" why the propoſition, which affirms that event, is
" true ; whether it has any poſitive influence or not."
Now, does Dr. Weſt deny, that motive is an antece-
dent, on which volition either in whole or part de-
pends ? Or that it is a ground or reaſon, either in
whole or part, either by poſitive influence or not,
why it is rather than not ? Surely he cannot with
conſiſtence deny this, ſince he does ſay, " By mo-
tive we " underſtand the *occaſion, reaſon*, end or de-
" ſign, which an agent has in view, when he acts ;"
and that motives are the *previous* " circumſtances,
" which are *neceſſary* for action ?" Surely a previous
circumſtance, which is neceſſary for action or voli-
tion, is an " antecedent on which volition depends ;"
and " a reaſon which an agent has in view, when he
" acts," and " a reaſon which is the occaſion of his
" acting," " is a reaſon either in whole or part, why
" the action is." So that however deſirous Dr. Weſt
may be, to be thought to differ, in this point, from
Preſident Edwards, it appears, that he moſt exactly
agrees with him. Yet he ſays, p. 11, " Mr. Edwards,
" by making motives the *cauſe* of acts of the will, and
" by declaring, that the exiſtence of the acts of the
" will is the effect of their motives, appears full as un-
" intelligible *to me*, as Chubb could poſſibly appear
" to him." But as it appears, that Preſident Edwards
has explained himſelf to mean by *cauſe* no other than
occaſion, reaſon or *previous circumſtance neceſſary for*
volition ; and that in this Dr. Weſt entirely agrees
with him ; if Preſident Edwards appear abſurd to

Dr. Weſt, Dr. Weſt muſt appear abſurd to himſelf, even as abſurd as Chubb could poſſibly appear to Preſident Edwards.

I do not pretend, that motives are the *efficient* cauſes of volition. If any expreſſion importing this, have dropped from any defender of the connection between motive and volition; either it muſt have happened through inadvertence, or he muſt have meant, that motive is an *efficient cauſe* in no other ſenſe than rain and the rays of the ſun are the efficient cauſe of the growth of vegetables, or than medicine is the efficient cauſe of health.

When we aſſert, that volition is determined by motive, we mean not that motive is the efficient cauſe of it; but we mean, that there is a ſtated connection between volition and motive, ſo that as Dr. Weſt ſays, "Whenever the mind acts or chooſes, it ALWAYS has "ſome reaſon" or motive, "which is the *occaſion* of "its acting or chooſing," and "is a previous circum-"ſtance neceſſary for action" or volition. This amounts to all we mean by an infallible connection between motive and volition; and therefore though Dr. Weſt denies ſuch a connection, he in fact holds it, as much as we do. By infallible connection between motive and volition, we mean, that volition never takes place without ſome motive, reaſon or cauſe of its exiſtence, either in the views of the mind of him, who is the ſubject of the volition, in the diſpoſition, bias or appetite of his mind or body, or from the influence of ſome extrinſic agent. In a ſenſe large enough to comprehend all theſe Preſident Edwards explains himſelf to uſe the word *motive*. His words are, "By motive I mean the whole of that which "moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, "whether that be one thing ſingly, or many things con-"junctly;" p. 5. He then proceeds to enumerate ſeveral things which operate as motives, viz. the *views* of the mind, the *ſtate*, *frame* and *temper*, &c. which the mind may have by nature, or which may have been introduced

introduced by education, example, cuſtom or *other means.*

Dr. Weſt grants an infallible connection between motive and volition ;——1. In that he grants, that motive is *neceſſary* to volition ;——2. In that he grants, that " there is *always* a *reaſon* for the mind's acting or chooſing, and that " when the mind acts, it " always has ſome end, deſign or *reaſon*, which is the " *occaſion* of its acting ; and in that he defines *motive* to " be the *occaſion*, *reaſon*, end or deſign, which an agent " has in view, when he acts." In theſe conceſſions not only does he expreſsly grant, that whenever there is a volition there is a motive ; but he implicitly grants alſo, that whenever there is a motive there is a volition. He expreſsly grants, that motive is the reaſon of the mind's acting. But the reaſon of the mind's acting is infallibly connected with its acting : Otherwiſe it is not the reaſon of its acting. If either the mind ſhould act without the ſuppoſed reaſon ; or if when the ſuppoſed reaſon exiſts, the action does not follow ; this fact in either caſe ſhows plainly, that the ſuppoſed reaſon is not the real reaſon of the action.——Again, motive is conceded to be the *occaſion* of the mind's acting. But if the motive exiſt and the action do not follow ; it is plain, that the motive is not the *occaſion* of the action.——As motive is allowed to be the *reaſon* of the action of the mind, it is as abſurd, that the motive ſhould exiſt without the action, as that the reaſon of an action ſhould exiſt without the action ; indeed it is the ſame thing. Let what will be ſuppoſed to be the reaſon of an action, if that ſuppoſed reaſon exiſt, and the action do not follow, this proves, the ſuppoſed reaſon is falſely ſuppoſed to be the reaſon ; and that either ſomething elſe is the true reaſon, or that the action came into exiſtence without reaſon.——If then motive be, as Dr. Weſt grants, the occaſion and reaſon of action, it is as abſurd and contradictory to ſay, that there is not an infallible connection between action and motive, as that there

is not ſuch a connection between a thing and its cauſe.

Dr. Weſt argues, that motives cannot be univerſally the cauſes of volition, as this would imply, that they are the cauſe of the divine volitions: But that "motives cannot be the cauſe of the divine volitions; "for this would be to aſſert, that motives were the "cauſe of the firſt cauſe." Now the ſame reaſoning will equally confute Dr. Weſt's ſcheme of motives; thus, Motives cannot be neceſſary occaſions of volitions, as this would imply, that they are the neceſſary occaſions of the divine volitions. But to aſſert this, would be to aſſert, that motives are the neceſſary occaſions of the firſt cauſe.

As volition always implies and ſuppoſes a motive; ſo does a motive as evidently imply and infer a volition. For by the very terms, that is no motive to a man, which does not perſuade, move or excite him to volition. This is the ſenſe in which Preſident Edwards uſes the word motive. It is not pretended by the moſt zealous advocate for the influence of motives, that the ſame objects and reaſons will always alike influence a man, and in like manner *move* or *be motives* to him; unleſs it be ſuppoſed, that the ſtate of the mind and every thing relating to it, be the ſame. The mind of man is from various cauſes exceedingly changeable, and by no means at all times ſuſceptible of the ſame impreſſions from the ſame intellectual views and from the ſame biaſes. The intellectual views may be the ſame, and the biaſes may be different; and the biaſes may be the ſame and the intellectual views may be different. It will not be denied, that there is an infallible connection between cauſe and effect: Yet this does not imply, that the ſame effect always follows from the ſame cauſe, unleſs by the ſame cauſe be meant, all the ſame things and circumſtances, which related to the effect, or may have had influence to produce it. And with the like explana-

tion

tion of the word motive, it is true, that the ſame motive is always attended with the ſame volition.

Since then wherever there is a volition, there is a motive, and wherever there is a motive, or, which is Dr. Weſt's explanation of motive, wherever there is the reaſon and occaſion of volition, there is volition, and alſo ſince wherever there is the ſame motive in the ſenſe juſt now explained, there is the ſame volition; what is wanting to ſupport the propoſition, that there is an infallible connection between motive and volition? A connection juſt as infallible as that between cauſe and effect?

Since our volitions are thus entirely limited, bounded and determined *according to* motives; wherein conſiſts the impropriety of ſaying, that our volitions are determined *by motives?* We mean no more by the latter expreſſion, than we do by the former.

If all our volitions be in this ſenſe determined by motives, in what ſenſe can it be pretended, that they are ſelf-determined; or that we determine and cauſe our own volitions? And what will become of the whole doctrine of ſelf-determination? It will not be pretended, that we cauſe all the objects, with which we are ſurrounded, and which preſent themſelves to us as objects of choice; nor that we cauſe all our natural biaſes, taſtes and appetites, which are the ſources of ſo many volitions.——If it ſhould be ſaid, that we determine our own motives, determine which motives we will comply with and which we will reject; ſtill as this very determination is the act of the will, a motive is neceſſary to that. Thus we ſhall go round in a circle; motive, determining, or (in the language of Dr. Weſt) *being previouſly neceſſary* to volition, and volition being neceſſary to motive.

It ſeems, that allowing what Dr. Weſt does allow, no man can hold ſelf-determination, in any other ſenſe than one of theſe two; (1) That we ourſelves determine, as we ourſelves think, perceive, hear, taſte, &c. which is no more than we all allow; and to explain

ſelf-determination thus, is to explain it away and give it up; and, as has been ſhown, it is thus given up by Dr. Weſt.——(2) That we efficiently cauſe our own volitions, but invariably according to motives, reaſons or preeſtabliſhed antecedents. This cannot be conſiſtently avowed by Dr. Weſt, both becauſe he maintains, that volition is no effect and has no cauſe, therefore we cannot be the cauſe of it; and becauſe to be the efficient cauſes of our own volitions implies, that "ſelf acts on ſelf and produces volition;" which is expreſsly renounced by him.

Dr. Weſt, to prove, that there is no infallible connection between motive and volition ſays, p. 17, 18; "Though it is true, that the mind never acts without "ſome reaſon or deſign in acting; yet there is no "need of aſſigning a reaſon for *not acting*." By *not acting*, Dr. Weſt means, as obſerved before, either *refuſing* and *voluntary neglect*, or *entire inaction*. If he mean the former, it is a real act of the mind and by his own conceſſion therefore is not "without a reaſon "and deſign." If he mean the latter, his argument is juſt as concluſive to diſprove an infallible connection between motive and volition, as the ſame argument is to diſprove the connection between cauſe and effect; Thus, though it be true, that an effect never comes to paſs without a cauſe; yet there is no need of aſſigning a cauſe for *no effect*. It is undoubtedly true, that perfect nihility requires no cauſe: But no man in his ſenſes would hence infer, that an effect requires no cauſe, or that there is not an infallible connection between cauſe and effect. In like manner "there is no "need of aſſigning a reaſon" or motive for perfect inaction, which is pure nihility. But it cannot be hence inferred, that there is no need of a motive for action, or that there is not an infallible connection between motive and action. Dr. Weſt denies an infallible connection between motive and action, and he endeavours to prove it by making it out that there is no connection between motive and *inaction*: And what

is

is this to the purpoſe? How does it hence follow, that there is not an infallible connection between motive and *action?*

Dr. Weſt puts the ſuppoſition, that at a gentleman's table he has the offer of tea, coffee or chocolate; that they can all be had with equal eaſe, and all appear equally eligible to his mind, and that he determines to take coffee. He then adds, p. 18, "I believe, that it is "impoſſible in this and a multitude of ſimilar inſtances "to aſſign any accident or circumſtance, which deter- "mines the mind to its choice among things, which ap- "pear equally fit and eligible. Conſequently here is "an undeniable proof of the liberty for which we "contend. And this inſtance will explain my idea, "that there is always a reaſon for acting or chooſing: "But that there is not always a reaſon for not acting; "and that things may appear eligible to us, and yet "not be choſen; *e. g.* I accepted the coffee, becauſe I "wanted ſome refreſhment. Coffee appeared to me "properly ſuited to anſwer my deſire. This was a ſuffi- "cient reaſon for my receiving coffee. The other two "appeared equally eligible. About them I exerted no "acts: But this being a *mere negation*, could require "no poſitive reaſon."——On this I remark,

1. If it were ever ſo true, that in chooſing between things perfectly indifferent, (if any ſuch there be) the mind acts without motive, how would this prove, that it acts without motive in any other caſe? And the inſtances of its chooſing things perfectly indifferent are ſo rare, that with reſpect to the main object of this diſpute, they ſeem hardly worth mentioning. The great object of this diſpute is, to inveſtigate that liber- ty which is neceſſary to virtue and vice, praiſe and blame. Dr. Weſt, if I underſtand him, contends, that an exemption from an infallible connection between motive and volition is eſſential to that liberty. Or if I do not underſtand him aright in this inſtance, he is at liberty to make his choice, whether or not to main- tain, that an exemption from ſuch connection be eſ-

ſential to that liberty, without which we cannot practiſe virtue or vice. If he maintain, that this exemption is eſſential to that liberty, I aſk, Do we exerciſe virtue or vice in thoſe inſtances only, in which we chooſe one of things perfectly indifferent; or does it follow from the ſuppoſition, that we act without motive in thoſe inſtances, in which we do chooſe one of things perfectly indifferent, that we alſo act without motive in other inſtances; viz. in chooſing one of things perfectly different, as virtue and vice, wiſdom and folly, our eternal happineſs and eternal miſery? If it be not true, that we exerciſe virtue or vice in thoſe inſtances only in which we chooſe one of things perfectly indifferent; nor that from the ſuppoſition, that there are things perfectly indifferent, and that we act without motive when we chooſe one of ſuch things, it follows that we act without motive in other caſes too; what is the great advantage of a power of chooſing without motive in ſuch a rare caſe? And is it worth while to diſpute about it? If we exerciſe moral agency in thoſe inſtances only, in which we chooſe one of things perfectly indifferent; our moral agency is confined to very narrow limits indeed, not extending to one of ten thouſand of our rational voluntary actions, as, I preſume, our opponents themſelves will grant. If we exerciſe moral agency in thoſe inſtances, in which we chooſe one of things entirely different, either we are perſuaded and influenced by the difference and ſo are governed by motive, and then the influence of motives is not inconſiſtent with moral agency or with liberty; or we chooſe and act without any regard to the difference of the propoſed objects: But this muſt be proved, to obtain credit. If our opponents ſuppoſe that it follow from our acting without motive, when (as they ſay) we chooſe one of things indifferent, that alſo we act without motive, when we chooſe one of things not indifferent; let them ſhow that it does follow. They have not as yet done it.

2. In

2. In the paſſage quoted above, Dr. Weſt conſiders his choice of coffee, as a real act of his mind ariſing from a reaſon or motive; but his neglect or refuſal of tea and chocolate as a mere *negation*, which requires no reaſon or motive. But I appeal to every candid reader, whether a voluntary refuſal of any object, be not as real an act of the mind, as a choice. If ſo, in truth and according to Dr. Weſt's conceſſion, it requires a reaſon and motive, as much as any other act. I do not mean, that his refuſal of tea and chocolate in the caſe put, is neceſſarily a diſtinct act from his choice of coffee: It may be no more a diſtinct act, than ſuppoſing coffee alone had been offered him, and he had accepted it rather than nothing, his acceptance of it and his refuſal of nothing had been two entirely diſtinct acts. The truth is, that his choice of coffee is one complex comparative act, implying a *preference* of coffee to tea and chocolate. I am ſenſible, that Dr. Weſt holds, "that choice, when uſed "about the determination of the mind reſpecting the "things that appear to us equally eligible, does not "include in it the idea of *preference*;" p. 16. But what elſe is meant by *preference*, than the chooſing of one thing rather than another or in the neglect of that other, when both are offered? If Dr. Weſt mean by *preference* any thing different from this, he ought in all reaſon to inform us what it is. The reaſon which the Doctor gives, to ſhow that a choice of one of two equally eligible things, is not a preference is, that "they are both conſidered as equally eligible:" P. 16: *i. e.* they are, (if I may ſo ſay) equally *chooſable* or equally worthy of choice. And if one cannot be *preferred*, becauſe they are equally worthy of choice; let it be ſhown, that it is not equally impoſſible that one of them ſhould be *choſen* when they are equally worthy of choice. If the conſideration that they are equally worthy of choice, preclude the poſſibility of *preference*, why does it not equally preclude the poſſibility of *election* or *choice?*

Dr.

Dr. Weſt ſays, that his acceptance of coffee, as it was an act, required a reaſon; but about tea and chocolate he exerted no act; and this being a mere negation, could require no poſitive reaſon. Now if coffee or nothing had been offered him, and he had accepted the coffee, he might as well have ſaid, that his acceptance of coffee, as it was an act, required a reaſon; but about nothing he exerted no act; and this being a mere negation, could require no poſitive reaſon. The truth is, every act of choice is a comparative act, whether one or more things be offered to our choice. When only one thing is offered, the compariſon is between that and nothing. When one of ſeveral things is offered, the compariſon is between thoſe ſeveral things. And if we accept the one thing, which alone is offered, we no more refuſe or decline the alternative *nothing* or the abſence of that one thing, than when we accept one of ſeveral things we refuſe the reſt.

3. If when ſeveral things, which Dr. Weſt calls equally eligible, are offered, and a man chooſe one of them, it be true, that he exerts no act about the reſt; the ſame would hold, though the things were not equally eligible and the things refuſed were manifeſtly moſt eligible: And thus it would be moſt eaſy to account for an act of preference of a moſt inferiour object, to a moſt ſuperiour one. It is but ſaying, that about the laſt "I exerted no act: And this be-"ing a mere negation would require no poſitive reaſon." Thus ſuppoſe a guinea and a ſhilling be offered to a beggar: He takes the ſhilling, but leaves the guinea. May not the beggar account for his conduct in the ſame way that Dr. Weſt accounts for his, in taking the coffee in the neglect of the tea and the chocolate? He might ſay, "I accepted the ſhilling, becauſe I "wanted a little money: The ſhilling appeared prop-"erly ſuited to anſwer my deſire. The guinea ap-"peared equally" and much more "eligible: About "that I exerted no act. But this being a mere ne-"gation,

" gation, could require no poſitive reaſon." But the queſtion would ſtill remain unanſwered, Why did not the beggar exert an act about the guinea, as well as about the ſhilling, or even in preference to it? Or, which comes to the ſame, why did he exert an act about the ſhilling in the neglect of the guinea? Juſt ſo, why did Dr. Weſt exert an act about coffee, in the neglect of tea and chocolate? Whatever be the proper anſwer to the laſt queſtion, will doubtleſs as properly anſwer the former. Nor need Dr. Weſt puzzle himſelf and his readers about things *equally eligible*. His principles are juſt as applicable to any other things, and equally prove that there is no connection at all between motive and volition, as that there is not an infallible and univerſal connection.

4. Dr. Weſt grants, that " when the mind chooſes, " it always has ſome *reaſon*, which is the occaſion of " its chooſing." Therefore when he choſe coffee in the neglect of tea or chocolate, there was ſome reaſon for it. But I appeal to the reader, whether according to the Doctor's own ſtatement of the caſe, there was any reaſon why he ſhould chooſe coffee in the neglect of tea and chocolate; and whether there was not the very ſame reaſon why he ſhould have choſen tea or chocolate in the neglect of coffee. He ſays, they all appeared equally eligible to him. Therefore there was no reaſon, according to him, why he ſhould chooſe one, to the neglect of the others.

In his ſecond part as well as in his firſt the Doctor grants, that " the mind never acts without ſome rea- " ſon for acting." P. 14, and 29. Yet he holds, that of things equally agreeable, it ſometimes chooſes one and leaves the reſt. Now what is the reaſon of its acting in this caſe? It is not enough to aſſign a reaſon why the mind ſhould take *ſome one* of ſeveral things propoſed. As all thoſe things are ſuppoſed to be equally eligible, a reaſon ought to be given why it finally takes one particular one in the neglect of the reſt. Unleſs this be done, no reaſon is given why

why it acts in this manner, in this case; and therefore for ought that appears, it acts without reason, which is contrary to the Doctor's concession. Therefore let the Doctor either retract his concession, and hold that the mind sometimes acts without any reason; or renounce the idea, that it sometimes chooses one of several things equally eligible, in the neglect of the rest.

The Doctor says, p. 28, Part II, "When two objects are equally fit, if one is taken and the other left; the mind had a purpose to answer." We should have been greatly gratified, if the Doctor had pointed out, what purpose the mind had to answer in taking that one which it did take, and in leaving the rest by supposition equally fit to answer the same purpose, for which the one is taken. Until he does point out the purpose, he must excuse us in withholding our assent and denying his proposition.——The Doctor in this repeats what he had said in his first part, that "about that which is not taken the mind exercises no act at all." To this I have already answered, that the mind does exercise an act about it; that the act of the mind is complex and comparative, having a respect to more objects than one, because more are supposed to be offered and brought into the view of the mind; that the mind does as really exercise an act about the object left, as if it were ever so inferiour or superiour to the one taken; and that the Doctor's reasoning, if it prove any thing, proves too much, viz. that if things ever so unequal be offered and the mind choose the basest and that which is in the lowest degree suited to answer its purpose, it may be still said to have a reason for the action. "But about the other, which is "not taken, the mind exercises no act at all —— no "reason can be assigned for the nonexistence of that "which is not."

However, perhaps the Doctor will avow this last observation, though he has not expressly done it as yet: For he "denies, that men are always governed "by the strongest motive." P. 6, Part II. To avoid

avoid all diſpute about words, let it be remembered, that by being *governed* by the ſtrongeſt motive, is meant no more than that the mind always *follows*, or *coincides with* the ſtrongeſt motive: And by *ſtrongeſt* motive Preſident Edwards has explained himſelf to mean, "that which has the greateſt degree of previous "tendency to excite choice;" p. 6. Or it is the moſt *perſuaſive* motive. Now will Dr. Weſt ſay, that when ſeveral motives are propoſed to a man, he ſometimes paſſes by the moſt perſuaſive, and follows the leaſt perſuaſive? If ſo, what is the reaſon and what is the motive of its action in this caſe? He allows, that there is a reaſon and a motive for every action: Let him point out the reaſon and the motive in this action.

The Doctor, p. 31, Part II, ſays, "If the mind "never acts without ſome motive or reaſon for acting, "then it follows, that the motives or reaſons for a vir- "tuous conduct, and the reaſons and arguments againſt "the practice of iniquity, ought to be ſet before us in "the *ſtrongeſt* light, to *enable* us to chooſe virtue and "to avoid vice."——1. Are we then unable to chooſe virtue and to avoid vice, unleſs the motives to the former and againſt the latter, "be ſet before us in the *ſtrongeſt* light?" It ſeems then, that unleſs thoſe motives be *thus* ſet before us, we are under no obligation to chooſe virtue and to avoid vice, becauſe we are not *able* to do it: For it is no part of Dr. Weſt's ſyſtem, that our duty extends beyond our *ability*. He denies the diſtinction between natural and moral neceſſity and inability, and holds, that where neceſſity or inability begins, liberty and moral agency end. Part II, p. 19.——2. Of what advantage can it be "to ſet the motives to virtue and againſt vice in the "*ſtrongeſt* light," if there be no connection between the *ſtrongeſt motives*, and volition? Surely none at all. It is therefore implied in the paſſage juſt quoted, as in many other paſſages in Dr. Weſt's book, that there is a connection between ſuch motives and volition, and that ſuch connection is not inconſiſtent with liber-

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ty. Yet as the Doctor "denies, that we are always "governed by the *ſtrongeſt motives*," he muſt hold, that there is no *ſure* connection between the ſtrongeſt motive and volition. Then the queſtion ariſes, What degree of connection between the ſtrongeſt motive and volition does he grant to exiſt and to be conſiſtent with liberty? If the higheſt degree of probability, reaching to the ſtep next to certainty, be allowed in the caſe, what ſhould render the only remaining ſtep ſo baleful to liberty, as to be inconſiſtent with it? Or if it be allowed, that the probability, according to the degree of it, does indeed diminiſh liberty; then it diminiſhes moral agency too; and therefore ſuch a repreſentation of the motives to virtue, as "ſets them "in the ſtrongeſt light," and makes it more or leſs probable, that they will influence to a certain conduct, has in reality no tendency to perſuade to a *virtuous* conduct; becauſe juſt ſo far as it has a tendency to lead to any particular conduct, it deſtroys moral agency and precludes the poſſibility of *virtue*. And ſuch a repreſentation is ſo far from "enabling us to chooſe vir-"tue," that ſo far as it has any effect on us, it renders it impoſſible that we ſhould chooſe it *morally*; and any other than a *moral* choice of virtue, if other there be, is no ſubject of exhortation.

The Doctor aſſerts, "that there is not an infallible "connection between motives and volition;" p. 80, Part II. And in the ſame page, "That the infalli-"ble connection between motives and volition can-"not take place, till the mind has determined to ex-"amine the ſeveral motives or reaſons for acting in "any particular manner, in order that it may adopt "the beſt. In that caſe the mind will *certainly* chooſe "*that which appears the beſt.*". Indeed! This is coming down wonderfully: This is acknowledging an infallible connection between motive and volition in all caſes, in which the mind *examines the ſeveral motives or reaſons for acting*: It is alſo acknowledging, that in every ſuch caſe the mind is governed by the *ſtrongeſt*

eſt motive, as " it *will certainly* chooſe that which *ap-*
" *pears to be the beſt.*" Of courſe there is an infalli-
ble connection between motives and volition in all caſes, except thoſe in which the mind acts abruptly and without due conſideration. And is it indeed true, that when the mind acts abruptly, it does not chooſe that which *appears* to be beſt, but that which at the time appears to be worſt, or at leaſt leſs good and eligible, than ſomething elſe, at the ſame time in view of the mind ? When men act abruptly and without due conſideration, no wonder if they be miſled by mere appearance, which is not always well founded. But do they in ſuch a caſe, act without regard to any appearance well or ill founded, and even contrary to the greateſt appearance of good ? That this is generally fact, needs to be confirmed by ſomething ſtronger, than mere aſſertion or implication.

Dr. Weſt, throughout his books in general oppoſes the infallible connection between motive and volition, as inconſiſtent with liberty and moral agency : But in the paſſage on which I am now remarking, grants ſuch a connection whenever " the mind" acts with proper deliberation, and " examines the ſeveral mo-
" tives and reaſons for acting in a particular manner." It ſeems then, that on Dr. Weſt's plan, whenever the mind acts with proper deliberation, it is under ſuch an infallible neceſſity of ſo acting, as is inconſiſtent with liberty and moral agency, and conſequently muſt be deſtitute of liberty and moral agency ; and that it poſſeſſes liberty and moral agency then only, when it acts abruptly and without proper deliberation. Will the Doctor avow this conſequence ? Or if he ſhould ſay, that although when " the mind has examined the
" motives and reaſons, it will *certainly* chooſe that
" which appears to be the beſt," and there is an infallible connection in the caſe ; yet that connection is not inconſiſtent with liberty and moral agency ; why does he diſpute againſt that connection at all ? If it do not

infringe

infringe liberty and moral agency, why is it ſo violently oppoſed ?

The Doctor, in p. 85, Part II, quotes theſe lines from Preſident Edwards ; " I ſuppoſe none will de- " ny, that it is poſſible for motives to be ſet before the " mind ſo powerful ——— as to be invincible ;" and then he remarks on them, " If he means, that *argu-* " *ments* may be placed before the underſtanding in ſo " ſtrong a light, as to become invincible, and ſuch as " the mind cannot but yield to, it is readily granted, " and is nothing to the purpoſe : For the underſtand- " ing is not the active, but the perceptive faculty of " the mind ; and liberty is placed in the will, which " is the only active faculty of the mind. But if the " meaning is, that motives may be ſo ſtrong, as *neceſ-* " *ſarily to determine the will*, this is denied to be poſ- " ſible, while the mind has the free exerciſe of *reaſon.* " But when the mind is ſo violently agitated, as to " loſe the free exerciſe of reaſon, as in the caſe of " running in a fright ——— liberty is deſtroyed.——— " Things that are not eligible in themſelves nor in " their conſequences, cannot become objects of choice; " which is to ſay, there can be no motive to chooſe " them, though we may find it difficult, and in ſome " caſes impracticable to bring our propenſities to ſub- " mit to our choice. When one is convinced, that " he has contracted a wrong habit, he finds no diffi- " culty in *chooſing* to overcome that habit ; but " he will have a vaſt deal of difficulty in his en- " deavours to overcome it, becauſe in every unguard- " ed hour, he will be liable to be led aſtray by his evil " habit. And therefore ſuch a perſon may ſay with " the Apoſtle, *To will is preſent with me, but how to* " *perform that which is good, I find not ; for the good* " *that I would, I do not ; but the evil that I would not,* " *that I do.* Here we ſee, that we may have a power " to chooſe, when we find it extremely difficult and " in ſome caſes impoſſible to do the things which we

" have

" have chosen. This shows the *absolute necessity* of " divine grace to *strengthen* us to do our duty."

On this remarkable passage, I beg leave to observe,

1. That Dr. West, according to his own principles, cannot consistently maintain, that " when the mind " loses the free exercise of *reason* its *liberty* is destroy- " ed." For *reason* belongs to " the understanding, " the perceptive faculty," and not " to the will, the " only active faculty ;" but " liberty is placed in the " will." Therefore according to him liberty is not affected by what takes place in the understanding, as the free exercise of *reason* does. On this ground it is, that he pleads, that those arguments which are invincible to the understanding, are nothing to the purpose as to the question concerning liberty, which is placed in the will. The ground of the argument manifestly is, that there is no certain connection between the understanding and the will ; and therefore that which overbears the understanding, does not at all, on that account, affect the will. Therefore that fear, which overbears reason, does not on that account affect the will or liberty. Otherwise if that fear which overbears reason and the right exercise of the understanding, do on that account affect and destroy liberty ; why do not those arguments, which are invincible to the understanding and overbear it, also affect and destroy liberty ; which is denied by Dr. West.

2. In this passage, Dr. West, however inconsistently with himself, holds, that motives necessarily determine the will. In the first place he declares, that it is impossible, that motives should be so strong as necessarily to determine the will, while reason remains. Yet in the same passage he asserts, that " when once we " are convinced, that things are for our greatest good, " we can easily choose them," and " things that are " not eligible in themselves nor in their consequences," and of course things that we do not " *perceive*" to be in either of these respects eligible, " cannot become " objects of choice." In p. 93, Part II, the Doctor

ſays, " The object, *motive* or *reaſon* for acting muſt be " prior to the action of the mind and *perceived* by it, " before it can act." " Nothing *can* become an ob- " ject, except it appears to be eligible." Ibid, p. 95. " There *muſt appear* ſome fitneſs or pleaſingneſs to the " mind, antecedent to its choice." Ibid. Nothing then can be an object of choice or be choſen, which is not and does not *appear* to be *eligible*, *fit* and *pleaſing*. Now all objects of choice are of two kinds, poſitive or negative, the poſſeſſion or abſence of the things propoſed for choice. And things which do not on the whole appear to be eligible, cannot be choſen; then the abſence of them being propoſed for choice, is of courſe choſen, and muſt be choſen, becauſe it muſt appear eligible. The poſſeſſion and the want, the preſence and the abſence, of the ſame things cannot, upon the whole, be at the ſame time eligible: This would imply a contradiction.——To refuſe an object is to chooſe the abſence or want of it. Therefore to refuſe thoſe things which appear to be eligible is impoſſible: Of courſe ſuch things muſt be choſen; there is a neceſſity of it, otherwiſe that would be choſen, which does not appear to be eligible, which Dr. Weſt declares to be impoſſible.

The ſame thing may be more briefly and perhaps more clearly expreſſed thus; Dr. Weſt grants that nothing can be choſen which does not appear to be eligible. Therefore the abſence of that which appears eligible cannot be choſen, becauſe that cannot on the whole appear eligible while the preſence and poſſeſſion of the object appears eligible: And as the abſence of the object cannot be choſen, or, which is the ſame thing, the object cannot be refuſed; of conſequence it muſt be choſen; and ſo there is an infallible connection between motive and volition, and motives neceſſarily determine the will.

If to this it ſhould be anſwered, that though thoſe things, which are not ſeen to be eligible, cannot become objects of choice, and therefore we cannot refuſe

or

or chooſe the abſence of thoſe things which we perceive to be eligible; yet we may not act at all with reſpect to them; and may neither chooſe nor refuſe them; I reply, as I have ſaid before, that is an impoſſibility; there is no medium with reſpect to any thing offered as an object of choice, between chooſing and refuſing; neither to chooſe nor refuſe in ſuch a caſe is to be blockiſhly inſenſible. Or if it be ſaid, that we only conſider and deliberate on the offer; ſtill we *chooſe* to deliberate.

3. According to this paſſage, a man can never chooſe vice or ſin. For ſurely they are neither eligible in themſelves, nor in their conſequences, and therefore according to this paſſage, "cannot become "objects of choice," *i. e.* cannot be choſen. But will Dr. Weſt abide by this? Or if to avoid this conſequence, the Dr. ſhould ſay, that his meaning is, that a thing which is not *ſeen* or *veiwed*, as eligible in either of thoſe reſpects, cannot be choſen; I anſwer, this implies, that the will in all its acts complies with the dictates of the underſtanding, and is neceſſarily determined by motive, as I have juſt now endeavoured to illuſtrate; nor, as I can conceive, is there any way to avoid this conſequence, but by recurring to what is denied to be poſſible, a ſuppoſed power of the mind, to act or not act at all, and to be perfectly torpid, in view of whatever motives. To take this for granted is a proſtrate begging of the queſtion.

5. As this paſſage holds forth, that the human mind always acts upon motive and cannot act without it, and therefore as is illuſtrated in a preceding paragraph, is always determined by motive; ſo it follows, that it is always determined by the *ſtrongeſt* motive, that which appears the moſt eligible, or has the greateſt previous tendency to induce volition. Surely there can be no motive or reaſon to act on a weaker motive in preference to a ſtronger: This can never appear eligible; and Dr. Weſt holds, that the mind never acts without ſome reaſon or motive; without the appearance of ſomething as eligible.

6. As the will is the only active faculty, and the ſeat of liberty and moral agency, ſo there is no morality in any other faculty, actions or impreſſions, than thoſe of the will; and Dr. Weſt ſuppoſes in this very paſſage, as well as elſewhere, that our propenſities and habits do not belong to will. Therefore, provided we *chooſe* things, which are for our greateſt good, it is of no conſequence, as to morality, whether or not "we find it difficult and impracticable to bring our "propenſities to ſubmit to our choice;" of no more conſequence, than whether we can bring our underſtandings to be as acute and comprehenſive, as we may chooſe. And though we have contracted a wrong habit, if we "chooſe to overcome it," it is of no more conſequence in a moral view, that we find "a vaſt "deal of difficulty in our endeavours to overcome "it;" or that we are "liable to be ſeduced and led "aſtray by it;" than that we find a vaſt deal of difficulty in our endeavours to overcome our ignorance of aſtronomy, and then that we are liable to be led aſtray by falſe guides and falſe witneſſes. For ſo long as our will and choice are right, all in which there is liberty and moral agency, is right, and ſo long we cannot poſſibly be led aſtray from our duty. And if our wrong propenſities and habits, under theſe circumſtances be not ſubdued, it will imply no fault in us, provided, as is ſuppoſed by Dr. Weſt, thoſe propenſities and habits conſiſt not in the active or moral faculty or depend not on it: For on this ſuppoſition they are not of a moral nature and imply nothing morally wrong.

7. Nor is it true, as Dr. Weſt here aſſerts, that though we eaſily chooſe that which is good, we ſtand "in *abſolute neceſſity* of divine grace, to ſtrengthen us "to our duty." So far as we chooſe that which is good, our wills are right, and our moral part is right. So far therefore we actually do our duty, and have no neceſſity of divine grace to ſtrengthen us, to do that which we have done already. Does the Doctor ſuppoſe,

poſe, that our duty calls us beyond our ſtrength? And that it obliges us to act againſt *abſolute neceſſity*.?

8. Nor if we were to be aſſiſted by divine power to perform any thing beyond the reach of our moral faculties, would there be any *grace* in ſuch aſſiſtance. It is *grace* to enable a man to perform his duty; but it is no grace, to enable him to perform that which is not his duty; *e. g.* to fly to the moon.

The Doctor ſuppoſes, that Preſident Edwards held, that there is always *a reaſon for not acting*. No doubt there is always a reaſon for the mind's refuſing an object offered. But Preſident Edwards never held, that the mind ever ſinks itſelf into perfect inaction and torpor; and of courſe he did not hold, that there is a reaſon for this.

The Doctor inſiſts, that "The mind determines *up-*"*on* motives, and is not properly determined *by* mo-"tives;" p. 87. This ſeems to be a mere diſpute about words. The Doctor might as well have ſaid, that vegetables grow *upon*, or *in conſequence* of the rain, and not *by* the rain. And would it be worth while to diſpute that matter with him?

"Strange ſo much difference there ſhould be
"'Twixt *tweedle-dum* and *tweedle-dee*."

It is conſidered by the compilers of the *Encyclopædia* lately printed at Philadelphia, as an invincible argument againſt the infallible connection between motive and volition, that if equal motives were ſet before a man to travel an eaſtern road and to travel a ſouthern road, he would, on the ſuppoſition of ſuch a connection, travel in a diagonal line, to the ſoutheaſt. But this is contrary to fact and experience. Therefore they conclude, there is no ſure connection between motive and action. They might juſt as concluſively have proved, that there is no infallible connection between evidence and the opinions of men. Thus, on the ſuppoſition that the arguments, that the world was created in the ſpring and that it was created in autumn, balance each other, the concluſion

muſt be, that it was created in neither of thoſe ſeaſons, but midway between them. If the arguments, that Dr. Weſt wrote the Eſſays on liberty and neceſſity, and that ſome other perſon wrote them, ſhould be equal; we ought to believe that neither of them wrote them; but a middle man between them.

Dr. Weſt, in his ſecond part, inſiſts more largely on the ſubject of chooſing between things equally eligible, than in his firſt part; and puts the caſe of four equal lines, one of which is to be touched; and he ſuppoſes that he determines to touch one of them, and this determination he ſuppoſes to be without motive and without extrinſic cauſe. Now in any ſuch caſe there appears to be no more difficulty in accounting for my determination to take or chooſe one in particular, than there is in accounting for my ſeeing or thinking of one in particular. Though our thoughts roam freely and apparently without control, yet Dr. Weſt will not pretend, that they happen by mere chance and without a cauſe. Juſt ſo as to our volitions; they no more happen in any caſe without a cauſe, than any other events. Nor can the mind itſelf, in which they take place, be the efficient cauſe of them, without running into an infinite ſeries of volitions, and implying volition before the firſt volition.—— Therefore let the Doctor bring as many inſtances as he pleaſes, of things apparently indifferent, ſo long as choice among them has a cauſe, and a cauſe extrinſic to the mind too; they make nothing to his purpoſe. I aſk Dr. Weſt, Is his determination to touch one of his equal lines, which he calls C, an uncauſed event? He will not pretend it. Is it efficiently cauſed by the mind itſelf, in any other ſenſe, than as the mind is the ſubject of it, or as it is the cauſe of all its own thoughts and feelings? To anſwer in the affirmative, and not to clear the anſwer of the abſurdities and impoſſibility charged upon it, is mere dogmatizing.——To all inſtances, in which creatures are ſuppoſed to chooſe one of ſeveral indifferent things,

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my anſwer is, that though we cannot point out the particular motive or accident, which is the occaſion of the choice of that particular one; ſtill this choice has a cauſe, and a cauſe extrinſic to the mind too, and it is as eaſy to account for our chooſing one of ſeveral indifferent things, as to account for our thinking of one of them in particular.

But perhaps the Doctor meant to evade this, by ſaying, that in the very act of determining to touch one of his equal lines, viz. C, he "voluntarily called it to mind." What does the Doctor mean by this? That he firſt wiſhed to think of C, and that in conſequence of this wiſh, it came to his mind? If he did mean this, it is to be preſumed, that he will not undertake to defend it. And as I can imagine no other meaning of "voluntarily calling C to mind," I muſt be excuſed from further anſwer until I am better informed. If the Doctor mean, that he wiſhed to think of one of his lines, and then C came to his mind; the queſtion returns, What made *C* come to his mind?

But the Doctor argues, that the *Creator* has a ſelf-determining power, and that he does or may exert that power in creating two or more perfectly ſimilar bodies and in placing them in different ſituations, or in cauſing one of them to move, while the other is at reſt, &c. As to all ſuch caſes I obſerve,

1. That every determination of God is as eternal, as unchangeable and neceſſary, as his exiſtence is, and therefore none of his acts are any more ſelf-determined, than his exiſtence. To ſuppoſe otherwiſe is to ſuppoſe that the Deity is mutable. If therefore he have determined to create ever ſo many bodies perfectly alike, and to diſpoſe of them in different circumſtances, this is no proof of ſelf-determination in the Deity, if by that term be meant any thing oppoſite to the moſt abſolute and irreverſible moral neceſſity: I ſay *moral* neceſſity, becauſe all neceſſity of moral acts, is moral neceſſity.

2. If God have created two bodies perfectly alike, and placed them in different ſituations; it will not follow, that he has done it without wiſe deſign and motive.

3. But why did he not place them in a reverſe of ſituations, that which is on the right hand, on the left, and that which is on the left hand, on the right? And ſo with reſpect to reſt and motion.——The anſwer has been long ſince given by Preſident Edwards; Theſe bodies, though ſaid to be numerically different, are no more different than the ſame ſound repeated at different times. Theſe ſounds are as numerically different as the bodies, and with the ſame reaſon it may be aſked, why was not the firſt ſound made laſt and the laſt firſt? Or why were not theſe numerically different ſounds interchanged? The abſurdity of putting this queſtion muſt appear to every one, becauſe it implies, contrary to the very ſuppoſition, that the ſounds are different in ſome other reſpect than time. So the queſtion, why the two perfectly alike bodies were not interchanged in their ſituation, implies, contrary to the ſuppoſition, that thoſe bodies differ in ſome other reſpect beſide their ſituation.

The Doctor ſuggeſts ſeveral conſiderations to ſhow, that theſe bodies do differ in ſome other reſpect beſide their ſituation; as that one of them may be in motion, the other at reſt. And what is motion but a change of ſituation? So the ſame ſound may move from one place to another; yet no body would conclude from that merely, that it was a different ſound from a perfectly ſimilar ſound, *i. e.* different from a repetition of the ſame ſound in a different place or at a different time.——Alſo the Doctor inſiſts, that thoſe ſimilar bodies are *numerically* different; that is, they differ in number, ſo that you may number them, and if you pleaſe, may call that on the right hand No. 1 or A, and that on the left hand No. 2 or B. And in the ſame manner you may number the ſounds; and you may as well aſk why ſound No. 2, was not made

made first, as why No. 2 of the bodies was not placed on the left hand. If two bodies be different numerically only, they differ in no other respect, than in situation; for if they did not differ in situation, they would become one body.

The Doctor proceeds, p. 15, "That they [the "bodies] are numerically different from each other, "appears from this consideration, that if the globe A, "on the right hand, should he removed to a far dis-"tant place, the Deity could create another just like "it, and put it in the same place from which A was "removed." So if sound A should be removed from the place in which it was first made to a far distant place, the Deity could cause another sound just like it, in the same place, from which A had been removed.——P. 16. "It is evident, that these two "globes are as really two, as though they were ever "so dissimilar." This is no more evident, than that the two sounds are as really two, as though they had been ever so dissimilar.——Ibid. "And they were "made to answer different purposes; and yet being "perfectly similar, A could have answered the pur-"poses of B and B of A." So the sound A may have been made to relieve Saul troubled by an evil spirit; and the sound B may have been made to answer the purpose of the temple worship. Yet being perfectly similar and indeed no more than the repetition of the same sound, A could have answered the purpose of B, and B of A.

Dr. West says, that President Edwards, in supposing that two globes perfectly alike, are the same in every respect except their situation, has confounded similarity with identity; p. 16, Part II. President Edwards does indeed suppose, that two globes perfectly alike in all respects except their situation, are the same in all respects except their situation; and if they could be alike in their situation too, as they then would be in the same place, no doubt Dr. West will grant, that in that case they would become one and the same

globe:

globe: If not let him point out in what reſpect they would not be the ſame.

The Doctor dwells long on the caſe of the two globes, and yet every thing that he ſays to make out, that they are two in any reſpect beſide place, may be ſaid to make out, that perfectly ſimilar ſounds given in different times or places, are not the ſame ſound repeated. What he ſays, p. 16, may be applied to the caſe of the ſounds thus; "What ſuperiour fitneſs has" the ſound A, to the ſound B, "that makes it neceſſa-"ry, that it ſhould be" given firſt and be continued in one place? "Or what ſuperiour fitneſs has" the ſound B to the ſound A, "that makes it neceſſary, "that it ſhould be" given in the ſecond place in point of time, and ſhould be moved to another place in point of ſituation? "It is certain no reaſon can be "aſſigned: For they being perfectly ſimilar, one "cannot in the nature of things be more fit than the "other. So then, here are two very different effects "of the divine power, without any poſſible reaſon" why ſound A ſhould not be given in the ſecond place and be moved, and ſound B, in the firſt place and not be moved.

The Doctor conceives, p. 17, that the ideas advanced imply, "that one and the ſame body may be "in two different places at the ſame time." No doubt they do imply, that a body which is in all reſpects one and the ſame with another body, except ſituation, may be in a different place from that other body at the ſame time; and may be the ſubject of effects different and contrary to thoſe, of which that other body may at the ſame time be the ſubject.

All that the Doctor ſays on this ſubject, implies, that a body different from another numerically only, differs from it in ſome other reſpect beſide ſituation. But he will doubtleſs perceive, that this is an error, if he reflect, that provided the diverſity of ſituation were removed and they were at the ſame time in the ſame place, they would no longer be numerically different.

ent.——Yet Dr. Weſt ſays, p. 17, "If they differed "only in place, then put A in the place of B, and it "would become B; and B, by changing with A, "would become A; which is not the caſe: For "ſhould we ſee A and B change places, ſtill we ſhould "call each by the ſame name we did before." If you put A in the place of B, it would become B, in the ſame and no other ſenſe, than if you make the ſound A, in the place and time of the ſound B, it will become B. If we ſhould ſee thoſe two bodies change their places with each other, ſtill they would be all the while in different places, as much ſo as two ſounds would be, if we ſhould hear the ſound, which is now in this apartment, gradually move to another place, and the perfectly ſimilar ſound, which is now made in the adjoining apartment, gradually move into this apartment. Thoſe ſounds being all the while thus different in place, do not become in all reſpects one ſound; the difference of place ſtill remains: And is all the difference of the bodies ſuppoſed to be ſeen to interchange places.——And if the globes ſhould be annihilated and then be created anew, and that which is now on the right hand ſhould be created on the left, and *vice verſa*; this would be as abſurd a ſuppoſition, as to ſuppoſe, that if the two perfectly ſimilar ſounds now exiſting in this apartment and in the adjoining apartment, ſhould ceaſe; that which is now in the adjoining apartment could be renewed in this apartment, and that which now exiſts in this apartment could be renewed in the adjoining, in the ſtead of the one which is now there. Every one muſt ſee, that this implies, that the ſounds are different from each other, in ſome other reſpect, than their place; which is contrary to the ſuppoſition.

The Doctor proceeds, ibid, "If one of the globes "ſhould be daſhed in pieces, it would not in the leaſt "affect the other, but it would be as whole as it was "before." So if one of the perfectly ſimilar ſounds made in different places, though at firſt entirely melodious,

lodious, ſhould become harſh and grate on the ear, it would not in the leaſt affect the other. Yet Dr. Weſt grants, that theſe before the alteration of one, are only the repetition of the ſame ſound.

The Doctor continues, " If the two globes were " one and the ſame in every reſpect, except their oc- " cupying two places at the ſame time, then whatever " accident ſhould take place with reſpect to one, " would equally take place with reſpect to the other: " That is, if A be daſhed in pieces, B muſt ſhare the " ſame fate; which we ſee is not the caſe." This is ſaid without proof or reaſon given for its ſupport, and therefore a bare denial is a ſufficient anſwer. If two ſounds in every other reſpect one and the ſame, ſhould be made in two places, whatever accident ſhould take place with reſpect to one, might not in the leaſt affect the other.

The ſum of my anſwer concerning the two globes, is, That they are no more two, than two perfectly ſimilar ſounds made in different places or times; that the ſuppoſition of their being interchanged, is as abſurd as the ſuppoſition, that the two ſounds ſhould be interchanged; that it implies, contrary to what is ſuppoſed, that they are different from each other, in ſome other reſpect beſide ſituation; and finally, that it is no more in the power of the Deity to interchange them, than to interchange the two ſounds.——If Dr. Weſt ſhould reply to this, as he often has done in other caſes, that " this is paſt his power to conceive:" Be it ſo; what follows? That therefore it cannot be true? And is Dr. Weſt's ſkill to conceive the ſtandard of truth?

" To ſay, that no two things can have equal de- " grees of eligibility and fitneſs in the divine mind, is " to confound the reaſon of acting, with action itſelf; " and to make the Deity a mere paſſive being, or a " mechanical medium of fate." Part II, p. 19.—— The Doctor has not told how this confounds the reaſon of acting with action, and he muſt not expect,

that

that all his readers will receive it upon his mere aſſertion. It is to be preſumed, that many of them will ſtill believe, that the divine mind always acts according to the dictates of wiſdom, and on account of ſuperiour fitneſs chooſes whatever it does chooſe, and that this is not to confound the reaſon of acting with action, but to preſerve them diſtinct.——If for the Deity to act always voluntarily according to the dictates of perfect wiſdom, be what the Doctor means by his being "a mere paſſive being," we grant it; but we appeal to the reader, whether the Doctor be not in this caſe guilty of a perverſion of language; or at leaſt whether he be not guilty of begging the queſtion, in ſuppoſing, that there is no action but that which is ſelf-determinate; as that is manifeſtly ſuppoſed in the propoſition now under conſideration.—— As to "the mechanical medium of fate," the reader will ſay, whether it be not *mere rant*, unworthy of a grave philoſopher and divine.

Dr. Weſt frequently ſays, and every where takes it for granted, that in the divine mind there may be innumerable things, which differ in many reſpects, which yet may have equal degrees of eligibility and fitneſs to anſwer God's particular purpoſes; and among theſe innumerable things the Deity can chooſe one and not another, and, with reſpect to any of them can act or not act.——That things thus different may be equally fit to anſwer the purpoſes of God is not granted and ought not to have been aſſerted without proof or inſtance. It appears to be a mere conjecture; and if mere conjectures be admitted as truth, truth is the moſt uncertain thing in the world. Beſides, it is very improbable, that things differing in ſeveral reſpects, ſhould be equally adapted to the ſame purpoſe. As to the idea that God can in any caſe act or *not act*, this appears to be an impoſſibility, for the reaſons already mentioned.

"If a man is led *by any means* or *motives* or *reaſons*, "to chooſe that which he formerly abhorred," ſays the Doctor,

Doctor, " and to abhor that which he formerly loved, " *he is ſtill as free as ever he was*; for nothing being " an object of choice, but what appears eligible, it is " impoſſible that the mind ſhould chooſe that which " is neither eligible in itſelf, nor in its conſequences; *i. e.* " nothing is an object of choice but eligible things. " When then things appear to us eligible, which former- " ly we abhorred, and we abhor things, that formerly " were eligible, we have only changed the objects of " our choice, but not our freedom: We are as free " now, as we were before." Part II, p. 30. The truth ſo naturally obtrudes itſelf on every man, that it is difficult for him conſiſtently to contradict it.* The Doctor here grants, that when a man chooſes an object, by " whatever means, motives or reaſons he is " led to the choice," " he is ſtill free." Therefore to be led by motives in any caſe is not inconſiſtent with freedom; therefore to be led by them *always*, in an *eſtabliſhed* and *infallible connection* between motives and choice, is not inconſiſtent with freedom. Why then does he diſpute Preſident Edwards for holding ſuch a connection?——Beſides, Dr. Weſt here grants, that if a man be led *by any means* to chooſe an object, ſtill he is *free*. Then he is free, when he is led to chooſe an object, by *an extrinſic cauſe*. Nay, he is free, when he is led by *a divine influence*, to chooſe an object. It is further to be obſerved, that in this paſſage, Dr. Weſt declares, that it is *impoſſible*, that the mind ſhould chooſe any thing, which does *not appear to it eligible*. What then becomes of ſelf-determination? Has the mind a power to make things appear agreeable or diſagreeable at pleaſure; to control all its own views, and to create its own happineſs in any circumſtances whatever? This indeed is the thorough ſcheme of ſelf-determination advocated by Archbiſhop King, but which has been ſince given up, though inconſiſtently, by Dr. Clarke, and ſo far as I know, by all other believers in ſelf-determination; and to

* *Naturam expelles furca, tamen uſque recurret*, Hor. Ep. I, 10.

to be ſure cannot be conſiſtently adopted by Dr. Weſt for many reaſons; particularly this, that Dr. Weſt holds that the will always follows motive; but this ſcheme is, that the will always goes before motive.

"Mr. Edwards and his followers," ſays Dr. Weſt, "ſuppoſe, that there muſt be a particular reaſon why "every determination of mind ——— is in this partic-"ular manner, rather than any other ——— which "will imply, that there can be no two objects in the "mind ——— equally eligible.——The contrary we "know to be true by OUR own experience." Part II, p. 14. How does Dr. Weſt know what OUR own experience is? He may indeed claim a right to know HIS own experience; but I defy him to tell what my experience, or the experience of any other man, is, unleſs he have had information. Who then gave him a right to ſpeak in the *plural* number in this caſe? And whom does he mean, when he ſpeaks of OUR experience? If he mean mankind in general, I call on him for proof, and wiſh he had been a little more reſerved in this inſtance. Strong aſſertions are equally open to all; and if they be good arguments, it is eaſy to prove, that the experience of mankind is directly the reverſe of what Dr. Weſt aſſerts it to be.

As to the queſtion, whether any two objects are, at the inſtant of the choice of one of them, equally eligible in the view of the mind; I anſwer it in the negative; and in my own experience never found them to appear any more equally eligible, than any two objects, to be equally the objects of my ſight or of the attention of my mind. And as to the various inſtances of ſeveral eggs, guineas and ſpots on a cheſs board, one of which is propoſed to be taken or touched; there is no more difficulty, as I have ſaid already, in aſſigning a reaſon, why one of them rather than any other, is taken or touched, than why one rather than any other, is more particularly ſeen or attended to, by the eye or the mind. The circumſtance, that one of them is more directly and particularly ſeen or attended

attended to, is a ſufficient reaſon, why that rather than any of the reſt ſhould be taken or touched: And when this circumſtance takes place with regard to any one of ſeveral guineas for inſtance, they are not all, or do not appear, equally eligible. That which is the immediate object of ſight or attention is, for that reaſon, moſt eligible: And how that came to be more particularly the object of ſight or attention, I am under no more obligation to account, than Dr. Weſt or any other man.

It is a ſentiment entertained by ſome, that we efficiently cauſe our own volitions, but invariably according to motives, reaſons or preeſtabliſhed antecedents. Dr. Clarke expreſſes this in various parts of his metaphyſical works; as in the following, "The "true, proper, immediate, phyſical cauſe of action, is "the power of ſelf-motion in men, which exerts itſelf "*freely* in conſequence of the laſt judgment of the underſtanding. But the laſt judgment of the underſtanding is not itſelf a phyſical efficient, but merely a *moral* "*motive upon which* the phyſical efficient, or motive power begins to act." *Being and Attributes*, p. 93. "The "experience of a man's ever doing what he judges reaſonable to do, is not at all an experience of his being "under any *neceſſity* ſo to do. For *concomitancy* in "this caſe is no evidence at all of phyſical connection. Upon ſuppoſition of *perfect liberty*, a reaſonable being would *ſtill conſtantly* do what *appeared* "*reaſonable* it ſhould do: And its *conſtantly* doing ſo, "is no proof at all of its wanting liberty or a phyſical "power of doing otherwiſe." *Remarks on Collins*, p. 25.——Dr. Price entirely agrees in this ſentiment with Dr. Clarke. "A ſelf-determining power, which "is *under no influence of motives* ——— has never "been contended for or meant by any advocates for "liberty.——Every being who acts at all, muſt act "for ſome *end* and with ſome *view*." *Correſpondence with Prieſtly*, p. 156. "The *influence of motives* is "perfectly

"perfectly consistent with liberty and indeed supposes "it." *Reid on the Active Powers*, p. 275.

On these passages I remark,

1. Dr. Clarke, as well as the other advocates for self-determination, abundantly contradicts these sentiments. Thus in his second letter to the gentleman at *Cambridge*, speaking of the final perception of the understanding and first operation of the active faculty, he says, "I think there is no connection at all be-"tween them; and that in their not being connected "lies the difference between action and passion, which "difference is essential to liberty."——But if a man "on the supposition of perfect liberty," "constantly "do what appears reasonable;" then a man may in a consistence with perfect liberty constantly act agreeably to the final perception of his understanding; *i. e.* the final perception of the understanding and action, or "the operation of the active faculty," may be constantly connected consistently with liberty. And is constant connection, no connection at all? And if in their not being connected lies the essence of liberty, the essence of liberty cannot be consistent with their constant connection.

2. That Dr. Clarke places liberty in a *physical power* to do an action. His words are, "A being's "constantly doing what appears reasonable it should "do, is no proof of its wanting liberty or a physical "power of doing otherwise." He evidently uses *liberty* and *physical power*, as synonymous expressions. Many other passages might be quoted from Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and other principal authors of that class, in which they expressly assert or evidently suppose, that whoever has a *physical* power to do an action, is free; and that the reason why motives are not inconsistent with liberty, is, that they infer not a physical necessity or inability. But this is no more than we all grant. Peter had the same physical or natural power to confess his Lord, which he had to deny him; and Judas, the same physical power to be faithful to him, as to

betray him. Nor do the moſt abſolute decrees and predictions deſtroy this phyſical power. So that abſolute decrees and predictions are, on this plan, perfectly conſiſtent with liberty.

3. Theſe paſſages imply, that though the mind is the efficient cauſe of its own volitions; yet this efficiency is limited to exert itſelf or to be exerted, according to motives and the dictates of the underſtanding. But this, on the plan of thoſe who deny that volition can be free and yet be the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, is no more liberty than the ſlave exerciſes, who moves and acts at the control of his maſter; or than the man has, who walks in a priſon and whoſe liberty is bounded and determined by the walls and gates of the priſon, and by the conſent of the gaoler. We might as well ſay, that a ſlave is in poſſeſſion of his liberty and is not controlled by the will of his maſter, but controls himſelf according to the will of his maſter; as that we are free with the liberty of ſelf-determination and contingence, and yet be always limited to determine ourſelves according to the influence of motives. If there be a real connection between motive and volition, that connection is as inconſiſtent with liberty as if motives were the efficient cauſes of volition; provided liberty mean contingence or previous uncertainty of action: And if liberty mean ſelf-cauſation of volition, and this ſelf-cauſation be under the control of motives or any extrinſic cauſe, ſtill where is liberty in the ſenſe contended for by our opponents? Volition in this caſe is equally limited and controlled, as if it were efficiently produced by motive.

Such ſelf-determination as this, is not at all inconſiſtent with efficacious grace, abſolute decrees, and the moſt firm preeſtabliſhment of all events and volitions. If ſelf-determination exert itſelf according to motives only, let God in his providence bring the proper motives into view, and we are efficaciouſly determined, or if you pleaſe, it is efficaciouſly brought

to paſs, that we ſhall determine ourſelves in a particular limited manner; and let God decree abſolutely that thoſe motives ſhall come into view, and he abſolutely decrees and foreordains what our conduct ſhall be. So that this kind of ſelf-determination does not at all anſwer the purpoſe of avoiding the dreadful doctrine of abſolute decrees, the fatality implied in that doctrine, or other doctrines connected with it.

4. If a man cauſe his own volitions according to motives only, and this be a univerſal rule; doubtleſs this rule was eſtabliſhed by ſome cauſe. This rule is an eſtabliſhment; this eſtabliſhment is an effect, and requires a cauſe as much as any other effect. Who or what is that cauſe? It is doubtleſs either the Firſt Cauſe, or ſome ſubordinate cauſe appointed by him. In either caſe the original cauſe of this eſtabliſhment, by which intelligent creatures cauſe their own volitions according to motives, is God. Alſo he in the courſe of his providence brings all thoſe motives into our view, on which we act. And doubtleſs both this eſtabliſhment and the coming of the motives into our view were cauſed by him, in conſequence of a previous determination to cauſe them. Therefore this ſcheme of ſelf-determination not only is conſiſtent with abſolute decrees and the efficacious providence of God; but it neceſſarily implies both theſe. It neceſſarily implies, that God has decreed all our volitions and is either mediately or immediately the cauſe of them all. Therefore it is inconſiſtent, that thoſe who eſpouſe this ſcheme of liberty and ſelf-determination according to motives, ſhould oppoſe the doctrines of God's abſolute decrees and efficacious grace.

5. Beſide this, the common abſurdity of ſelf-determination equally attends this ſcheme of determining ourſelves according to motives; I mean the abſurdity of an infinite ſeries of volitions cauſing one another. If all free volitions be cauſed by the ſubject, that volition in which a man complies with a motive, muſt have been cauſed by himſelf and by a preceding vo-

lition; and this laſt volition, for the ſame reaſon, muſt have been cauſed by one preceding that, and ſo on infinitely.

6. Nor is this all. The doctrine now under conſideration is, that every volition is according to a motive, and is under the perſuaſive influence of it. Therefore every one of that infinite ſeries of volitions muſt have been put forth in the view of ſome motive. So that here we have not only an infinite ſeries of volitions producing one another; but an infinite ſeries of motives, according to which they do produce one another.

Dr. Reid holds, that "there are innumerable ac-"tions done by a cool and calm determination of the "mind, with fore-thought and will, but *without motive.*" *Active Powers*, p. 275. This is directly contrary to Dr. Weſt. He holds, as before quoted, "That the "infallible connection between motives and volition "cannot take place, till the mind has determined to "examine the ſeveral motives or reaſons for act-"ing——In that caſe the mind will certainly chooſe "that which appears the beſt;" Part II, p. 80; *i. e.* will certainly act *with* motive.——It is equally contrary to Dr. Reid himſelf. In the next page he grants, "that an action done without any motive can neither "have merit nor demerit;" and ſays, that this is a ſelf-evident propoſition, and that he knows of no author that ever denied it. Now an action in which there is neither merit nor demerit, is not a moral action. But is not every action done by a cool and calm determination of the mind, with fore-thought and will, a moral action? If it be, ſince according to Dr. Reid, ſuch an action may be done without a motive, it follows, that, directly contrary to what Dr. Reid himſelf aſſerts, an action done without a motive, can have merit or demerit: Or a moral action may have no merit or demerit in it. Or if an action done by a cool and calm determination of mind, be not a moral action, then in this controverſy we have no more to do with it, than we have with the beating of the pulſe

or

or winking of the eyes: For this controverſy reſpects moral actions only.——Again, in the page laſt referred to, Dr. Reid tells us, "If a man could not act without motive, he would have no power at all." But if we have a power to act without motive, this power, according to Dr. Reid, does not enable us to do thoſe actions, which have either merit or demerit; *i. e.* moral actions. Therefore for the purpoſes of morality, of virtue and vice, reward and puniſhment, ſuch a power would do us no good. So that according to Dr. Reid, we have no power to perform any moral action. For according to him, power to act with motive only, is no power at all. Therefore whatever power we have, is a power to act without motive. But a power to act without motive, is a power to perform thoſe actions only, which have neither merit nor demerit; *i. e.* which are no moral actions.——Yet in p. 277, he ſays, "The actions, which are done without a motive, are of moment in the queſtion concerning *moral liberty*." By *moral* liberty I conclude, he means that liberty, in the exerciſe of which we act morally, or with merit or demerit. Therefore queſtions concerning this liberty are queſtions concerning *moral* actions. But how can thoſe actions, which have no morality in them, be of moment in queſtions concerning *moral* actions? Can the periſtaltic motion or the action of the ſolids on the fluids in the human conſtitution, be of moment in a queſtion concerning malice or envy?

In the page laſt quoted, Dr. Reid ſays, "If we have a power of acting without motive, that power joined to a weaker motive, may counterbalance a ſtronger." What if it may? The action or actions, which ſhould be the reſult in ſuch a caſe, would not be of a moral nature. For if an action done entirely without motive be not of a moral nature, as Dr. Reid grants, that which is done againſt the ſtronger motive, being on the whole done without motive, muſt alſo be not of a moral nature. As the weaker motive is

withſtood and balanced by a part of the ſtrength of the ſtronger, ſo far as a man acts againſt the exceſs of the ſtrength of the ſtronger, he muſt act without motive. Therefore if a man be influenced by a regard to his duty, as with the force of 1, to preſerve his temperance; and be influenced by his appetite, as with the force of 2, to intemperance, and then by a ſelf-determining power determine himſelf to temperance againſt the ſtronger motive; there is according to Dr. Reid's own conceſſion, no virtue and no morality in the determination. Who then would wiſh for ſuch a power as this? And why did Dr. Reid think it worth his while, to diſpute for it? Surely in diſputing for it, he ſpent his time and ſtrength in a very uſeleſs manner.

Though Dr. Reid holds, as juſt quoted, that "if a "man could not act without motive, he would have "no power at all;" yet he holds, as has been quoted alſo, that "the influence of motives is perfectly con-"ſiſtent with liberty and indeed ſuppoſes it." And he defines liberty, p. 251, to be "a power over the "determinations of the will." Therefore as "the in-"fluence of motives is perfectly conſiſtent with *liber-"ty* and ſuppoſes it;" and as "a power over the de-"terminations of the will" is liberty; the influence of motives is perfectly conſiſtent with "a power over the "determinations of the will:" And if a man could not act without motive, but always acted under the influence of it, he in the firſt place, "would have no power at all;" in the ſecond place, he would have ſome power; viz. "a power over the determinations "of his own will," which according to him, is *liberty*, and not only is conſiſtent, with the influence of motive, but is ſuppoſed in it.——But the defenders of the ſelf-determining power are fated to inconſiſtency, and ſelf-contradiction, and not one of them more ſo than this Dr. Reid.

He alſo holds, that in order to have any power at all, we muſt have a power to act without motive, and therefore

therefore without the influence of motive. But the influence of motive is, according to his own conceſſion, ſuppoſed in liberty. Therefore to have any power at all, we muſt have a power to act without that which is ſuppoſed in liberty and therefore without liberty itſelf: And if we have that which is ſuppoſed in liberty, and of courſe have liberty itſelf, we have no power at all; *i. e.* if we have a power over the determinations of our own will, which is liberty; we have no power at all and have no liberty; or if we have power and liberty, we have no power nor liberty.—— But it is endleſs to trace the abſurdities of the ſelf-determining power and of the moſt acute writer that ever undertook the defence of it. It is indeed a burdenſome ſtone, which like that of *Siſyphus*, will forever roll down on the heads of thoſe who give it a place in their building.

If we have a power to act without motive, we have a power to act without end or deſign; and ſuch an action is as totally without morality, as the blowing of the wind, or the motion of a cannon-ball: And a power to perform ſuch an action, is not a power to perform any moral action, nor can ſuch a power be called *moral* liberty; but it is a power to diveſt ourſelves, in that action at leaſt, of all moral agency.

To chooſe any thing without motive, is really a contradiction; it is to chooſe it and not chooſe it, at the ſame time. Whatever is choſen, is choſen as being agreeable in ſome reſpect or other; and whatever is agreeable, is agreeable either in itſelf immediately, or on account of its connection with ſomething elſe and its ſubſerviency to it, which ſomething is immediately agreeable in itſelf. Now whatever is agreeable on account of its connection with ſomething elſe, is choſen on account of that ſomething elſe, as the motive. Whatever is in itſelf agreeable to a man, is choſen from the motive of his appetite, taſte or bias, which is included in Preſident Edwards's ſenſe of motive. And whatever is not agreeable to a man on one or

other of theſe accounts, is not agreeable at all, and therefore is not choſen.

To chooſe an object without motive, is to chooſe it without any end or deſign, either of immediate or remote gratification of any principle in him, who makes the choice: And whether this be poſſible or conceivable, I wiſh every candid perſon to judge.

An act of choice without a motive, in the large ſenſe of motive as defined by Preſident Edwards, is an event without a cauſe: For every cauſe of volition is included in Preſident Edwards's definition of motive. "By motive," ſays he, "I mean the whole "of that which *moves*, excites or invites the mind to "volition, whether it be one thing ſingly, or many "things conjunctly;" p. 5. Accordingly in his further explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable objects and views, all *reaſons* and arguments, and all internal biaſes and tempers, which have a tendency to volition; *i. e.* every *cauſe* or occaſion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence or any other extrinſic influence, be the cauſe of volition, it may be called a *motive* in the ſame ſenſe that a bias is. Now, if an act of choice be without motive in this ſenſe, it is abſolutely without a cauſe. The evaſion of Doctor Clarke and others, that the mind itſelf is the cauſe of its own volitions, has been already conſidered; beſide other abſurdities, it has been found to lead to an infinite ſeries of volitions cauſing one another; which is as great an abſurdity, as an infinite ſeries of men begetting one another.——Or if it were allowed, that a man does efficiently cauſe his own volitions without motive; ſtill he muſt cauſe them without deſign or end, and therefore muſt cauſe them in the dark and by mere chance.

Archbiſhop King in Law's edition, p. 394, ſays, "The will cannot be determined to good by objects." Then all the good and evil in the univerſe cannot determine one act of the will. In p. 354, he ſays, "The more free any one is and the leſs liable to ex-

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"ternal motions, the more perfect he is." Therefore the less liable a man is to be influenced by the divine law and its precepts, by the beauty of virtue, by right and wrong, by the divine glory, or by the rewards and punishments of virtue and vice here or hereafter; the more perfect he is!!!

If motives have not influence on men they are not capable of moral government. The whole of moral government depends on influencing the subject by the motives of laws, precepts, penalties, rewards and punishments, &c.

However, the Archbishop is perhaps the most consistent advocate for self-determination, that has ever written. Clarke, Johnson, Price and Reid grant too much. They grant, though they do not hold to it throughout, that the will always acts according to motives, and allow the influence of motives; yet they hold, that the will determines itself and causes its own acts; which is just like the idea of some concerning the power of the civil magistrate, a power to govern the people, who have the entire government of the magistrate. But Archbishop King strikes a bold stroke. He holds, that there is "a faculty" in human nature "naturally inclined to exercise, and that one exercise "is more agreeable than another, not from any nat-"ural fitness in one rather than another; but from the "application of the faculty itself: For another would "often be no less agreeable, if it had *happened* to be "determined to that." Ibid, p. 269. "It is the very "nature of an *active* power, to make an object agree-"able to itself, *i. e.* good, by its own proper act. "For here the goodness of the object does not pre-"cede the act of election, so as to excite it, but elec-"tion makes the goodness in the object; that is, the "thing is agreeable because chosen, and not chosen "because agreeable. We cannot therefore justly in-"quire after any other cause of election, than the "power itself." Ibid, p. 279, 280. It seems then, that it is the nature of a self-determining power to

exercise

exercise itself, not in any particular manner, but in any manner and every possible manner. It presses like water in a cistern on every side alike, endeavouring to flow out in exercise. And whenever it does in fact flow out in any particular exercise, there was no cause or reason for this exercise, more than for any other possible exercise: The only cause or reason is the natural inclination of this power to flow out in any and all possible exercises. This is just as good accounting for any particular exercise of this power as it would be, to account for the Archbishop's writing his book, by saying, that he had a general power and inclination to write something or other.

In this scheme of Dr. King, we see the genuine idea of *liberty of indifference*: It is an equal inclination, previously to election, to all possible elections and volitions, and a perfect indifference to all conceivable objects; so that no particular object or situation is more suited to give pleasure or misery to a man, than another; and pleasure and pain are the consequence and depend entirely on a man's own choice and will; so that it is entirely in a man's power and depends entirely on his own will, to render Nebuchadnezzar's furnace more pleasant, than a bed of down perfumed with roses.

It is further observable, that according to this account of the self-determining power, whenever it does exercise itself, it does it by *mere chance*, or as Dr. King himself expresses it, it *happens* to be determined to that exercise. Thus we have the famous liberty of contingence or perfect uncertainty, a liberty of blind fate or chance!

Our opponents hold, that the governing influence of motive is inconsistent with liberty and moral agency; then if a man be influenced by any motive to a compliance with the gospel and its precepts, or by any temptation to the commission of any action commonly reputed ever so criminal; in reality there is no virtue in the former nor vice in the latter: Because

cauſe the influence of the motive deſtroys liberty and moral agency, the man is wrought upon by an extrinſic cauſe and therefore is a mere patient and not an agent. Therefore no man needs to be at all afraid of any temptation, nor according to this ſcheme ought *the Lord's Prayer* to remain any longer without correction: The light of this improved age requires a new edition of it *corrected* and *improved.*

If it be objected, that motives do indeed have an influence to perſuade men, but not a *certain infallible* influence; I anſwer, juſt ſo far as they have influence, their influence *is* certain and infallible, becauſe it is an influence that really exiſts. That which does exiſt, *certainly* exiſts, and it is an infallible truth, that it does exiſt.

Or if it be pleaded, that the mind is ſtill free, becauſe motives are not the efficient cauſes of volition; I anſwer, that the ſame plea would prove, that a Weſt-India ſlave is free, becauſe his actions are not efficiently cauſed by his maſter or driver, and they only exhibit ſuch motives as influence the ſlave himſelf to perform thoſe actions: And the ſame plea will prove, that moral neceſſity is perfectly conſiſtent with liberty. For moral neceſſity is a mere previous certainty of a moral action; and this is no more the efficient cauſe of the action, than the perſuaſive motive, which is the occaſion of an action.

I am entirely willing, that the advocates for the ſelf-determining power ſhould take their choice of either Dr. Clarke's ſcheme of *conſtant concomitancy* of motives and volitions; or Archbiſhop King's ſcheme, that motives have no influence, and that previouſly to election all things are perfectly indifferent to the man who makes the election. If they chooſe to adopt the ſcheme of *conſtant concomitancy*, they at once allow an infallible connection between motives and volition; they muſt give up the power to act or not act, the liberty to either ſide, and their favourite argument from chooſing one of ſeveral indifferent things;

they

they muſt renounce the independence and ſovereignty of the will, and allow that it is as really bounded, limited and controlled by motives, as the ſlave is by his driver, or as the will is by moral neceſſity; and there is nothing of their boaſted liberty left worth contending for, nothing but the pitiful power of manufacturing volitions according to the mandates of motives; juſt as a Weſt-India negro manufactures ſugar under the laſh of his driver.

Or if they chooſe Archbiſhop King's ſcheme; abſurdities no leſs glaring will follow. If all things before election be indifferent, then every election is made without motive, reaſon, end, deſign or any conſideration right or wrong; every act of choice is an act of as perfect ſtupidity, as the motion of a canon ball or the falling of a ſtone; every man by choice or rejection makes any object either agreeable or diſagreeable, good or bad, to himſelf; every man, in every ſituation has the perfect control of his own happineſs and miſery; and it is but for him to chooſe to lie on a gridiron, which he can as eaſily do, as chooſe any thing elſe, and he converts it into a bed of roſes.——This is ſelf-determination *to ſome purpoſe.*

Such exclamations as the following have been made, in relation to this ſubject; "If man be gov-
"erned by motives, how is he free? Where is free-
"dom? What liberty has man more than a beaſt?
"All his actions are ſubject to a fatal chain of cauſes
"and effects?" But ſuch exclamations may juſtly be retorted, on either of the forementioned hypotheſes of determining our own volitions agreeably to motives, or without motives. If we determine them agreeably to motives only; then we are limited to motives, we can go in one track only, we can act no otherwiſe than according to the dictates of ſovereign and all controlling motives. Then "how is man free?
"Where is freedom? What liberty has man more
"than a beaſt? All his actions are ſubject to a fatal
"chain of motives."——Or if it be ſaid, that we determine

termine our own volitions without motives, end, design or any consideration good or bad; as in this case we act with perfect stupidity, it may with the greatest propriety be demanded, "How are we free? Where is "freedom? What liberty has man more than a beast?"

If there be, as Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, &c. allow, a constant concomitancy or connection between motives and volitions; this connection is an established law; as really such, as the connection between a certain temperature of the seasons and the growth of vegetables. Now of this establishment there is some author: It is an effect and has an efficient cause. Nor will it be pretended, that the mind, which is the subject of the volitions, is the efficient cause of this establishment. This beside other difficulties attending it, would imply a direct contradiction; as it is now granted, that the mind acts invariably according to motives; and yet in establishing the influence of motives, it must act without that influence, *i. e.* without motive. For a motive can have no influence, before influence is given to it; and nothing can be a motive, which has no persuasive influence or tendency. Therefore the influence of motives and the connection between them and volitions, are the effects of some cause extrinsic to the mind. And this causation of the influence and consequences of motives, or of the connection between motive and volition, is really a causation of volitions themselves, and that by an extrinsic cause.——Thus the authors just mentioned and those who with them acknowledge a constant concomitancy of motives and volitions, are brought into a dilemma. If they hold that this concomitancy and constant connection is caused by the mind itself, they must grant, that it is caused without motive, and so contradict the very principle they grant, of constant concomitancy. If they allow, that this connection is caused by some other cause, than the mind itself; they must of course grant, that volitions are the effects of an extrinsic cause.

"If volition and agreeable perception," ſays Dr. Weſt, p. 12, "be one and the ſame thing, then mo-"tive and volition are one and the ſame thing: For "nothing can be a motive, but an agreeable percep-"tion; or ——— motive is the perceiving of the "fitneſs of an object to anſwer a particular purpoſe." Hence he argues, that "if motive be agreeable per-"ception, and agreeable perception be a volition, and "motive be the cauſe of an act of the will, then an "act of the will is the cauſe of an act of the will." And that "motive and volition are one and the ſame "thing."——No doubt Dr. Weſt has a right to tell his own ſenſe of the word *motive*. But when Preſident Edwards has particularly given his ſenſe of that word, and it appears to be entirely different from that of Dr. Weſt, the Doctor has no right to argue from his ſenſe, to confute the Preſident. He by motive meant not only a perception of the fitneſs of an object to a particular purpoſe, but, as has been already ob-ſerved, "the whole of that which moves, excites or "invites the mind to volition;" and not only "the "views of the mind," but "the ſtate, frame, temper "and habit of the mind," however cauſed. Therefore many volitions may be cauſed or occaſioned by motive in this ſenſe, which are not cauſed by any perception at all, but by appetite, bias, taſte, &c. And if a man perceive ever ſo clearly the fitneſs of an object to an-ſwer a particular purpoſe, and in this reſpect its agree-ableneſs, this is not the ſame as actual choice of that object, all things conſidered. A man may perceive, that hard and conſtant labour is well fitted to the in-creaſe of his property; yet he may not chooſe it.

Though it ſhould be ſaid, that every agreeable per-ception is a volition; it would not follow, that a vo-lition is a motive to itſelf, which is what Dr. Weſt means, if he mean to fix any abſurdity, in ſaying, that motive and volition are one and the ſame. There is no abſurdity in the ſuppoſition, that one volition ſhould be a motive to another volition; that a ſtrong

wiſh

wiſh for honour ſhould be a motive to determine a man to generoſity, hoſpitality, a general good treatment of his neighbours, and many ſervices uſeful to the public; and charity requires us to believe, that a deſire to do good, was the motive, which made Dr. Weſt willing to write and publiſh his *Eſſays on Liberty and Neceſſity*.——The principle from which Dr. Weſt endeavours to faſten an abſurdity on Preſident Edwards, is that nothing can be a motive but an agreeable perception; which is both contrary to truth and contrary to Preſident Edwards.

Archbiſhop King ſpeaks abundantly of "depraved elections." What does he mean by *depraved elections?* Elections not according to truth, reaſon or divine revelation? But if a man were to chooſe according to theſe, he muſt not be perſuaded to ſuch election by *any regard* to truth, reaſon or divine revelation; this would imply, that all things were not perfectly indifferent to him before election, and that ſome things are choſen, becauſe they are previouſly adapted to excite choice, and not agreeable merely becauſe they are choſen, as he holds in places before quoted. Beſides; if a man chooſe what is agreeable to truth, reaſon or revelation, *from a regard to* truth, reaſon or revelation, or which is the ſame thing, from the motive of truth, reaſon or revelation, he is *perſuaded, influenced* and *wrought upon* by thoſe motives; conſequently he is *paſſive* in being the ſubject of this influence of the motives, and not free in the ſenſe of freedom, which the Archbiſhop holds——Again, if a man chooſe what is dictated by truth, reaſon or revelation, from regard to any thing elſe than truth, reaſon or revelation; as he is influenced by motive, which is the thing which he regards, he is in the ſame ſenſe not free. Therefore to be free in that ſenſe he muſt chooſe it from no regard to any thing, but without motive, end or deſign. And in ſuch a choice what there is of depravity or virtue, more than there

is

is in the ſhining of the ſun or in the blowing of the wind, let any man point out.

Whether there be an infallible connection between motives and volitions or not; ſtill ſo far as they influence and have effect; ſo far the ſubject is wrought upon by an extrinſic cauſe and is paſſive; and therefore according to our opponents, ſo far his liberty and moral agency are deſtroyed. Why then ſhould motives ever be uſed with any man? We ought not to uſe them, wiſhing that they may have no effect or influence at all. Nor ought we to uſe them, to deſtroy moral agency, and to turn men into machines. For what purpoſe then ſhould we uſe them? We commonly uſe them to perſuade. But to perſuade is to influence a man by motive, which is an extrinſic cauſe; and under the influence of motive, he is paſſive; and in ſuch a caſe our opponents ſay his liberty and moral agency is deſtroyed. But if they be not in this way deſtroyed; an infallible connection between motive and volition is not inconſiſtent with liberty; and therefore why ſhould Dr. Weſt or any other man diſpute againſt it?

Moſt, if not all writers in favour of ſelf-determination allow, that men *generally* act on motive; and I preſume they would not deny, that whenever they do act on motive, they are *perſuaded* to act *by the motive.* Therefore on their principles, men are generally deprived of liberty and moral agency, generally act as mere machines and paſſive inſtruments; and all their objections againſt an infallible connection between motives and volition, may be retorted, with reſpect to the general conduct of mankind: And as to the liberty and moral agency exerciſed in ſome rare inſtances, when men act without motive, as when they are ſuppoſed to chooſe between things perfectly indifferent; it is a mere trifle not worth diſputing about.

Dr. Price declares (Correſpondence with Prieſtly, p. 347,) "That by determining as we pleaſe," he means, "our poſſeſſing a power to make either of two

"motives

" motives the ſtrongeſt ; *i. e.* to make either of them " the motive that ſhall prevail, and the motive on " which we ſhall pleaſe to determine." But this act, by which we make one motive the ſtrongeſt, muſt be without motive. If it be not without, but be under the influence of motive, not we, but that prior motive makes that motive ſtrongeſt, on which we pleaſe to determine. And as the compliance with that prior motive is an act in which we determine as we pleaſe, a ſtill prior motive is neceſſary to that act, and we muſt give ſtrength to that motive too, and ſo on to infinity.——On the other hand, if without motive we make one motive ſtronger than another, we in this caſe at leaſt act without motive ; which is contrary to what Dr. Price abundantly profeſſes : He ſays, " A ſelf-determining power which is under *no influ-* " *ence from motives*, has never been meant by any " advocates for liberty."——But if we may and do act without motive in making one motive to prevail ; why may we not immediately act without motive, as well as firſt without motive make one motive the ſtrongeſt, that we may comply with it ? Beſides ; to give ſtrength to a motive, that we may comply with it, is really, in the act of giving that ſtrength, to comply with the motive, and to chooſe the object which it recommends. It is like giving money to a friend, that he may procure for us a certain commodity. This certainly implies, that we chooſe and wiſh for that commodity.

In the ſame page Dr. Price puts the queſtion ; " Has a man urged by contrary inclinations, no con- " trolling power over his inclinations, to make one of " them preferably to the other, the inclination which " he will follow ?" I anſwer, no ; there is a contradiction in it. The ſuppoſition implies, that before he " makes one of them the inclination that he will " follow," it is not the inclination which he chooſes to follow. But this is not true : In that he voluntarily makes it the inclination that he will follow, it is

implied that he is inclined to follow it. He is willing and chooſes to follow it, and therefore he voluntarily makes it the inclination, which he will follow. Thus it is previouſly what he makes it to be; and he is willing before he is willing. In making it the inclination, which he will follow, he does follow it. He follows it before he follows it.

Dr. Price in the ſame book, p. 348, ſays, "I am "ſenſible, that it is nonſenſe, to deny the influence "of motives, or to maintain that there are no fixt "principles and ends, by which the will is guided." Then is it not nonſenſe, to aſſert, that we give ſtrength to motives? And that we make an inclination, the inclination that we will follow? This ſeems to be the inevitable conſequence, unleſs we give ſtrength to one motive, under the influence of another, and ſo run into the infinite ſeries.

Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins, p. 12, 13, ſuppoſes, that motives have *ſome* influence, but not a prevailing, governing one; and that over and above the perſuaſive influence of motives, the ſelf-determining power muſt by its own force exert itſelf to produce volition. Thus, p. 12, he reprobates the ſuppoſition, that if a man be not determined by motives neceſſarily, *i. e.* certainly and really; he can in no degree be influenced by them. But to be influenced by motives, is to be really and effectually influenced, juſt ſo far as the ſubject is influenced by them at all: And ſo far as he is influenced or perſuaded by them, ſo far is he governed and determined by them: For that is what we mean by a determination by motives. On the other hand, ſo far as a man is not influenced or determined by motive, he acts without motive and without regard to it. So that there is no medium between no real or perſuaſive influence of motive, and a *determining governing* influence.

Again, p. 14, he reprobates the idea, "that mo-"tives and reaſons can be of no weight and no uſe "at all to men, unleſs they *neceſſitate* them; and that "if

" if a perſon be not determined *irreſiſtibly*, then he " muſt be totally indifferent to all actions alike, and " can have no regard to motives and reaſons of ac- " tion at all." By *neceſſitating* and *determining irreſiſtibly*, if he mean any thing to the purpoſe, he muſt mean really and actually to influence by perſuaſion, ſo as to give ſome bias or inclination to the will. And it is plain, that if motives do not at all bias or incline the will, the man remains in a ſtate of total indifference, and " has no regard to motives or rea- " ſons of action at all." Nor is there any medium between an inclination of the will and total indifference; for this is the ſame as to ſay, that there is no medium between an inclination of the will and no inclination of it. And if " motives and reaſons" do not incline men's wills and have no previous tendency to incline them, " they are of no weight or uſe at all " to men;" and if a perſon be not really inclined by them, he is totally indifferent to them.

In the ſame page, the Doctor conſiders it as needing proof, " that a ſelf-moving power is inconſiſtent " with having any regard to reaſons of acting." So far as a perſon is perſuaded to act, by reaſons and motives; ſo far he is *influenced* by motives, in the ſenſe, in which we hold, that any perſon is influenced by them; therefore ſo far is not ſelf-determined or ſelf-moved. Or if by ſelf-determination be meant, that under the effectual perſuaſion of motives, we cauſe our own volitions; (though we deny the poſſibility of cauſing our own volitions) yet as to liberty in the ſenſe in which I oppoſe it, it would come to the ſame. The ſlave, who always acts by motives exhibited by his maſter, is as abſolutely controlled by his maſter, as the whip in the maſter's hand. Beſides, to be effectually perſuaded by motive to volition, and to cauſe our own volition independently of extrinſic influence, is a direct contradiction.

" The doing of any thing *upon* or *after* or *in conſe-* " *quence of*, that perception" (the perception of motive)

tive) "this is the power of ſelf-motion or action, "which ——— in moral agents we call *liberty*."—— If the doing be merely in conſequence of motive, without any *influence* of the motive perſuading to the doing; that which in this caſe is called a motive, is very improperly ſo called. So a motive would be no reaſon at all for the doing. If it be a reaſon and properly a *motive*, it *moves* the agent to the doing; conſequently the doing is not *ſelf*-motion, unleſs ſelf-motion and motion excited by an extrinſic cauſe are one and the ſame. Nor is this motion a *free action* in a ſenſe oppoſed to moral neceſſity. It is not free from extrinſic cauſality, nor of courſe free from a dependence on an extrinſic cauſe. Every effect is dependent on its cauſe. Nor is it free with a liberty of contingence. This implies, that ſomething happens without a cauſe.

If it ſhould be ſaid, that motive in this caſe is not the *efficient* of the action or doing: This is granted; but at the ſame time, for reaſons already given, it is denied, that the man himſelf is the efficient cauſe of it. He who eſtabliſhed the laws of nature, ſo called, is the primary cauſe of all things. What is meant by efficient cauſe in any caſe, in which an effect is produced according to eſtabliſhed laws? For inſtance, what is the efficient cauſe of the ſenſation of heat from fire? If it be anſwered, fire is the efficient cauſe; I alſo anſwer, that the motive is the efficient cauſe of the volition and doing aforeſaid. If it be ſaid, that the Great Firſt Cauſe is the efficient of the ſenſation of heat; the ſame Great Agent is the efficient cauſe of volition, in the ſame way, by a general law eſtabliſhing a connection between motives and volitions; as there is a connection between fire in certain ſituations and the ſenſation of heat.

To allow, that we are free, though we always act in conſequence of motives, unleſs by acting be meant an action not excited or influenced by motive, and of which the motive is no reaſon, is to plead for no other

er liberty, than is perfectly conſiſtent with the moſt abſolute moral neceſſity and with abſolute decrees.

Doctors Clarke and Price conſider the man free, who efficiently cauſes his own volitions according to motives, becauſe he himſelf and not the motives, is the efficient cauſe. Yet as by the ſuppoſition he cauſes them according to motives, he is limited by them. And is a ſlave free, who manufactures a commodity under the control and laſh of his maſter? Or is the convict free, who himſelf walks around the ſtake, to which he is chained? Yet according to the ſyſtem of the ſaid gentlemen, the ſlave and not the maſter is the efficient cauſe of his own volition to labour. The convict and not the ſtake, is the efficient cauſe of his own volition to walk around the ſtake. Nor is the maſter the efficient cauſe of the limitation of the volitions of his ſlave; he merely exhibits the motives to their limitation: And it will not be pretended, that the ſtake is the efficient cauſe of the limitation of the volition of the convict.

Dr. Price, in Correſpondence with Prieſtly, p. 341, ſays, "that no influence of motives, which is ſhort of making them phyſical efficients or agents, can claſh with liberty." Now the walls, gates and bars of a priſon are not *phyſical efficients or agents*; yet they are as inconſiſtent with the liberty of the priſoner, as if they were ſuch efficients and agents, and ſtood around him with gun and bayonet, to confine him to the ſpot; or as if they had built and made themſelves for the purpoſe of his confinement. So if man be limited to act agreeably to motives only, they are as inconſiſtent with his liberty, as they would be, if they were intelligent agents, had created themſelves and had eſtabliſhed the connection between themſelves and volition. It is as to liberty, immaterial who or what has eſtabliſhed the connection between motives and volitions, provided the connection be infallibly eſtabliſhed: As it is immaterial as to the liberty of a priſoner, who or what made the walls, gates and bars of the priſon,

whether the walls, gates and bars themſelves, any extrinſic cauſe, or even the priſoner himſelf. If he had built and made them all, had locked himſelf in and had flung the key through the grates, he would be as effectually deprived of his liberty, as if the ſame things had been done by any other agent.——Theſe obſervations lead to a further anſwer to the plea, that we give ſtrength to the motive which determines us. What if a man ſhould give ſtrength to a motive? After it is thus become ſtrong, it as effectually governs the man, and as really deprives him of his liberty, as if it had derived its ſtrength from any other ſource. Suppoſe a man were poſſeſſed of creating power, and ſhould create another man ſtronger than himſelf, and this other man ſhould bind the former hand and foot: Would he not be as effectually deprived of his liberty, as if he had been in the ſame manner bound by any other man?

CHAPTER V.

In which it is inquired, whether Volition be an Effect and have a Cauſe.

THE title of Dr. Weſt's ſecond *eſſay* is, "That vo-
"lition is not properly an effect, which has a
"cauſe." Whether his meaning be, that it is an effect which has no cauſe, or that it is not an effect at all, the words do not determine; but from the ſequel I conclude, the latter is his meaning. This, as has been already noticed, is indeed contradicted by the Doctor, as in this paſſage, p. 24, "The modification in "queſtion" (*i. e.* the modification which the mind gives itſelf in willing or acting, which the Doctor explains to be volition) "is the conſequence or EFFECT of the "mind willing or chooſing." Then volition is an *effect*; and an effect of a preceding volition.

I preſume the Doctor has the merit of originality in this part of his ſyſtem. Many things in the common ſcheme of ſelf-determination do indeed imply, that volition has no cauſe; viz. Liberty as oppoſed to all neceſſity or certainty; the ſovereignty and independence of the will; its exemption from all influence of motive or extrinſic cauſe, &c. Still I have not met with one writer before Dr. Weſt, who had boldneſs enough expreſsly to avow the ſentiment. Dr. Clarke and all the reſt hold, that volition is the effect of the mind itſelf in the exerciſe of its ſelf-moving or ſelf-determining power. And Doctor Price, when charged by Dr. Prieſtly with holding, that volitions come to paſs without a cauſe, rejects the imputation and takes it hardly, that ever it ſhould have been made to him or his ſyſtem. Correſpondence with Prieſtly, p. 349.

But let us examine the reaſons, by which Dr. Weſt endeavours to ſupport this doctrine. They are the following;

1. That volition is an abſtract term and ſignifies ſomething, which cannot exiſt without a ſubject; or volition is nothing but the mind willing or acting; and therefore is not an effect; p. 21.——But ſuppoſe volition be nothing but *the mind willing* or *acting*; is that ſtate of the mind or the mind in that ſtate, not an effect? Dr. Weſt will not deny, that the mind abſolutely conſidered is an effect. If then the mind *willing* or in the exerciſe of volition, is not an effect; it ſeems, that the mind while without volition is an effect or a creature; but in the exerciſe of volition ceaſes to be an effect, and therefore ceaſes to be a creature. Will Dr. Weſt avow this?——Motion is an abſtract term and ſignifies ſomething, which cannot exiſt without a ſubject; or motion is nothing but a body moving. But will it hence follow, that motion or a body moving is not an effect? No more does it follow from the argument of Dr. Weſt now under conſideration, that volition is not an effect? The Doctor grants, that volition is the modification or mode of the mind; and is not that mode an effect? If it be not an effect, becauſe it is a mode of the mind, then doubtleſs no other mode of the mind is an effect. And ſtrip the mind of all its modes, and you will take away the mind itſelf; becauſe ſome of thoſe modes are *eſſential* modes. If all the modes of the mind, eſſential and accidental, taken ſingly and collectively, be not effects; the mind itſelf is not an effect.——On the principle of Doctor Weſt's argument, no mode whatever is an effect. The principle is this, That whatever cannot ſubſiſt of itſelf out of any ſubject, is not an effect. But no mode, ſolidity, extenſion, figure, colour or motion, can ſubſiſt without a ſubject. Therefore not one of them nor any other mode is an effect. And if not one of thoſe modes by itſelf, is an effect, all of them taken together are not an effect; and therefore body or matter is not an effect: Yea neither matter nor ſpirit is an effect. And as matter and ſpirit with their modes, comprehend the whole creation; it will follow,

that

that no *creature* is an effect; *i. e.* no creature is a creature.

2. That volition or the mind willing, is not an effect, becauſe it is an efficient cauſe.——Dr. Weſt believes, that a carpenter is the efficient cauſe of a ſhip: And does he therefore believe, that the carpenter in building the ſhip is not a creature? This would follow on the principles of this argument. The principle is, that whatever is an efficient cauſe, cannot be an effect. Therefore as a carpenter is the efficient cauſe of a ſhip, he is not an effect, or not a creature. Dr. Weſt and others take it for granted, that if volition be an effect, it cannot be a cauſe. This is juſt as abſurd as to hold, that unleſs a carpenter be uncauſed, he cannot build a ſhip; and that a creature can be the cauſe of nothing.

3. That if the operation or action, which is eſſential to the idea of a cauſe, be itſelf an effect; then its cauſe muſt operate to produce the ſaid effect; and conſequently the laſt mentioned operation being an effect, muſt have another cauſe to produce it, and ſo on *in infinitum*; and this infinite ſeries of cauſes and effects entirely excludes the firſt cauſe and any efficient cauſe; p. 22.——But it is denied, that in the caſe here ſuppoſed, an infinite ſeries of cauſes and effects is involved. Suppoſe it be true, that the action which is neceſſary to conſtitute a man an efficient cauſe, be the effect of an extrinſic cauſe; how does it follow, that there muſt be, in this caſe, an infinite ſeries of cauſes? We maintain that action may be the effect of a divine influence; or that it may be the effect of one or more ſecond cauſes, the firſt of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here then is not an infinite ſeries of cauſes, but a very ſhort ſeries, which terminates in the Deity or firſt cauſe.—— I know that it is often *ſuppoſed* and *aſſerted* by Dr. Weſt, that volition cannot be an effect at all; and that it is *ſuppoſed* by all others, who maintain Dr. Weſt's general ſcheme, that it cannot be an effect of an extrinſic

trinsic cause. But their supposing it is a mere assumption of the thing in dispute, in this part of the argument. Let them *prove* it and they will do something to the purpose.——Again; the cause or series of causes, which is implied in the idea, that volition is an effect, is so far from excluding the first cause and any efficient cause, as Dr. West says, that it inevitably leads to the first cause, and implies, that there is an efficient cause of all volition in creatures, as well as of every thing else short of the first cause.

4. That volition in the Deity is no effect, but is only the Deity considered as willing or causing; and therefore to assert, that volition is no effect, is not in itself an absurdity. Why then may we not assert, that volition in the creature is no effect? P. 23.——On this I observe, It is granted, that volition in the Deity is not an effect; but it no more hence follows, that volition in the creature is not an effect, than that existence and knowledge in the creature, are not effects, because they are not effects in the Creator.

5. That if human volition be an effect, then man must be passive in willing, but if he be passive in willing, he can be active in nothing else; *i. e.* he is no agent, but a mere passive machine. But if man be active in willing, then volition cannot be the effect of an extrinsic cause, and will be nothing but the mind acting or operating; p. 23. ——No doubt if human volition be an effect, man is so far passive in willing, as to be the subject of the influence of that cause which produces volition; still he is active too in volition, is still an agent and not a *mere* passive machine. In volition man is both passive and active; passive as he is the subject of the influence of the cause which excites volition, and active in the exercise of it. As the day-labourer is passive in that he is influenced by the prospect of wages, to consent to labour, and active in exerting and in consenting to exert himself in labour. Nor does it follow from a man's being active in volition, that volition cannot be the effect of an extrinsic cause. The idea, that it does follow, takes

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for granted the very thing in queſtion, viz. that an action cannot be an effect, eſpecially of an extrinſic cauſe. Dr. Weſt ought to have proved this.

Beſides; why does the Doctor ſay, "If man be "active in willing, then volition cannot be the effect "of any *extrinſic* cauſe?" Ibid. His doctrine equally implies, that it is not the effect of an *intrinſic* cauſe. His doctrine is, that volition is, in general terms, not an effect and has no cauſe. But now, it ſeems the Doctor recedes from this, and holds only, that volition is not the effect of an *extrinſic* cauſe, implicitly granting, that it is *an effect*, and an effect of an *intrinſic* cauſe.

The Doctor tells us, that "if man be paſſive in "willing ——— he is ——— a *mere paſſive machine*;" p. 23.——How does this appear? A man is paſſive in his intellectual views; but is he in thoſe views a mere paſſive *machine?* The human intellect is very different from what we commonly call a *machine.* Or if by *machine* the Doctor mean any thing that is influenced by an extrinſic cauſe; I grant, that in this ſenſe, both the human intellect and human will are *machines;* and in granting this, I grant no more than is implied in the moral neceſſity for which I plead. Yet ſuch an application of the word *machine*, would be a groſs perverſion of it.

6. That the Deity has not only acted from all eternity; but is continually acting upon the whole creation, for the preſervation and government of it. Yet theſe operations and energies of the Deity are not effects, though they take place in time. Therefore the energies or volitions of the human mind are not effects, though they alſo take place in time; p. 24.—— But I deny, that the operations or energies of the Deity *begin* in time, though the effects of thoſe operations do. They no more begin in time, than the divine exiſtence does; but human volitions all begin in time. There is no ſucceſſion in the divine mind; therefore no new operations take place there. All

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the divine acts are equally from eternity, nor is there any *time* with God. "One day is with the Lord as "a thouſand years and a thouſand years as one day." The *effects* of thoſe divine acts do indeed all take place in time and in a ſucceſſion.——If it ſhould be ſaid, that on this ſuppoſition the effects take place not till long after the acts, by which they are produced; I anſwer, they do ſo in our view, but not in the view of God. With him there is no time, no before nor after with reſpect to time; nor has time any exiſtence either in the divine mind or in the nature of things, independently of the minds and perceptions of creatures; but it depends on the ſucceſſion of thoſe perceptions. So that from the conſideration, that the divine energies and operations are no effects, it no more follows, that human volitions are no effects, than from the conſideration that the divine exiſtence and knowledge are no effects it follows, that *our* exiſtence and knowledge are no effects.

7. That if volition were an effect, we could not be the *cauſes* of any effects: At the moſt we ſhould be *mere paſſive inſtruments*; p. 25.——This wholly depends on the meaning of *words*, as moſt of Dr. Weſt's arguments do. If by *cauſe* the Dr. mean a *ſelf-determinate* cauſe, he, *as uſual*, begs what he has no right to expect will be given him. But if by *cauſe* he mean a rational, voluntary agent, acting under the perſuaſive influence of light and motives; we may be ſuch cauſes, though volition is an effect; and acting as ſuch cauſes we may produce effects. Thus Noah built the ark: Moſes hewed two tables of ſtone, &c.——And if under the name of a *paſſive inſtrument* the Doctor mean to include ſuch a rational, voluntary agent, as I have juſt deſcribed; I grant, that in this ſenſe we are paſſive inſtruments, and it is impoſſible, that a rational creature ſhould be any other than ſuch a paſſive inſtrument. But I reprobate the calling of ſuch an agent a mere paſſive inſtrument, as a great abuſe of language.

But

But ſuppoſe volition were not an effect; ſhould we then be cauſes of effects? or ſhould we then be leſs paſſive inſtruments? If volition were no effect, we ourſelves ſhould no more be the cauſes of it, than any extrinſic cauſe. It would happen in us by mere chance. And ſhould we in the exerciſe of that volition, which is without cauſe and is merely accidental, be any more cauſes of an effect, than we ſhould be in the exerciſe of a volition excited by a proper motive? If any reaſon can be given to ſhow, that we ſhould, let it be given. Though it may be pleaded, that when we become the ſubjects of volition by mere chance, we are not the ſubjects of the operation of a cauſe in the production of volition, and in that ſenſe are not paſſive; yet in this caſe volition takes place in our minds equally without our cauſation, our previous agency or conſent, as if the ſame volition were cauſed by ſomething extrinſic. So that if we be not equally *wrought upon* in theſe two caſes, we are equally *inactive*, and therefore can no more be *cauſes* in the one caſe, than in the other: And there is nothing more favourable to liberty or ſelf-determination in the one caſe than in the other.

8. That if volition were an effect, we could have no more ideas of cauſe and effect, than a blind man has of colours. For we being paſſive in our ideas of ſenſations, they could never ſuggeſt to us the ideas of cauſe and effect; and if volition or internal action be the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, our reflections could never afford an example of an efficient cauſe, and ſo we muſt for ever be deſtitute of the ideas of cauſe and effect; p. 25.——On this I obſerve,

(1.) It wholly depends on the meaning of the word *cauſe*. If as I before obſerved, it mean a ſelf-determinate cauſe, which "acts on itſelf and produces volition;" I grant, that we have no idea of ſuch a cauſe, more than a blind man has of colours. Nor has Dr. Weſt any idea of ſuch a cauſe, as he reprobates it and does not believe in its exiſtence. Neither God

nor

nor creature can be ſuch a cauſe as this; it is an impoſſibility; it is perfectly like the animal, which Preſident Edwards ſuppoſed the traveller profeſſed to have ſeen in *Terra del fuego*. But if cauſe mean a rational, voluntary agent producing effects under the influence of motives; ſuch cauſes we ourſelves are or may be; and the idea of ſuch a cauſe we derive from every artificer, whom we ſee employed at his trade, from every huſbandman, who in our view tills the ground, and from every external action which we perform.

(2.) Though we are paſſive in our ideas of ſenſation, yet every idea of that kind, for the very reaſon that we are paſſive in it, ſuggeſts to us the ideas of both cauſe and effect. In that we are paſſive in thoſe ideas both cauſe and effect are implied. If no cauſe operated upon us to produce the effect, ſenſation, we ſhould not be paſſive in ſenſation. It is true, the becoming paſſively the ſubjects of ſenſation, does not ſuggeſt to us the idea of a ſelf-determinate or ſelf-actuating cauſe; for ſuch a cauſe does not exiſt, is an impoſſibility, and therefore no idea of it can be conceived; as I have already endeavoured to ſhow.

(3.) This argument ſuppoſes, that we get the idea of an efficient cauſe by the experience, that we ourſelves are the efficient cauſes of volition. But in the firſt place we deny, that we ever do experience ourſelves to be the efficient cauſes of volition: And in the ſecond place, if we did, it would be entirely inconſiſtent with Dr. Weſt's propoſition now under conſideration; it would prove, that volition is an effect, and that we ourſelves are the efficient cauſes of it.

(4.) Be it ſo that "our reflections can never afford "us an example of an efficient cauſe;" what abſurdity follows? We avow that our reflections cannot afford us an example of ſuch a cauſe. We neither efficiently cauſe our own volitions nor our own perceptions. Yet we are not deſtitute of ideas of

cauſe

cauſe and effect, as I have already ſhown.——But certainly according to Dr. Weſt our reflections do not afford us an example of an efficient cauſe of volition; for volition is, according to him, no effect and has no cauſe.

9. That if our volitions were the effects of an extrinſic cauſe, we could never have the idea of dependence and independence, and therefore could not connect our ideas together, *i. e.* could not be rational beings. And as we are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are not the effects of an extrinſic cauſe, but that we are ſelf-determinate, and that we get the ideas of dependence and independence, by experiencing in ourſelves, that in willing and chooſing we act independently of any extrinſic cauſe; p. 25.

This implies, that in volition we act independently, and that from ſuch independent actions we derive the idea of independence. But this again is a ſheer begging of the queſtion. How does it appear, that we act independently? The Doctor might as well have taken it for granted, that we act ſelf-determinately. We no more grant, that we acquire the idea of independence, by experiencing it in volition, than that we acquire the idea of an efficient cauſe by experiencing ourſelves to be the efficient cauſes of our own volitions. And if any man have the idea, that any creature is in volition independent of all extrinſic cauſes, this idea is not allowed to be according to truth. As to the divine independence, which is indeed entire and abſolute, Dr. Weſt will not pretend, that we get the idea of this by experiencing the like independence in ourſelves. We no more get that idea in this way, than we get the idea of the divine omnipotence, by experiencing omnipotence in ourſelves. So that though we have the ideas of dependence and independence, can connect our ideas together and are rational beings, it by no means follows, as Dr. Weſt infers, "that our volitions are not the effects of an *ex-*
"*trinſic* cauſe, and that we are ſelf-determinate."

And

And why does the Doctor continually deny volition to be the effect of an *extrinsic* cause? The proposition which he has undertaken to support, equally implies, that it is not the effect of an *intrinsic* cause.

10. That volition is only the relation of the energy of a cause in producing an effect, and therefore is not an effect, and has no proper existence of its own; p. 26.——If volition be only the *relation* of the energy of a cause, it is not the *energy* itself or *action* of a cause; and how then is it a part of the subject of the present inquiry? The present inquiry and discussion relate to the voluntary *actions* of a rational being. As to the relations and external denominations of those actions, they may be and commonly are different in every action, yet the actions themselves may be the same.——Besides; the Doctor will not pretend to deny, that volition is an action of the mind, or as he chooses to express it, *the mind acting*. And is the mind acting only the relation of the energy or action of that mind? And has the mind acting "no proper "existence of its own?" If it have, it is an effect doubtless, because it is a creature. An action of the human mind is an event, and an event coming to pass in time, and therefore has a cause: And Dr. West says, he "cannot be charged with holding, that events "take place without a cause;" p. 27.

11. That no agent can bring any effect to pass, but what is consequent on his acting. Therefore it is very absurd to call the acting or activeness of a being, an effect; because it introduces the utmost absurdity into language, by confounding and blending things together, which are very different; p. 28.——It is an undoubted truth, that no agent can bring any effect to pass, but what is consequent on his acting. But how does it hence follow, that it is very absurd to call the action of a being an effect? And how does this confound and blend things together, which are very different? It will not be denied, that the prophesying of a prophet may be the act of that prophet; yet acting by

by inſpiration he is excited to that act by a divine agency. No doubt the Divine Being brings to paſs this effect by a previous act or exertion of himſelf. But where is the abſurdity of calling this propheſying an effect of the divine influence? How does the calling of it ſo, confound and blend the divine influence and the act of the prophet, which are acknowledged to be very different from each other?

12. That cauſe and effect are not ſynonymous terms; and therefore "in whatever ſenſe any thing is "a cauſe, in that ſenſe it is not proper to call it an "effect; for this reaſon, that cauſes conſidered as "cauſes, are not effects." Part II, p. 90. This is juſt as concluſive reaſoning as if the Doctor had ſaid, the words *tree* and *effect* are not ſynonymous terms. Therefore in whatever ſenſe any thing is a *tree*, in that ſenſe it is not proper to call it an *effect*; for this reaſon, that *trees* conſidered as *trees* are not *effects*. Rain conſidered as the cauſe of the growing of graſs, is an effect; a medicine conſidered as the cauſe of a cure, is ſtill an effect; and Dr. Weſt conſidered as the author of ſeveral eſſays on liberty and neceſſity, is as really a creature of God, as he is when he is conſidered to be in the exerciſe of his favourite liberty or power of *not acting* and is in perfect *torpor*.—— The Doctor proceeds, "The mind acting is the mind "cauſing; for I conceive, whenever the mind acts, "it produces ſome effect." Ibid. If the Doctor mean that whenever the mind is the ſubject of an *internal* act or volition, it produces ſome *external* effect; this is manifeſtly a miſtake, and the Doctor himſelf will not avow it. If he mean, that whenever it is the ſubject of volition, it produces that volition as an *effect*; this in the firſt place is giving up what he himſelf had written an eſſay to prove, viz. that volition is not an effect; and ſecondly it is a begging of the main point. In ſhort, Dr. Weſt is a moſt ſturdy metaphyſical beggar. But as charity demands no gratuities to ſuch beggars, he is to expect none.——He adds to the

laſt quotation, it " will introduce the greateſt confu-
" ſion in language, to ſpeak of the mind, conſidered
" as cauſing, as being an effect." But what confuſion of language is it, to ſpeak of Dr. Weſt conſidered as the author of eſſays on liberty and neceſſity, as being a creature? I hope, when the Doctor ſhall write again, he will *ſhow* that it confounds language, and not merely *aſſert* it.

The Doctor, in the page laſt quoted, ſays, " The
" queſtion is, whether every act of the will is a new
" effect produced by the Deity or by ſome other
" extrinſic cauſe." I do not allow this to be the queſtion. The Doctor aſſerts in general terms, that volition is not properly an effect. The queſtion is entirely general, whether volition be an effect of any cauſe, *extrinſic* or *intrinſic*. When this queſtion ſhall have been ſettled, a ſubſequent one may ariſe, whether it be an effect of *extrinſic* cauſe.

Thus I have conſidered Dr. Weſt's arguments to prove, that volition is not an effect and has no cauſe. Whether they do really prove it, the reader will judge.

Dr. Price in his Correſpondence with Prieſtly, p. 341, ſays, " An agent that does not put himſelf in mo-
" tion, is an agent that is always acted upon, and an
" agent that never acts." On this I remark, that it is not true, that every agent, who does not put himſelf in motion, is always acted upon, by an extrinſic agent. The Deity did not at firſt put himſelf in motion, meaning by *motion* volition.——If he did, he was before without motion or volition. And Dr. Price would not pretend, that God exiſted from eternity without any volition, and that when he came down within the limits of time, he put himſelf into volition, *i. e.* he created volition in his own mind. Or if by being *acted upon*, Dr. Price meant, the Deity's acting according to the moſt wiſe and holy reaſons, which his infinite underſtanding can ſuggeſt; no doubt in this ſenſe the Deity himſelf is acted upon; and if this be inconſiſtent with agency, inſtead of but one, as Dr. Price ſays,

there

there is *not one* agent in the univerſe. God no more put himſelf in motion or volition at firſt, than he put himſelf into exiſtence. Nor has he at any time put himſelf into any particular volition. This would imply a new thing and a change in God.

To ſay, that an agent that is acted upon cannot act, is as groundleſs, as to ſay that a body acted upon, cannot move; unleſs the main queſtion is begged, by ſuppoſing, that action means ſelf-determinate action.

The advocates for ſelf-determination are in like manner guilty of begging the queſtion, by uſing *active power* to mean a ſelf-determining or ſelf-moving power; a power which puts itſelf into exerciſe, without the agency or influence of any extrinſic cauſe. We deny the exiſtence and poſſibility of ſuch a power: We hold, that it is as impoſſible, as that an animal ſhould beget itſelf, or take one ſtep before the firſt ſtep. If this be meant by *active power*, we deny that any being poſſeſſes it; and our opponents ought to be aſhamed to beg it.

Dr. Weſt holds, that volition is no effect and has no cauſe: He alſo holds, that volition is a modification of the mind. Indeed it is manifeſt, that the mind willing, is the mind in a different mode or differently modified, from what it was, when not willing. Now is the event of this modification taking place in the mind, not an effect? And is it uncauſed? Then not only does an event come to paſs without cauſe, which Dr. Weſt denies; but it happens by mere blind, ſtupid, undeſigning chance.——It might as well be ſaid, that the event of a canon ball moving is not an effect, as that the event of the mind willing is not an effect.

It is pleaded, that if volition be the effect of an *extrinſic* cauſe, it is wholly paſſive: Dr. Weſt joins with others in this plea, p. 23. But if volition be the effect of an *intrinſic* cauſe, it is equally paſſive. For as Dr. Weſt himſelf ſays very rightly, p. 23, "Every "effect is wholly paſſive with regard to the cauſe "which produces it."

Dr. Weſt ſays, volition is "a property of a mind." P. 21, 22. Therefore when volition exiſts in the mind, it is the ſubject of a property of which before it was deſtitute. Now is not this an effect? Does not ſome efficient cauſe, either the mind itſelf or ſome other cauſe, endue it with that property, as really as if it were endued with any other property? Or as if a body were endued with a particular colour?

He further holds, page 6 and 7, that "virtue and "vice are mere modes or attributes of a rational agent." But virtue and vice are voluntary acts of the mind, or volitions. Therefore volitions are modes or attributes of a rational agent. But according to him theſe modes have no cauſe and are no effects. And if ſome modes be not effects, how ſhall we know, that other modes or any modes are effects? If no modes be effects, ſince we know nothing of ſubſtances but by their ſenſible modes and qualities; how ſhall we know, that ſubſtances themſelves are effects?

Volitions are acts and events: And if ſome events be uncauſed, why may not all?

Dr. Weſt contradicts and gives up his doctrine, that volition has no cauſe, in all thoſe places, in which he allows, that volition is not without motive: As when he grants, "that the mind acts upon motives" ——— "that when the mind acts or chooſes, "it always has ſome end, deſign or reaſon, which is "the occaſion of its acting or chooſing" ——— that "motives are the previous circumſtances which are "neceſſary for action," &c. &c. Motives then are the reaſons, the occaſions, the neceſſary previous circumſtances or antecedents of volition. And what are theſe but *ſecond cauſes?* Cauſes in the ſenſe, in which Preſident Edwards explains himſelf to uſe the word *cauſe* with relation to this very ſubject, p. 41, 42.—— We ſay, that fire is the cauſe of the ſenſation of heat; that rain and ſun-ſhine are the cauſes of vegetation, &c. Yet they are no more than the ſtated antecedents. In the ſame ſenſe motives, according to Dr. Weſt,

Weſt, are cauſes of volitions. Beſides, all ſecond cauſes are the effects of the firſt cauſe. Therefore ultimately volitions are effects of the Great Firſt Cauſe.

If volition be no effect, it is not the effect of the mind in which it exiſts. That mind has no control over it: It comes to paſs without its wiſh or conſent, as fully as if it were the effect of ſome extrinſic cauſe. How then is the mind any more, or in any more deſirable ſenſe, free, than if volition were produced by an extrinſic cauſe? Which would a wiſe man chooſe? to have all volitions take place by pure accident, by blind chance and fate? or to have them ordered by a wiſe and good cauſe, in the application of proper motives? And are we agents in the former of theſe caſes, more than in the latter? On this hypotheſis volitions are his, in whoſe mind they exiſt, in this ſenſe only, that he is the ſubject of them. And this is true on the ſuppoſition, that they are cauſed by an extrinſic cauſe. And how on this plan, are we more accountable for our volitions and actions, than on the ſuppoſition, that they are produced in us by an extrinſic cauſe?

If volition be no effect and have no cauſe, it proceeds from no power or faculty in human nature as its cauſe; not from the power of will, nor even from any *ſelf-determining power*, whether it conſiſt in the will or in any other part of human nature. What then is the advantage of the ſelf-determining power ſo ſtrenuouſly advocated? It cannot produce one volition nor one free act. How then does liberty conſiſt in it? or depend on it? Or how does it contribute any aid toward liberty? And what becomes of the boaſted independence and ſovereignty of the will?

That a volition is produced in me by ſome extrinſic cauſe, is not at all oppoſed to liberty, unleſs by *liberty* be intended *contingence* or an exemption from all cauſality. If I could cauſe a volition in myſelf, it would be as neceſſary, as if it were produced by ſome other cauſe. Dr. Weſt rightly obſerves, that "every "effect is wholly paſſive with regard to the cauſe,

"which produces it." As the volition then produced by myſelf is wholly paſſive, it could not be more paſſive, if it were produced by ſome extrinſic cauſe.

Dr. Weſt, in p. 25, ſays, "Our conſciouſneſs, that "we are ſelf-active, ſuggeſts to us the ideas of cauſe "and effect, of dependence and independence:" *i. e.* Our conſciouſneſs that we are the bare ſubjects of volitions, which are no effects at all, whether of ourſelves or of any other cauſe, and therefore are not dependent on any cauſe, ſuggeſts to us the ideas of cauſe and effect, dependence and independence. Whether this be rational, let the reader judge.

In p. 26, Dr. Weſt explains himſelf to mean by *volition*, "the *relation* of energy exerted by a cauſe in "producing an effect;" and ſays, "It cannot be con-"ſidered as being an effect of any cauſe whatever, or as "having any proper exiſtence of its own." In ſupport of this idea he quotes Preſident Edwards, where he ſays, that action and paſſion are ſometimes uſed to ſignify the mere relations of activeneſs of ſomething on another, and of paſſiveneſs or of being acted upon by another thing; and that in this caſe they do not ſignify any poſitive effect or cauſe or any real exiſtences. Hence Dr. Weſt infers, that according to Preſident Edwards, he cannot be charged with holding that events take place without a cauſe.——On this it may be obſerved,

1. Preſident Edwards tells us, that whenever the word action is uſed to ſignify a *mere relation*, it does not ſignify *an action* or ſome motion or exerciſe of body or mind. But Dr. Weſt generally uſes volition to ſignify *an action* or exerciſe of the mind: And yet in the paſſage now under conſideration, he gives an explanation of volition, in which he ſays it ſignifies "the *relation* of the energy of a cauſe," and therefore not the energy itſelf, the exerciſe, exertion or act of that cauſe. Preſident Edwards did not ſuppoſe, that the word *action* generally and properly ſignifies a mere relation; but that it generally and properly ſignifies a poſitive

poſitive exiſtence,* or an event which has as real an exiſtence, as any fact or event. As to the word *volition*, Preſident Edwards never conſiders that as ſignifying a mere relation. Whereas Dr. Weſt conſiders this to be the proper meaning of volition.

2. As to the paſſage, which Dr. Weſt quotes from Preſident Edwards, the latter had good reaſon to ſay, that when the *action* is uſed to expreſs not any exertion, fact or event, but the *mere relation* of activity with reſpect to ſomething as the ſubject; it ſignifies no effect or cauſe and no real exiſtence. This may be illuſtrated by ſome other relation; as ſonſhip, the relation between father and ſon. A father is a real exiſtence, and every created father is an effect. So is a ſon. But *ſonſhip* is no real exiſtence; nor is it a proper effect or cauſe, more than the relation between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones. Now volition is not ſuch a mere relation: It is a real poſitive act, motion or exerciſe of a mind, and Dr. Weſt abundantly grants this.

3. If volition be a mere relation of energy, it is not "an exertion of an active principle," "an act of "the will," "an exerciſe of the mind," &c. as Dr. Weſt aſſerts it to be. Beſides, if it be a mere "*relation* of the energy exerted by a cauſe" or mind, what is the energy, act, exerciſe or exertion of which volition is the relation? Surely an act or exertion, and the relation of that act; a thing and the relations of that thing, are not one and the ſame. The ſame thing may have different and oppoſite relations. The ſame man may ſuſtain the oppoſite relations of a father and a ſon. And if ſuch a man be the ſame thing with his relations, he is the ſame thing with his ſonſhip, and the ſame thing with his fatherhood. Thus, as two things which agree with a common meaſure, agree between themſelves, it will follow, that ſonſhip and fatherhood are the ſame thing.

 4. By

* It will be remembered, that logicians and metaphyſicians divide beings into ſubſtance and mode, and conſider modes as having as real and poſitive an exiſtence, as ſubſtance.

4. By volition Dr. Weſt means either an act of the mind, or not. If he do mean an act of the mind, volition with him is not a mere relation, but a proper poſitive event or fact; and therefore muſt be an effect and have a cauſe; or an event takes place without a cauſe. If he do not by volition mean an act of the mind, it is ſurely not a *free* act; and if we do not act freely in volition, we do not act freely at all, *i. e.* we are not free agents. It is generally granted, and to be ſure Dr. Weſt's whole book implies, that all the moral liberty which we have is exerciſed in volition. But if volition be a *mere relation*, and not an act and a free act; we have no liberty; and by holding, that volition is a mere relation and not an act, Dr. Weſt gives up all that liberty for which he diſputes.

The Doctor, in his ſecond part, p. 12, grants that "acts "of the will, volition, choice and determination of the "mind may with *propriety* be called effects, when they "ſignify thoſe determinations or concluſions, which "the mind makes in conſequence of its comparing "two or more things together." Therefore ſome acts of the will are effects. How is this conſiſtent with what the Doctor holds both in his former book and in this, that volition cannot be properly called an effect? Beſides; what the Doctor here ſays, is applicable to all volitions, and therefore all volitions are according to his own account, effects. For all volitions are "determinations or concluſions, which the mind makes "in conſequence of its comparing two or more things "together." If two or more things be expreſsly propoſed, and one of them be choſen, it is the very caſe here ſtated by Dr. Weſt. Or if one thing only be expreſsly and poſitively propoſed as the object of our choice, ſtill there is a real competition between this thing and the abſence or neglect of it; and the mind comes to a determination in conſequence of its comparing theſe two together. Therefore according to Dr. Weſt's own account every volition "may with "propriety be called an effect;" and yet according to the

the ſame Dr. Weſt, "volition cannot be properly called an effect." "How can theſe things be?"

But Dr. Weſt endeavours to evade this conſequence, by ſaying, "I have uſed the term *volition* to ſignify "*the mind conſidered as acting*. In this ſenſe and in "this only, I ſay volition is not *an effect*." But the mind conſidered as acting, acts in conſequence of comparing two or more things together, and ſuch an act Dr. Weſt allows to be an effect. Alſo he grants, "that the human mind and all its powers and facul-"ties are effects;" p. 13. But will he ſay, that the human mind with all its powers and faculties *dormant* and *inactive*, is an effect, but the ſame mind with its powers and faculties *acting*, is not an effect? And does it ceaſe to be an effect or a creature, as ſoon as it begins to act?

"If volition be only the mind acting; and if the "mind acting is properly a cauſe, then it is not prop-"er to call it an effect." Ibid, p. 13. But what or where is the impropriety of calling it an effect? In ſuch a diſpute as this, to aſſert ſuch a novel propoſition without proof or illuſtration, is unreaſonable. By the ſame reaſoning it may be proved, that any man who makes any thing is himſelf not an effect or creature. Thus, If a carpenter at work be properly a cauſe of a ſhip, then it is not proper to call him an effect or creature; and if Dr. Weſt writing be properly the cauſe of ſeveral eſſays on liberty and neceſſity; then it is not proper to call him a creature.

"When volition is uſed to ſignify the mind act-"ing, in that view it is properly a cauſe and not an "effect;" ibid, p. 28. What if it be properly a cauſe? This does not prevent its being properly an effect too, any more than the Doctor's being properly the cauſe of ſeveral eſſays prevents his being, or proves that he is not, properly a creature of God.——"Cauſes as "cauſes, are not effects;" ibid, p. 13. Then authors as authors, are not the creatures of God.

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The Dr. argues, ibid, p. 94, That an action cannot be the effect of the Deity, becauſe "an effect is "moſt certainly paſſive in coming into being ——— "but this will imply *paſſive action* or *inactive action*, "which is abſurd." I grant, that an effect is in this ſenſe paſſive, that it is produced by the agency of the efficient cauſe; and in that ſenſe a volition cauſed by the Deity or other efficient cauſe is paſſive. If Dr. Weſt mean by paſſive action, an action which in its production is cauſed by an extrinſic cauſe, I grant it; and however Dr. Weſt pronounces it *abſurd*, he knows, that it is as eaſy for another to pronounce it *not abſurd*; and the one pronunciation is juſt as good proof as the other. Volition is action, and if the Doctor will prove to the conviction of candid inquirers, that ſuch an action cannot be the effect of a divine agency or other extrinſic cauſe; he will do ſomething more than affirm the contrary to be abſurd. As to the expreſſion *inactive action*, if by this he mean, that the action is the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, I grant it, and demand proof that the idea of ſuch an action is abſurd. If he mean an action, which is not voluntary; I know of no perſon who pleads for ſuch an action.

What the Doctor ſays here, as well as almoſt his whole book, may be eaſily retorted. Suppoſe volition is not from an extrinſic cauſe, but from the ſubject as the cauſe; ſtill it is as really and fully paſſive with reſpect to its cauſe and in coming into exiſtence, as if it were the effect of an extrinſic cauſe. It would as much be the ſubject of the operation of this intrinſic cauſe, in order to its exiſtence. Therefore in this caſe too we have *paſſive action* and *inactive action*.

The Doctor in p. 23, Part I, ſays, "How can he" [man] "be an agent, if volition be the effect of "an extrinſic cauſe?" To which I anſwer by aſking another queſtion or two; How can he in volition be

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an agent, if it be the effect of an intrinsic cause? The volition is still as passive in this case and equally produced by the efficiency of its cause, as it is when produced by an extrinsic cause. And how can man be an agent, if as the Doctor holds, volition be the effect of no cause, extrinsic or intrinsic? In that case, it is merely casual or accidental, like the motion of one of Epicurus's atoms in the infinite void.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER VI.

Of Foreknowledge and the Certainty or Neceſſity implied in it.

DR. Weſt begins his third eſſay thus; "We ſhall "endeavour to ſhow, in this eſſay, that infalli- "ble foreknowledge in the Deity does not prove, that "events take place in conſequence of an antecedent "or previous neceſſity;" p. 29. Let foreknowledge prove or not prove what it will, unleſs events take place abſolutely without a cauſe, they do take place in conſequence of an antecedent or previous neceſſity. Unleſs they take place abſolutely without a cauſe, they are effects; and every effect neceſſarily follows its cauſe. Dr. Weſt grants, p. 23, "that every ef- "fect is wholly paſſive with regard to the cauſe which "produces it." And as it is paſſive, it is brought into exiſtence by the cauſing or neceſſitating influence of its cauſe. Its exiſtence therefore "takes place in "conſequence of an antecedent or previous neceſſity;" and this is true of all events, which happen without cauſe. But Dr. Weſt denies, that any events take place without a cauſe. Therefore he muſt concede, that all events "take place in conſequence of an "antecedent neceſſity."

If to this it ſhould be ſaid, that though all events are effects, and are neceſſitated by their reſpective cauſes, and in that reſpect take place in conſequence of an antecedent neceſſity: Yet as volitions are the effects of the mind, in which they exiſt, this cauſe does not *produce* them or exert its producing act, in conſequence of an antecedent neceſſity; I anſwer, The mind, if it do efficiently cauſe volitions, cauſes them either in conſequence of an antecedent certainty, or without that certainty. If it cauſe them in conſequence of antecedent certainty, it cauſes them under the influ-

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ence of moral neceſſity; for antecedent certainty of moral actions is all we mean by moral neceſſity. If it cauſe them without that certainty, it cauſes them contingently and by mere chance or blind fate.

Beſides, if the mind cauſe its own volitions, it neceſſitates them into exiſtence, and therefore they come into exiſtence under the influence of antecedent neceſſity; and the cauſing act is an event and therefore muſt have a cauſe, and *this* cauſe muſt neceſſitate *this* event into exiſtence; and ſo it runs into an infinite ſeries of acts cauſing one another, every one of which comes into exiſtence in conſequence of an antecedent neceſſity.

That the infallible divine foreknowledge of any event does imply all that antecedent neceſſity of the future exiſtence of that event, for which we contend, may appear thus:——The infallible or certain foreknowledge of any event is a knowledge of the certainty or certain truth, that the event will come into exiſtence; and that certainty which is the object of this knowledge, is all the neceſſity, for which we contend. This is what Preſident Edwards calls philoſophical neceſſity, which with regard to moral actions is moral neceſſity; and it muſt exiſt at the time the knowledge of it exiſts, and indeed in order to be the object of knowledge: And as the knowledge is by the ſuppoſition *foreknowledge*, therefore it muſt exiſt before the event foreknown, and therefore the certainty or neceſſity of that event muſt exiſt before the event itſelf; of courſe it is *antecedent* neceſſity. To ſuppoſe otherwiſe is to ſuppoſe, that a certainty or certain truth may be ſeen and known before it exiſts, and that what is not, may be ſeen and known to be.

Dr. Weſt argues, p. 32, that becauſe "the Deity is "poſſeſſed of an underived ſelf-exiſting knowledge, "which is independent of any cauſe or medium what"ever, and his knowledge can extend to all futuri"ties, independent of the imperfect mode of inferring "concluſions from their premiſes; conſequently in-

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"fallible preſcience in the Deity cannot imply any "antecedent neceſſity of the event foreknown." By antecedent neceſſity we mean antecedent certainty or antecedent certain truth. Now does Dr. Weſt mean, that ſince the Deity poſſeſſes an underived and ſelf-exiſtent knowledge, therefore he ſees and knows, that there is a certainty of the future exiſtence of an event, when there really is no ſuch certainty? Or that God knows that to exiſt, which does not exiſt? He does mean this, if he mean any thing to the purpoſe. For if he mean, that God ſees a certainty which exiſts, it does exiſt in order to be ſeen; and therefore antecedent certainty or moral neceſſity is implied in the divine preſcience. But let the knowledge of God be ever ſo underived, ſelf-exiſtent and independent, it will not enable him to diſcern that which is not, to ſee truth or certainty, before it exiſts, or to ſee truth to be falſehood and falſehood to be truth.——If by *independent* knowledge he mean a knowledge which is not dependent on the truth and has not truth for its foundation and object; he muſt ſtill mean, that God can know a propoſition to be true which is not true.

It is manifeſtly implied in what Dr. Weſt ſays on this ſubject, that if divine foreknowledge were derived through any *medium*, or if it be founded on decrees, it would be utterly inconſiſtent with human liberty. But ſince it is, as he ſuppoſes, immediate and not dependent on decrees, it is perfectly conſiſtent with human liberty.——That there will be a general rejection of antichriſt and antichriſtian errours, we know by the medium of divine prediction: And does the Doctor believe that this our knowledge is more inconſiſtent with the liberty of thoſe, who ſhall reject antichriſt, than the abſolute and underived knowledge of God? Or than our own knowledge of the ſame fact, if it were intuitive and underived?

The Doctor adds, "If this definition of the divine knowledge," viz. that it is underived, ſelf-exiſtent and independent, "be juſt; then it will follow that there "is

" is no previous or antecedent *certainty in the things* " *themſelves*, upon which divine preſcience is founded." This manifeſtly implies, that God foreknows things before they are future, and ſees a certainty before it is. " By certainty," ſays the Doctor, " in the things " themſelves, previous to the divine knowledge, *muſt* " *be meant* ſome medium diſtinct from the things them- " ſelves, by which they render themſelves evident " to the divine knowledge." He here aſſerts, but brings nothing to prove what he aſſerts. And what ſignify ſuch bare aſſertions? Does the Doctor expect his readers will receive them as proofs? May they not juſtly demand evidence, that this *medium* which he here mentions, muſt be meant by certainty in things themſelves? By that certainty I mean no ſuch thing: But poſitively I do mean what Preſident Edwards declares that he meant, " The firm and infallible con- " nection between the ſubject and predicate of the " propoſition," which affirms them to be connected; or the *real truth* of the propoſition. For inſtance it is a real truth, that I am now writing, and the certainty or reality of this truth or fact, is the ground of the divine knowledge of it; and this certainty conſiſts in the firm and indiſſoluble connection of the ſubject and predicate of the propoſition which affirms, that I am writing. This certainty or truth of the thing is no " medium diſtinct from the thing" or fact " itſelf, by " which it renders itſelf evident to the divine knowl- " edge;" but it is the real exiſtence of the very thing or fact.——Again, it is to all Chriſtians a real and certain futurity and truth, that Jeſus Chriſt will judge in righteouſneſs. But the truth and certainty of this future event is not a *medium* diſtinct from the futurity of the event itſelf, by which it renders itſelf evident to the divine mind; but it is the real and infallible futurity of the event itſelf and conſiſts in the firm and infallible connection between the ſubject and predicate of the propoſition which affirms the futurity of the event. Now will Dr. Weſt pretend, that there

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is no truth or no firm and infallible connection between the ſubject and predicate of the propoſition, that *I am now writing*, which is the foundation of the divine knowledge of that event? If this were ſo, real truth and fact would not be the foundation, rule or object of the divine knowledge; but God might indifferently know truth to be falſehood and falſehood truth.

Or if by "the medium by which things render "themſelves evident," the Doctor mean *the truth and reality of things*; I grant that what ever is known whether to God or creatures, is known by this medium; and this is true of the moſt ſelf-evident propoſitions and of the moſt independent and underived knowledge. But to call this *a medium* of knowledge is a perverſion of language. Surely truth is not the medium by which itſelf is known.

Dr. Weſt himſelf notwithſtanding his abundant labour "to ſhow, that infallible foreknowledge in the "Deity does not prove, that events take place in con- "ſequence of an antecedent neceſſity;" fully and frequently grants all that we maintain. Thus, p. 37. "That the Deity does perfectly diſcern all connec- "tions between ſubjects and predicates ——— is "readily granted." Now this implies, that the ſaid ſubjects and predicates are really and in themſelves connected, and in order of nature before that connection is diſcerned. This real and certain connection is the certainty or certain truth of things themſelves, of which we have been ſpeaking; and which with regard to moral events and actions is moral neceſſity. P. 41. "The future volitions of moral agents are ſo infalli- "bly and indiſſolubly connected with the divine fore- "knowledge, which has had exiſtence from all eterni- "ty, that it is impoſſible, that the Deity ſhould be de- "ceived; and therefore all theſe volitions will moſt "*certainly* take place." P. 46. "There may be a "*certainty* ——— that ſuch a thing will take place," ſpeaking of an human action. But certainty with regard

gard to moral actions is moral neceſſity, and if all volitions foreknown by God will *certainly* take place, they will take place by moral neceſſity.——P. 52. "All things from eternity to eternity being preſent to "the divine mind, *he ſees all things as they are.*" Therefore if he ſee ſome events as certainly future, they are certainly future; for he ſees them as they are. And this certain futurity is the object of the divine knowledge, and in the order of nature is antecedent to it, as really as the exiſtence of this paper, on which I am writing, is in the order of nature antecedent to my ſight of it. But this antecedent certain futurity of any moral action, is antecedent moral neceſſity. Therefore as all moral actions are *foreknown* by God in conſequence of an antecedent moral neceſſity, much more do they *come into exiſtence* in conſequence of ſuch an antecedent neceſſity.——P. 53. "Deity would from all eternity have "infallibly foreknown this propoſition, *as a certain* "*truth*," viz. the propoſition concerning Peter and Judas denying and betraying their Lord. It ſeems then that whatever propoſition concerning a future event is infallibly foreknown by God, is foreknown as a certain and infallible truth; or which is the ſame thing, it is known, as an infallible truth, that the event will come to paſs; and therefore it is a certain and infallible truth antecedently in the order of nature to the knowledge of it; and therefore the event being a moral act, was morally neceſſary antecedently to the foreknowledge, and much more antecedently to the event itſelf.——P. 52. "This neceſſity being only "a conſequence founded upon *the certainty of the* "*thing* foreknown." Thus notwithſtanding all Dr. Weſt's clamour againſt Preſident Edwards, becauſe he had ſpoken of a *certainty in things themſelves*, he himſelf here expreſsly holds the very ſame. And will Dr. Weſt deny, that this "certainty of the thing foreknown" is the ground of the divine foreknowledge of that thing, in the ſame ſenſe, that my preſent

exiſtence is the ground of the divine knowledge, that I exiſt? If this be not denied, it cannot be denied, that certainty or moral neceſſity is in order of nature antecedent to the foreknowledge, and much more antecedent to the exiſtence, of a moral action.

Dr. Weſt will not deny, that any future event foreknown by God, will certainly come to paſs. Then there is a certainty, or it is an infallible truth, that every ſuch event will come to paſs, and this certainty now exiſts antecedently to the exiſtence of the event. But this certainty with regard to moral events, is moral neceſſity. Therefore there is a neceſſity of the exiſtence of all events divinely foreknown, and this neceſſity is antecedent to the exiſtence of the events. Thus, mere foreknowledge is an infallible proof of antecedent neceſſity.

"We frequently ſay, It is a pity ſuch a perſon did "ſo; there was no occaſion for it; he might eaſily "have omitted the doing of the thing in the time of "it, if he would. Why may we not as well ſay, A "man *will certainly* do a particular thing, though he "will have power to forbear doing it? There could "not be the leaſt appearance of abſurdity or contra-"diction in ſpeaking in this manner about a future "action, any more than about a paſt action, were it "not for the great difficulty or ſuppoſed impoſſibility "of conceiving how a thing can be foreknown, un-"leſs it be connected with ſomething that now ex-"iſts; that is, a thing cannot be foreknown, unleſs "there is a medium, which has a preſent exiſtence." P. 30.——On this paſſage I remark,

1. Here again Dr. Weſt holds that certainty in things, which he ſo abundantly reprobates in Preſident Edwards. He ſays, "a man *will certainly* do a particular thing;" and he doubtleſs means, that it is a certain futurity, the event itſelf is certain, or it is a certain and infallible truth, that the man will do the thing; and not merely that this truth is known, whether by God or creature. Truth is truth wheth-

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er known or not: And this infallible truth is the very certainty in the things themſelves, of which Preſident Edwards ſpeaks.

2. What does Dr. Weſt mean, when he ſays, "He might eaſily have omitted the doing of the thing, "*if he would?*" Suppoſe the thing done was an *internal* act, a volition to go to a debauch: In what ſenſe does Dr. Weſt mean, that the man could have avoided this volition, *if he would?* Does he mean, that if he had not had the volition, he would not have had it? This is an undoubted truth, but does not diſprove the neceſſity of it. If God had not always ſpoken the truth, he would not have ſpoken the truth. But it does not hence follow, that God does not always neceſſarily ſpeak the truth, when he ſpeaks at all, or that he can lie. If there had been no God, there would indeed have been no God; but does it hence follow, that the divine exiſtence is not neceſſary?——To ſay, that if a man had choſen not to go to a debauch, he would indeed have choſen not to go to it, is too great trifling to be imputed to Dr. Weſt. Yet to ſay, that the man could have avoided the *external action* of going to the debauch, if he would, would be equal trifling; for the queſtion before us is concerning the liberty of the *will* or *mind* and not of the body.——On the whole, we have before us one of Dr. Weſt's *things hard to be underſtood*, and we muſt wait for an explanation.

3. When we ſay concerning any paſt action of a man, "There was no occaſion for it; he might eaſi-"ly have omitted the doing of the thing in the time "of it, if he would;" if we mean, that there was no antecedent certainty, that he would perform that action, we mean a falſehood. That action was as much from eternity the object of the divine omniſcience, as any action which is now future; therefore the certainty of its then future exiſtence preceded its actual exiſtence. And this certainty was as fixed, unalterable and indefeaſible, as the divine foreknowledge or the

divine decree. The foreknowledge and decree of God imply no other kind or degree of neceſſity, than the aforeſaid abſolute certainty. A futurity that is abſolutely certain is implied in the divine foreknowledge; and the addition of a decree cannot increaſe that certainty.

4. When we ſay, A perſon might eaſily have omitted a certain paſt action, in the time of it, if he would; we commonly mean, that he was under no compulſion or coaction, or no *natural* neceſſity; and that he had a *natural power* to omit the action. This undoubtedly every man has with regard to every voluntary action, and this however that action be foreknown or decreed by God. Though Judas betrayed his Maſter, "according to the determinate counſel and "foreknowledge of God;" yet he was under no *natural* neceſſity to betray him, but had a full *natural power* to do otherwiſe. Now Dr. Weſt reconciles foreknowledge with liberty, on the ground that we have ſtill *a phyſical* or natural power to do otherwiſe. On the ſame ground we may reconcile abſolute decrees with liberty.

5. In the ſame ſenſe "we may as well ſay, Such a "man will *certainly* do a particular thing, though he "will have power to forbear the doing of it." He may doubtleſs have a *natural* power to forbear; ſtill this does not at all diminiſh the *certain futurity* of the action; and that whether the action be foreknown only, or foreknown and decreed. And a natural power is all the power, which the man will have to forbear the action. Any power oppoſed to moral neceſſity or the certain futurity of the action, would imply that it is uncertain, whether he will perform that action; which is contrary to the ſuppoſition made by Dr. Weſt, "that the man *will certainly* do the thing."

6. As to "the great difficulty or ſuppoſed impoſſi-"bility of conceiving, *how* a thing can be foreknown, un-"leſs it be connected with ſomething that now exiſts;" this is needleſsly brought in here. In this part of the argument

argument we are under no neceſſity of inquiring or ſhowing *how* God foreknows future events, but may, ſo far as relates to the certain futurity of all events foreknown by God and the antecedency of that certainty to the exiſtence of the events, allow, that God foreknows future events in the independent and underived manner, which Dr. Weſt maintains. This would equally imply a certainty antecedent to the exiſtence of the events foreknown, as a foreknowledge founded on a decree would imply it. Dr. Weſt's account of the divine foreknowledge implies, as I have ſhown, all that certainty or neceſſity, for which we plead. Beſide what has been already ſaid to ſhow this, I add, that Dr. Weſt grants, that foreknowledge has no cauſal influence to bring things into exiſtence, or to make their exiſtence more certain, than it would be without foreknowledge. "I ſuppoſe it will be "readily granted on all ſides, that even the divine "foreknowledge itſelf has no influence or cauſal force, "with regard to the thing foreknown, either to bring "it into exiſtence or to hinder its happening; but "that all things would take place juſt in the ſame "manner, if they were not foreknown, as they do "now;" p. 45. Dr. Weſt alſo grants, that all future events are foreknown by God, and that all things which are foreknown by him, will certainly and infallibly come to paſs. Now as this certainty is not cauſed by foreknowledge, it muſt exiſt independently of it. And as God ſees all things as they are; therefore when he ſees them to be certainly future, they *are* certainly future; and this certain futurity, which is the object of the divine knowledge, exiſted in the order of nature antecedently to the divine knowledge, and much more antecedently to the actual exiſtence of the events themſelves. Otherwiſe God would ſee events to be certainly future, while they are not certainly future.

"The obvious reaſon," ſays Dr. Weſt, p. 31, "why we cannot know things but only by intuition

"or proof, is becauſe all our knowledge is entirely *ab* "*extra*." And does the Doctor believe, that if part of our knowledge were not *ab extra*, we ſhould know ſome things neither by intuition nor by proof? Whatever is known by intuition is ſelf-evident; and whatever is known by proof, is evident by the medium of ſomething elſe. And whatever is known at all, is either evident by itſelf immediately, or is evident by ſomething elſe mediately. Therefore Dr. Weſt, in ſuppoſing, that if our knowledge were not all *ab extra*, we ſhould know ſome things neither by intuition nor by proof, ſuppoſes that ſome things would be evident to us, neither immediately nor mediately, neither by themſelves nor by any thing elſe: And what kind of a ſource of knowledge we ſhould then have, I leave the Doctor to explain.

"If previous certainty in things themſelves means "nothing diſtinct from the things themſelves, then all "that can be meant by this previous certainty in things "themſelves, upon which the divine knowledge is "founded, is only this, that the Deity cannot know "that things will exiſt, which he knows never will ex-"iſt. And therefore to ſay, that there is a previous "certainty in things themſelves, upon which the di-"vine knowledge is founded, is only ſaying in other "words, that the divine knowledge is founded on the "divine knowledge;" p. 34. By certainty in things themſelves I have already explained myſelf to mean the *truth* and *reality* of things themſelves, or the truth of the propoſition which aſſerts their exiſtence or relation: And *previous* certainty of things themſelves means nothing different from the truth of the propoſition, which aſſerts their future exiſtence, or its being a real truth, that thoſe things will exiſt. Now, whether to ſay, that the divine foreknowledge of an event, is founded on the truth, that the event will come into exiſtence, be the ſame as to ſay, "that the divine fore-"knowledge is founded on the divine foreknowledge," I am willing any candid perſon ſhould judge.

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The Doctor ſays, p. 34, "That knowledge in the "Deity muſt mean the ſame thing with certainty." No doubt knowledge in the Deity is the ſame thing with *ſubjective* certainty or certain knowledge; but it is not the ſame with *objective* certainty, or the truth which is the object of the divine knowledge.

The Doctor grants, p. 41, "That the future vo-"litions of moral agents are ſo infallibly and indiſſo-"lubly connected with the divine foreknowledge, "which has had exiſtence from all eternity, that it is "impoſſible, that the Deity ſhould be deceived; and "therefore theſe volitions will moſt *certainly* take "place. For by *neceſſary* here he" [Preſident Edwards] "can ——— mean nothing diſtinct from *in-"fallible certainty*. But how does their being neceſſa-"ry in this ſenſe, *i. e. infallibly certain*, prove that the "volitions of moral agents are effects produced by an "*extrinſic* cauſe."——Undoubtedly by neceſſity in this caſe Preſident Edwards means nothing diſtinct from infallible certainty. This is the very thing which he abundantly declares himſelf to mean. "And as "the divine foreknowledge," by Dr. Weſt's conceſſion, "has had exiſtence from eternity;" and as "the "volitions of moral agents are indiſſolubly connected "with that foreknowledge," and "thoſe volitions will "moſt certainly take place;" of courſe there was an infallible eternal certainty, that all human volitions would come into exiſtence juſt as they do exiſt, and Dr. Weſt grants all that we hold on this head. What then becomes of liberty *to either ſide, to act or not act?* For inſtance, it is now divinely foreknown, that *Gog* and *Magog* will riſe and compaſs the camp of the ſaints. Therefore when *Gog* and *Magog* ſhall come into exiſtence, they will no more have a liberty *to act or not act*, as to this inſtance of their conduct, than they would have, on the ſuppoſition that the ſame conduct were decreed.——It is true, there would be this difference in the caſes, that the decree would *cauſe* the certain futurity of that conduct, but the

foreknowledge would not *cauſe* it: Nor is it of any importance as to liberty, by whom or by what this certain futurity is cauſed, or whether it be without cauſe. If a priſon when built, be no obſtruction to liberty, then the agency of the maſon and carpenter who built it was nothing oppoſed to liberty. So if *certain futurity*, when eſtabliſhed, be not inconſiſtent with liberty; then the divine decree, by which it is eſtabliſhed, is not inconſiſtent with liberty.

If it ſhould be ſaid, that God foreſees, that *Gog* and *Magog* will influence themſelves to the conduct juſt now mentioned; be it ſo; then it is now infallibly certain, that *Gog* and *Magog* will influence themſelves to that conduct. Where then is their liberty to act or not act? It is not left looſe and undetermined, whether they ſhall influence themſelves to that conduct; but it is previouſly certain, that they will influence themſelves to it.

The Doctor in the laſt quotation, aſks, "How "does their being infallibly certain, prove that the "volitions of moral agents are effects produced by "an *extrinſic* cauſe?"——Suppoſe they are not effects of an *extrinſic* cauſe, but are effected by the ſubject of thoſe volitions, if that were poſſible; yet if it be previouſly and from all eternity certain, that the ſubject will produce theſe volitions in himſelf; ſtill there is no *liberty to either ſide, to act or not act*; but he is limited to produce in himſelf thoſe very definite volitions, which are divinely foreſeen, and therefore he is confined *to one ſide*, is confined *to act* and that definitely.

Or ſuppoſe theſe volitions are produced by no cauſe whatever, then God foreſees that they are about to happen abſolutely without cauſe and by mere chance; ſtill there is in this caſe no liberty to either ſide, but the volitions are without cauſe confined to one ſide only.

It is abundantly pleaded by Dr. Weſt and others, that the circumſtance that the divine foreknowledge is not the efficient cauſe of human volitions, renders

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that foreknowledge entirely consistent with their idea of liberty, even as the divine knowledge of a volition in present existence is consistent with the liberty of that volition.——If by liberty in this case they mean self-determination or the causation of volition by the subject himself; I grant, that the most absolute foreknowledge is perfectly consistent with this idea of liberty: And so is an absolute decree as consistent with it. If God were absolutely to decree, that a particular man shall cause in himself a particular volition, the man would accordingly cause that volition in himself, and therefore according to the definition of liberty now given, he would be free.—— But if by liberty in this case be meant, what the writers to whom I am opposed, call *a liberty to either side*, and *a power to act or not act*, as opposed to moral necessity; the divine foreknowledge of a volition is utterly inconsistent with the liberty of that volition. For according to this definition, liberty implies, that the volition is not fixed or determined, and therefore it is uncertain what it will be, or whether it will be at all. But divine foreknowledge implies, that it is absolutely certain, that a volition foreknown will be, and what it will be, as Dr. West grants.

The circumstance, that foreknowledge does not efficiently *cause* an event to be certainly future, is nothing to the present purpose. We are not now inquiring what *causes* an event to be certainly future, but whether it *be* certainly future. If it be certainly future it is necessary, in the sense in which we use the word *necessity*, let what will be the cause of that futurity, or if the futurity be uncaused. Divine prophecy is not the cause of the futurity of the event foretold, yet no man will say, that it does not prove the certain futurity of that event. But prophecy no more implies or proves the certain futurity of the event foretold, than the divine foreknowledge implies and proves the certain futurity of the event foreknown.—— To say, that a divine decree is inconsistent with liber-

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ty, because it *makes* the action certainly future, when the certain futurity itself is allowed to be consistent with liberty, is very strange! What if it does make it certainly future? That certain futurity, when made, is not inconsistent with liberty. So long as this is granted, to hold that the divine decree as making or producing that certain futurity is inconsistent with liberty, is as absurd as to grant that a free circulation of the fluids in the animal constitution is consistent with health; and yet to hold, that exercise *as producing* and merely because it produces that free circulation, is inconsistent with health.

I grant, that divine foreknowledge is as consistent with liberty, as the divine knowledge of a present volition is. If by liberty be meant the causation of volition by the subject, God may undoubtedly as well foresee this, as see it present. But if by liberty be meant a liberty to either side, a liberty to act or not act, as opposed to moral necessity; since this implies, with regard to an act now in existence, uncertainty whether the act does exist, and with regard to a future act, uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether it will exist; I say, no such uncertainty is or can be with regard either to an act seen by God to be now in existence, or an act divinely foreseen. As therefore the divine knowledge of the present existence of an act, is utterly inconsistent with this kind of liberty in that act; we need not and we do not pretend, that the divine foreknowledge of an act is more inconsistent with the same kind of liberty in the act foreknown.——There is this difference however in the cases; knowledge of a present act does not imply, that the act was certain *previously* to its existence. But the foreknowledge of an act does imply this. This difference ought carefully to be noticed, or we shall run into great errour. If, when it is said, that foreknowledge no more proves a necessity of the act foreknown, than the knowledge of an act at present existing, proves the necessity of this

this act, the meaning be, that foreknowledge no more proves, that the future act foreknown is certainly future *previouſly* to the exiſtence of it, than the knowledge of a preſent act proves, that this act was certainly future *previouſly* to its exiſtence; the truth of this propoſition is by no means allowed. Foreknowledge by the very term reſpects a future event; of courſe the foreknowledge exiſts before the event. And as it is granted on all hands, that foreknowledge implies a certainty of the event foreknown; it follows, that there is a certainty of the future exiſtence of every event foreknown, and this certainty is previous to the exiſtence of the event. But the knowledge of a preſent event may not exiſt before the event itſelf; if it does, it is then *foreknowledge*. And as it does not, ſo far as it is the bare knowledge of a preſent event, exiſt before the event; it does not imply a *previous* certainty, that the event would come into exiſtence.

My ſeeing a man perform an action does not prove, that it was certain beforehand, that he could perform it. But if a prophet under inſpiration ſee, that a man will tomorrow perform a certain action, this does prove, that it is beforehand certain, that he will perform it. And ſurely the foreſight of a prophet no more proves this, than the foreknowledge of God.——Suppoſe the act foreknown by God, is about to be ſelf-originated, ſtill it is as neceſſary or certain beforehand, as if it were not to be ſelf-originated; becauſe the foreknowledge is from eternity and therefore precedes the exiſtence of the act out of the divine mind. For though all things are always preſent *in the divine mind*; yet all things are not always in preſent exiſtence *out of the divine mind*, any more than all creatures exiſted from eternity.——Be it ſo, that in the divine foreknowledge all things are preſent; then all human volitions are from eternity as fixed and certain, as if they exiſted from eternity not only in the divine mind, but out of the divine mind, and are as incapable of not exiſting, as the divine mind is incapable of deluſion or errour.

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"Bare *certainty*, that an agent will do ſuch a thing, "does not imply in it, that he had not in himſelf a "*power* to refrain from doing it;" p. 45. This depends on the meaning of the word *power* to refrain. If this mean *natural* power, as it has been explained, it is granted, that ever ſo great certainty and even a divine abſolute decree, that an agent ſhall do ſuch a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not in himſelf a power to refrain from doing it. But if by *power* to refrain be meant *moral* power, or a power oppoſite to moral neceſſity, which is the bare certainty of a moral action, it is abſurd and ſelf-contradictory to ſay, that the bare certainty that an agent will do ſuch a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not a power to refrain from doing it. It is the very ſame abſurdity and contradiction, as to ſay, that a bare certainty, that an agent will do ſuch a particular thing, does not imply in it a certainty, that he will do it.

In the ſame page the Doctor tells us, "The only "queſtion is, whether ſuppoſing it to be foreknown, "that an agent will conduct in ſuch a manner, at "ſuch a time, it will be any contradiction to affirm, "that the ſaid agent will have a power, at the ſame "time, to act in a different manner." If it be foreknown, that an agent will act in a particular manner, at a particular time; it will be granted, that there is a certainty, that he will act in that particular. But certainty of moral action is *moral neceſſity*, and moral inability of the contrary. And to aſſert, that an agent is under a moral inability to act in a different manner, and yet has a moral power to act in a different manner, is a direct contradiction.

The Doctor ſays, p. 29, "That infallible fore-"knowledge in the Deity does not prove, that events "take place in conſequence of an antecedent or pre-"vious neceſſity; that it only proves a *logical* neceſ-"ſity or a neceſſity *of conſequence*; *i. e.* it being *cer-"tain*, that a thing will take place, it follows, that to "aſſert that it will not take place, muſt be falſe and

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"cannot be true."——As the Doctor makes much of this, which he calls a *logical* neceſſity, or a neceſſity *of conſequence*, let us examine it.

The foreknowledge of God is here ſaid to prove a logical neceſſity only, or a neceſſity of conſequence; which is ſaid to be this, that "it being certain, that a "thing will take place, it follows, that to aſſert that "it will not take place, muſt be falſe and cannot be "true." Here one thing is ſaid to follow from another, by a logical neceſſity or a neceſſity of conſequence. Let us take an example: It is a certain truth that the dead will riſe; and does it hence *follow*, that it is a falſehood, that the dead will not riſe? No, the latter is no more a conſequence from the former, than the former is a conſequence from the latter; or than that twice two are not unequal to four, is a conſequence from this propoſition, that twice two are equal to four; or than from its being true, that a thing *is*, it follows as a conſequence that it is not true, that it *is not*. The one is no conſequence from the other, but is preciſely the ſame thing expreſſed in different words, which convey the very ſame idea. You might as well ſay, that if a man be *kind*, it follows as a conſequence, that he is *benevolent*; or that if a man be *buſy*, it follows as a conſequence, that he is employed in *buſineſs*. Thus we may argue and draw conſequences all day long, yet make no more progreſs, than the ſoldier who marches without gaining ground.

Dr. Weſt ſays, p. 32, "No neceſſity is implied in "divine preſcience, except merely a logical one; "but this ——— is in the nature of things *ſubſequent* "to the infallible foreknowledge of the exiſtence of "the thing foreknown." But does Dr. Weſt mean, that in foreknowledge God foreſees an event as uncertain, and that in conſequence of this foreſight the event becomes certain? Surely the Doctor did not well conſider the ſubject, if this be his meaning. To foreknow is certainly to foreſee: And certainly to foreſee, is to ſee a future event as certainly about to be.

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This certainty of its futurity is supposed and implied in foreknowledge, and is not the *consequence* of it. Dr. West says, "It will be readily granted on all sides, "that even the divine foreknowledge itself has no in- "fluence nor causal force, with regard to the thing "foreknown, either to bring it into existence, or to "hinder its happening." Therefore it has no influence to make its existence certain or necessary; how then is the necessity *subsequent* to foreknowledge? The certainty of its existence is *antecedent* in the order of nature to the foreknowledge, and is the ground or the object of it. This also is abundantly implied in various passages of Dr. West's book, as has been shown above. In p. 53, the Doctor speaks of his logical necessity as "only a *consequence founded* upon the "certainty of the thing foreknown." But this certainty of moral actions is the very moral necessity, for which we plead. If the Doctor mean this by his logical necessity, it is presumed, that the reader sees the absurdity of saying, that this necessity is *consequent* on the divine foreknowledge; and also the absurdity of saying that it is *founded on* the certainty of the thing foreknown. A thing is not consequent on itself nor on that which is founded on itself, as foreknowledge is founded on the certainty of the thing foreknown. If the Doctor mean any thing else by his logical necessity, I wish to be informed how he means any thing to the purpose of opposing that moral necessity of human actions, which President Edwards had advanced, and by which he explained himself to mean the certainty of moral actions. A logical necessity consequent on that certainty is a different thing from the certainty itself.

But allowing, what Dr. West holds, That foreknowledge proves a necessity consequential to foreknowledge; this necessity would be as inconsistent with liberty, as one that is antecedent to foreknowledge; because the necessity would exist antecedently to the actions of creatures, as it follows immediately from foreknowledge.

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The Doctor, in his Second Part, p. 92, says, "Mr. "Edwards had raised a spectre, which he could not "lay. With him necessity was necessity; and with "him it was all one, whether the necessity was previ- "ous to the thing in question, or a consequence drawn "from the supposition of its having taken place." This is an injurious representation. The necessity for which President Edwards pleads, is "previous to "the thing in question," and he never pleads for a necessity which is "a consequence drawn from the mere "supposition of its having taken place." The necessity for which he pleads, is that which is implied in divine foreknowledge; and as this exists before the event foreknown, so the necessity which is implied in it and proved by it, is also previous to that event, and does not follow or begin to exist in consequence even of that foreknowledge, and much less in consequence of the supposition, that the thing foreknown has taken place. The only thing, so far as I know, which could give occasion for this representation by Dr. West is, that President Edwards calls this necessity *a necessity of consequence*, and says, that a thing necessary in its own nature, or one that has already come into existence, being supposed, another thing necessarily connected with either of the former, and the necessity of whose existence is in question, certainly follows; *i. e.* the necessity of this last thing certainly follows from the existence or supposition of the existence, of either of the former. For instance, when the divine decree or foreknowledge of an event is supposed, the existence of the event decreed or foreknown will certainly follow. But the necessity, which Dr. West injuriously imputes to President Edwards, is not the necessary existence of *one thing*, implied in the supposed existence of *another*; but the necessary existence of *one and the same thing*, so long as it is supposed to exist; and this necessary existence amounts to no more than the mere identical, trifling proposition, that *what is, is*. Of such trifling President Edwards was incapable,

pable, and the implicit imputation, that he has written an octavo volume in ſupport of a propoſition ſo inſignificant, ought either never to have been made, or to have been better ſupported, than by mere aſſertion.

In the latter part of his third eſſay, the Doctor has ſpent a number of pages to ſhow, that a certainty that a man will perform particular actions does not imply that he is under a neceſſity of performing them, or that he has no power to avoid them. But all this is labour loſt, and is eaſily anſwered by making the diſtinction between natural and moral inability; or it all depends on the ambiguity of words and is mere logomachy.

Dr. Clarke endeavours to evade the argument for moral neceſſity drawn from the divine foreknowledge, by ſaying, that foreknowledge no more implies neceſſity, than the truth of a propoſition aſſerting ſome future event implies neceſſity. This may be granted. If a propoſition aſſerting ſome future event, be a real and abſolute truth, there is an abſolute certainty of the event; ſuch abſolute certainty is all that is implied in the divine foreknowledge; and all the moral neceſſity for which we plead. And though this certainty is conſiſtent with a phyſical or natural ability to do otherwiſe, it is not conſiſtent with the contingence or uncertainty of the event. So that there is no liberty of contingence in the caſe, no liberty to either ſide, to act or not act, no liberty inconſiſtent with previous certainty of moral action, which is moral neceſſity.

Dr. Weſt ſtrenuouſly oppoſes the doctrine, that the divine decrees are the foundation of God's foreknowledge. As I have already obſerved, this queſtion ſeems to be foreign from the diſpute concerning liberty; therefore I do not wiſh to bring it in here; otherwiſe I ſhould have no objection to entering on the diſcuſſion of it. But ſuppoſe the contrary were true, that foreknowledge is the foundation of decrees;

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I presume it would be granted, that decrees immediately follow foreknowledge. Therefore all events are decreed before they come to pass. And as decrees establish, or imply an establishment of the events decreed, and this antecedently to their existence; therefore on this plan there is an absolute certainty of all events and moral actions, and that antecedently to the existence of those actions; because they are all absolutely decreed by God immediately on his foreknowledge of them and before they come into existence.

"If this does not imply, that foreknowledge is not "an essential, attribute, I am under a great mistake;" p. 35. Be it so, that Dr. West is under a great mistake; what follows? Is it impossible, that he should be under a great mistake? If foreknowledge be an essential attribute, it doubtless exists antecedently to human actions, and therefore implies a certainty of them antecedent to their existence. The truth is, that the foreknowledge of any particular event is no more an essential attribute of God, than the knowledge of any present or past event. Knowledge in general is an essential attribute; but any particular perception of the divine mind is no more an essential attribute, than any particular act of the divine will, or any one decree of God. Will in general is an essential attribute; but Dr. West will not pretend, that every act of the divine will is an essential attribute. Or if it be, doubtless every instance of foreknowledge is an essential attribute. By the same argument by which Dr. West proves, that according to our ideas of decrees and foreknowledge, knowledge is not an essential attribute; it may be proved, that according to Dr. West's ideas of those subjects, will is not an essential attribute of God. The Doctor, p. 36, tells us, "That the divine determinations are the Deity decreeing and willing;" *i. e.* they are the will of God. But according to him the divine determinations or decrees are founded on foreknowledge. There-

fore the divine will is founded on God's foreknowledge and is not an eſſential attribute of God, but is ſelf-created, or a creature of the divine underſtanding.

The advocates for liberty to act or not act, "pretend not to be able to ſolve the difficulty ariſing from "divine preſcience." This is an honeſt confeſſion. Yet with this acknowledged inſuperable difficulty attending this favourite doctrine, they are determined to adhere to it. This confeſſion Dr. Price in particular makes in the following words; "The foreknowledge of a "contingent event carrying the appearance of a contra-"diction, is indeed a difficulty; and I do not pretend to "be capable of removing it." Correſpondence with Prieſtley, p. 175.——If this be a ſufficient apology for holding a doctrine, which cannot be reconciled with an acknowledged truth, it will be eaſy to apologize for holding any doctrine whatever; *e. g.* the doctrine of tranſubſtantiation. It is only neceſſary to ſay, "That a body ſhould be turned into fleſh, and yet retain all the ſenſible qualities of bread, as it carries the appearance of a contradiction, is indeed a difficulty; and we do not pretend to be capable of removing it.

Dr. Weſt holds, p. 53, that what is foreknown by God, is *eternal truth*; yet, p. 33, he holds, that "there "is no antecedent certainty in things themſelves, on "which divine preſcience is founded:" *i. e.* God knows a propoſition to be a certain truth, before it is a certain truth, and after his knowledge of it, it becomes a certain and eternal truth; yet the divine knowledge has no cauſal influence to make it a truth.——He ſtrenuouſly oppoſes the idea, that human moral actions are certainly future antecedently to the divine foreknowledge of them; at the ſame time, he grants, that they are not *made* certainly future by the divine foreknowledge; and yet holds, that as foreknown by God, they are *eternal truths*. If they be eternal truths, doubtleſs the propoſitions which aſſert them, were certainly true from eternity, and therefore in the divine foreknowledge of them God perceived that eternal

nal truth and certainty, and that certainty was the object and so the ground of the divine foreknowledge, and therefore there was "an antecedent certainty in "things themselves, on which the divine prescience is "founded."——Besides, as the Doctor grants that foreknowledge has no influence to cause that certainty, I ask, By what is it caused? Is it caused by nothing? According to the Doctor the certain futurity of the things foreknown by God, does not exist antecedently to foreknowledge, and is not caused by it; yet it exists from eternity; and it is that very eternal truth which there is in all things foreknown by God.

In page 45, he grants, "that all things would take "place just in the same manner, if they were not fore-"known, as they do now." Then all things and all events are fixed and established independently of foreknowledge and antecedently to it, and were independently of foreknowledge certainly about to be. With what consistency then does Dr. West deny a certainty in things themselves antecedent to foreknowledge. And on what ground can he oppose the doctrine of divine decrees, which represents those decrees as antecedent in the order of nature to foreknowledge?

If God from all eternity knew events to be future, they were future, and future in the order of nature before foreknowledge, and were future by the divine agency or by the agency of some other cause, or of no cause at all. If they were future by the agency of God, that is all that the doctrine of absolute decrees implies. If they were future by the agency of any other cause, this supposes another eternal cause. If they were future by no cause, they may and will come into existence by no cause; which is absurd. To imagine, that they are from eternity future by the agency of human free will, is to suppose, that human free will either existed from eternity, or could and did produce effects eternal ages before it existed.

It is said, that there is properly no foreknowledge in God, that all his knowledge is present knowledge,

and that paſt, preſent and future, are now all preſent in the divine mind.——Still God does not view all *poſſible* things as preſent. The *exiſtence* of ſome things is preſent to God; only the poſſibility of other things is preſent to him. Whence ariſes this difference? What gives ſome things a preſent exiſtence in the divine mind, when other things have only a poſſible exiſtence in the ſame mind? This difference is an effect; otherwiſe all real exiſtences and events are neceſſary exiſtences, or thoſe which are not neceſſary, become future, and finally come into exiſtence, with a cauſe. The difference between poſſible and future volitions cannot be the effect of the mind of the creature; becauſe it exiſted before that mind exiſted.

By all things being preſent in the divine mind, is meant not that God now ſees them to be preſent to creatures and in their view; but that his view of all things, ſo far as relates to himſelf, is the ſame as it will be, when they ſhall have come into exiſtence in the view of creatures. He ſees them not to be in exiſtence as to us, but ſees their exiſtence to be as to us future. And this is all that we mean by foreknowledge. So that ſaying, that all knowledge in God is preſent knowledge, does not ſhow, that there is no foreknowledge in him. A knowledge of things as future with reſpect to creatures, is foreknowledge: And the whole objection, that the divine knowledge is all preſent knowledge, is founded on the ambiguity of words, or of the phraſe, *all things are preſent in the divine mind*, or this, that, *all the divine knowledge is preſent knowledge*. If the meaning of that phraſe be, that God ſees now, that certain things will at ſome future time be in exiſtence in the view of creatures; this is granted on all hands; and what follows from it? Surely not that there is no certainty previous to the exiſtence of thoſe things in the view of creatures, that they will thus be in exiſtence; but, that there is ſuch a certainty. Therefore in this ſenſe of the phraſe it is not at all oppoſed to, but implies the doctrine of previous certainty

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and moral neceſſity, which we maintain. If that phraſe mean, that God now ſees all events, which ever take place, to have a preſent exiſtence in the view of creatures; this is not true and will not be pretended by our opponents. Yet this is the only ſenſe of the phraſe, which oppoſes the doctrine of previous certainty as argued from the divine foreknowledge. That all things are preſent in the divine mind, can mean no more, than that all things are now ſeen by God, and that there is no paſt nor future with him. Still he views ſome things to be paſt, and other things to be future, with reſpect to creatures: And his view of ſome things as future with reſpect to creatures, is what we mean by the divine foreknowledge; not that he views things as future with reſpect to himſelf. If therefore God now ſees, that certain volitions will hereafter take place in the minds of *Gog* and *Magog*, according to prophecy, they will *certainly* take place, and there is a moral neceſſity of it, and a moral neceſſity *now exiſting* ages before thoſe volitions will have an exiſtence in the minds of thoſe men. The conſideration, that all things are preſent with God, does, as before obſerved, not at all prove, that there is not now a previous certainty or moral neceſſity, that thoſe volitions will come into exiſtence; but evidently proves that there is ſuch certainty, and that in two reſpects; (1.) A certainty previous in order of time to the exiſtence of thoſe volitions in the minds of *Gog* and *Magog*. (2.) A certainty previous in the order of nature to the divine foreknowledge itſelf, and which is the foundation of that foreknowledge.

Moſt or all the objections brought againſt moral neceſſity, may be brought with equal force againſt divine foreknowledge. For example; "If there be "an abſolute moral neceſſity, that John go on in ſin, and "be finally damned, there is no poſſibility that he be "ſaved. Then why ſhould he or any other perſon uſe "any endeavours toward his ſalvation?"——If there be force in this objection, it is equally forcible againſt

divine foreknowledge: Thus, If God foreknow, that John will go on in ſin and be finally damned, there is an abſolute certainty or moral neceſſity of it. Therefore there is no poſſibility of John's ſalvation; and why ſhould he or any other perſon put forth any endeavours toward it? This and all objections of the kind imply, that all moral events are left in a ſtate of perfect uncertainty, till they come to paſs, that they come to paſs by mere chance, and that they are not, and cannot poſſibly be, the objects of foreknowledge.

It has been already obſerved, that though divine foreknowledge is not the efficient cauſe of the certain futurity of any event; yet it implies, that the event is certainly future, and this certainty, let it be cauſed by what it will, or though it be uncauſed, is with reſpect to a moral event, moral neceſſity, and equally conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with liberty, as if it were cauſed by foreknowledge. I now obſerve further, that this certain futurity undoubtedly is cauſed *by ſomething*. It is equally abſurd to imagine, that an event may become *future* without a cauſe, as that it may come *into exiſtence* without a cauſe. Certain futurity implies, that the actual exiſtence of the event is ſecured to take place in due time. And whatever is able thus to ſecure the event, is able to bring it into exiſtence. If it may be ſecured without a cauſe, it may be brought into exiſtence without a cauſe. This certain futurity of all events from eternity is an effect, and cannot be the effect of any creature, becauſe no creature exiſted from eternity. It muſt therefore be the effect of the Creator, who alone exiſted from eternity, and who alone therefore could from eternity give futurity to any event.

Therefore however frightened Dr. Weſt and other writers be at the idea, that moral actions ſhould be the effect of a cauſe extrinſic to the ſubject of thoſe actions, we ſeem to be neceſſitated to give into this idea, from the conſideration, that all moral actions of creatures were from eternity foreknown and therefore were certainly future. This eternal futurity muſt be

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an effect of a cauſe extrinſic to all creatures. This extrinſic cauſe ſecures their exiſtence, and in due time actually brings them into exiſtence.

It is ſaid, that God knows all things from eternity, as we know things preſently exiſting before our eyes. Now the actual exiſtence of things out of our minds is the foundation of our knowledge in the caſe. But it will not be ſaid, that all things exiſted from eternity out of the divine mind, and that this exiſtence of them is the foundation of the divine eternal knowledge of them or of their exiſtence in the divine mind. If they did eternally exiſt out of the divine mind, they were neceſſarily exiſtent in the ſame ſenſe in which God is; and conſequently none of our actions are cauſed by ourſelves or by our ſelf-determining power: They are as uncauſed, as neceſſary and as eternal, as the divine exiſtence.

Dr. Clarke in his remarks on Collins, p. 39, ſays, that "in the argument drawn againſt liberty from the "divine preſcience, or power of judging infallibly con- "cerning free events, it muſt be proved, that things "otherwiſe ſuppoſed free, will thereby unavoidably "become neceſſary." On this I remark, (1.) That if by the word *free* the Doctor mean any thing oppoſite to the moſt abſolute moral neceſſity, he muſt mean *contingent, uncertain, not certainly future.* But nothing is in this ſenſe ſuppoſed, or allowed, to be free.——(2.) We do not pretend from the divine preſcience to prove, that "thereby things unavoidably *become* neceſſary," or certainly future. But we do pretend from preſcience to prove, that all events *were* certainly future, in the order of nature, antecedently to the preſcience; and that they are certainly future, in the order of time, antecedently to their exiſtence.

Dr. Clarke in his *Being and Attributes*, p. 95, &c. grants, that all things are and were certain from eternity, and yet ſuppoſes, p. 97, that an univerſal fatality would be inconſiſtent with morality. But it ſeems,

that according to the Doctor an universal and eternal certainty of all things is not inconsistent with morality; and if by fatality he meant any thing different from certainty, he opposes what nobody holds.—— Ibid, p. 98, the Doctor says, "mere certainty of "event does not imply necessity." But mere certainty of event doubtless implies itself, and that is all the necessity, for which we plead. The Doctor's argument to prove, that certainty does not imply necessity, is, that foreknowledge implies no more certainty, than would exist without it. At the same time he grants, that there is "the same certainty of event in "every one of man's actions, as if they were never so "fatal and necessary." Now any other certainty or necessity than this we do not pretend to be implied in foreknowledge. And as the Doctor himself grants this necessity to exist, whether there be or be not foreknowledge; then in either case all that necessity, for which we plead, is granted to exist.

Dr. West, in p. 20, 21, Part II, thinks President Edwards inconsistent with himself, in denying, that the divine decrees are founded on foreknowledge, and yet holding, that "the perfection of his understanding "is the foundation of his decrees." The Doctor argues, that "If foreknowledge in the Deity, is part of "the perfection of the divine understanding. Then is it "the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; "and so his objection lies just as strong against him, "as against us." Doubtless the perfection of the divine understanding; *i. .e* God's perfect view of the fitness of certain things to certain uses and ends, is the reason why he decrees and appoints those things to those uses and ends. But this is very different from supposing that foreknowledge is the foundation of decrees, and that God first foresees certain events about to take place, and then decrees to permit them to take place. And the inconclusiveness of Dr. West's argument just quoted, may appear thus; If after-knowledge, or a knowledge, that events have taken place, be a part

of

of the divine underſtanding; then it is the foundation of his wiſe purpoſes and decrees. But it will not be pretended, that the conſequent in this caſe juſtly follows from the antecedent. Yet it follows as juſtly as in the argument of the Doctor. Not every perception which belongs to the divine underſtanding is the foundation of God's decrees univerſally or generally: Beſide the inſtance already mentioned, I might mention God's perfect knowledge of geometry, mechanics, &c. The divine perfect knowledge of thoſe ſciences is not the foundation of all God's decrees; No more is God's foreknowledge.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII.

Objections conſidered.

1. IT is argued, that we are poſſeſſed of a ſelf-determining power and a liberty to either ſide, becauſe we find, that we have a power to conſider and examine an action propoſed to us, and to *ſuſpend* our determination upon it, till we ſhall have duly conſidered it.——But as the determination to ſuſpend and examine is a voluntary act, it no more appears to be without motive or without moral neceſſity than any other voluntary act.——Suſpenſion is either a voluntary act or not. If it be a voluntary act, it no more appears to be without motive and moral neceſſity, than any other voluntary act. If it be not a voluntary act, it is not a *free* act, nor is any liberty exerciſed in it; and therefore it is nothing to the preſent purpoſe.

To argue, that we have a power of ſelf-determination, becauſe we have a power to ſuſpend an action, is as groundleſs, as to argue, that we have a power of ſelf-determination, becauſe we have a power to chooſe to act, or becauſe we have a power of will. Suſpenſion is a voluntary act or a volition, and the argument under conſideration is this; A man has a volition, not at preſent to determine in a certain caſe; therefore he has a power efficiently to cauſe volition in himſelf. This argument is juſt as concluſive as the following; A man has a volition at preſent to determine in a certain caſe; therefore he has a power efficiently to cauſe volition in himſelf: Or as this; A man has a a volition, therefore he has a power efficiently to cauſe volition in himſelf.

But if ſuſpenſion be no voluntary act, but a total ſuſpenſion of all volition, it is, if poſſible, ſtill leſs a proof of ſelf-determination. Self-determination is a voluntary act, and ſuſpenſion is brought as an inſtance of

of ſelf-determination. But how can that, which is no voluntary act be an inſtance of a voluntary act? This is as abſurd as to argue ſelf-determination from any intellectual perception, or from the perfect inſenſibility of a dead corpſe.——But this mode of arguing is familiar with Dr. Weſt, who conſtantly argues a ſelf-determining power, from a power to *not act*, a power to be perfectly torpid.

2. Self-determination is argued from our own conſciouſneſs and experience. Dr. Weſt ſays, page 26, that "we experience in ourſelves; that in willing "and chooſing we act independently of any extrinſic cauſe." Others hold, that we are *conſcious* of ſelf-determination and an exemption from extrinſic cauſality.——When gentlemen ſpeak of experience and conſciouſneſs, they ought to confine their obſervations to themſelves; as no man is conſcious of more than paſſes in his own mind, and in ſuch things a man can with certainty tell his own experience only. For my own part, I am not conſcious of either ſelf-cauſation of volition, or an exemption from extrinſic cauſality; and to be ſure I am not conſcious, that my volitions take place without cauſe and by mere chance. I am conſcious of volitions of various kinds; but I never yet caught myſelf in the act of *making a volition*, if this mean any thing more than *having* a volition or being the ſubject of it. If any man be conſcious, that he makes his own volitions, he is doubtleſs conſcious of two diſtinct acts in this, one *the act made* by himſelf, another *the act making* or by which he makes *the act made*. Now will any man profeſs to the world, that he is or ever has been conſcious of theſe diſtinct acts? If not, let him tell the world what he means by being the efficient cauſe of his own volitions. If he mean, that he has volitions, this is no more than the advocates for moral neceſſity are conſcious of, and to grant that this is all that is meant, is to give up the argument. If it be meant, that he cauſes them by *the mind itſelf* or by ſome *power* of the mind and not by

by any *act* of the mind or of thoſe powers; I appeal to the reader, whether this be, or can be, a matter of conſciouſneſs. I take it to be univerſally granted, that no man can be conſcious of more than the *acts* and perceptions of his own mind. The exiſtence of the mind and of its powers, is *inferred* from the acts, and we are not properly conſcious of them. Dr. Reid may be an authority with the gentlemen, with whom I am now concerned. "*Power*," ſays he, "is "not an object of any of our external ſenſes, nor "even an object of *conſciouſneſs*. That it is not ſeen, "nor heard, nor touched, nor taſted, nor ſmelt, needs "no proof. That we are not conſcious of it, in the "proper ſenſe of the word, will be no leſs evident, if "we reflect, that conſciouſneſs is that power of the "mind, by which it has an immediate knowledge of "its own *operations*. Power is not an operation of "the mind, and therefore is *no object of conſciouſneſs*. "Indeed every operation of the mind is the exertion "of ſome power of the mind; but we are conſcious "of the *operation only*, and the power lies behind the "ſcene: And though we may juſtly *infer* the power "from the operation, it muſt be remembered, that "*inferring* is not the province of *conſciouſneſs*, but of "*reaſon*." *Eſſays on Active Powers*, p. 7.

If from our conſciouſneſs of volitions, it follows, that we *efficiently cauſe* thoſe volitions, let a reaſon be given, why it will not equally follow from our conſciouſneſs of any perception, *e. g.* the ſound of thunder, that we efficiently cauſe that too.

If we be the efficient cauſes of our own volitions, they are effects. But an effect is produced by a previous exertion of the efficient cauſe, which act is as diſtinct from the effect, as the divine creating act was diſtinct from the world created. Every effect is paſſive with regard to its cauſe, and paſſive in this reſpect, that the cauſal act of the efficient operates upon it: Therefore the volition is and muſt be diſtinct from the act of the efficient by which it is cauſed. If a man be

be the efficient cauſe of his own volition and he be conſcious of it, he is conſcious of an act of his own mind previous to every volition cauſed by himſelf, efficiently cauſing that volition, and as this cauſing act muſt be a voluntary act, in order to be a free one, there muſt be an infinite ſeries of voluntary acts cauſing one another, or one act before the firſt: And of this the man who is ſubject, muſt have a conſcious experience, or elſe he cannot be conſcious of ſelf-determination. Whether any man will profeſs to be conſcious of all this, we muſt wait to ſee. It is to be preſumed however, that no man will profeſs to have experienced an infinite ſeries of acts, or one act before the firſt act.

As to knowing by conſciouſneſs and experience, that our volitions are not the effect of an extrinſic cauſe; this I conceive is an abſolute impoſſibility, unleſs we know by experience and are conſcious, that we ourſelves efficiently cauſe them in the manner juſt now deſcribed, viz. in an infinite ſeries, or with one act before the firſt. Unleſs we be conſcious, that we cauſe our own firſt volition by a previous act, we cannot be conſcious, that we cauſe it at all. And if we be not conſcious, that we cauſe that, we cannot be conſcious but that it was cauſed extrinſically. If we do not experience that we cauſe our volitions by our own previous acts, we do not experience, that we cauſe them at all. All we experience is the volitions themſelves, and we have no more evidence, that they are not the effects of an extrinſic cauſe, than from the experience of any of our ideas of ſenſation, we have evidence that thoſe ideas are not excited by an extrinſic cauſe.

Let an inſtance be taken and I preſume no man will pretend, that he is conſcious, that he cauſes one volition by another: *e.g.* a volition to give to the poor. Will any man pretend, that he is conſcious, that he cauſes in himſelf a volition to give to the poor, by a previous volition; and that he in the firſt place finds,

finds, by conſciouſneſs, that he chooſes to have a volition to give to the poor before he has it, and that by this previous choice he becomes willing to give to the poor? If no man will pretend this, but every man by the bare ſtating of the caſe ſees, that it implies the abſurdity that he is willing before he is willing, ſurely it is high time to give up this argument from experience and conſciouſneſs.

It has been ſaid, that we *perceive* no extrinſic influence producing our volitions. Nor do we perceive any extrinſic influence producing a great part of our thoughts and perceptions, which yet it will not be pretended, that we ourſelves cauſe.

It is impoſſible for a man to be conſcious of a negative, otherwiſe than as he is either not conſcious of it, or is conſcious of the oppoſite poſitive. Therefore when it is ſaid, that we are conſcious, that our volitions are not the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, the meaning muſt be either that we are not conſcious, that they are the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, or that we are conſcious, that we do efficiently cauſe them ourſelves. That we are not conſcious, that our volitions are the effect of an extrinſic cauſe, is no proof, that they are in fact not the effect of ſuch a cauſe, becauſe if they were the effect of ſuch a cauſe, ſtill we ſhould not be conſcious of it. If whether they be the effect of ſuch a cauſe or not, we ſhould not be conſcious, that they are the effect of ſuch a cauſe, then the circumſtance that we are not conſcious, that they are the effect of ſuch a cauſe, is no proof either way. Nor are we conſcious, that we do efficiently cauſe our own volitions, as it is preſumed appears by what has been already ſaid in this and former chapters.

But if we were conſcious, that we do efficiently cauſe our own volitions, this would be no argument againſt the abſolute previous certainty or moral neceſſity of all our volitions. Such efficiency may have been from eternity the object of the divine abſolute foreknowledge or decree. So that to a conſciouſneſs

ſciouſneſs of liberty as oppoſed to moral neceſſity, it is requiſite, that we be conſcious not only, that we efficiently cauſe our own volitions, but that we cauſe them, with the circumſtance, that it was previouſly uncertain, whether we ſhould cauſe them or not. But of this circumſtance it is impoſſible, that we ſhould be conſcious; it is no act or perception of the mind, and therefore cannot be an object of conſciouſneſs.

Archbiſhop King ſpeaks of a man's being "conſcious, that it was in his power, to have done otherwiſe than he has done." If this mean any thing oppoſite to moral neceſſity, it muſt mean, that a man is conſcious, that it was not previouſly certain, that he would do as he has done. But of this no man can be conſcious, for the reaſon already given.

3. It is further argued, that we act as if we were under no neceſſity, but at perfect liberty; and that therefore the doctrine of moral neceſſity is contradicted by all our conduct, and the maxims of it.—— To this I anſwer, that our conduct does by no means ſhow, that we are not influenced by motives, or that we act without motives, without deſign, without biaſes, taſtes, appetites or any ſuch principles, and in perfect indifference, inſenſibility and ſtupidity. On the other hand, the conduct of all mankind ſhows, that they are actuated by motives, biaſes, various paſſions and appetites, which have as ſtated and regular an effect on their minds and conduct, as ſecond cauſes have in the natural world. The conduct of men does by no means ſhow, that their conduct is previouſly altogether uncertain and left to mere chance. It does indeed ſhow, that they are free agents in the proper ſenſe; *i. e.* intelligent, voluntary agents, acting upon motives and various principles in human nature, natural and acquired; and therefore we uſe arguments and motives with one another to influence each other's conduct. All this is perfectly conſiſtent with the ſcheme of moral neceſſity for which

which I plead, and is implied in it: And all government civil and domeſtic is not only conſiſtent with that ſcheme, but is built upon it; otherwiſe in vain would be all the motives of rewards and puniſhments exhibited as the means of government, and by which government is carried into effect.

If moral neceſſity be inconſiſtent with the practice of mankind, ſo is that previous certainty implied in the divine foreknowledge; for that, with reſpect to moral actions, is moral neceſſity.

4. It is objected, that on this plan all agency and action are deſtroyed or precluded.——Anſwer; If by agency and action be meant ſelf-determinate or contingent agency and action, I grant that this ſcheme does preclude them and means to preclude them. But it is not allowed, that ſuch agency and action are neceſſary to a rational, moral being, or are at all deſirable or even poſſible: And to take theſe for granted, is to beg the main points in diſpute. Let it be ſhown that ſuch agency and action are neceſſary, deſirable, or poſſible, and ſomething to the purpoſe will be done. But rational voluntary agency or action, ariſing from motive and principle, and directed to ſome end, is not precluded, but ſuppoſed and eſtabliſhed by this ſcheme.

It is ſaid, that on the hypotheſis of a divine agency in all things, there is *but one agent* in the univerſe. But the Deity is no ſelf-determinate agent: He is no more the efficient cauſe of his own volitions than he is of his own exiſtence. If he were, his volitions would not be from eternity, nor would he be unchangeable. Therefore with as much reaſon, as it is ſaid, that there is *but one* agent in the univerſe, it might have been ſaid, that there is *not one*. Self-efficiency of volition is either neceſſary to agency and action, or it is not. If it be neceſſary, God is not an agent. If it be not neceſſary, we are agents and God too.

It is further ſaid, that on this plan of a moral neceſſity eſtabliſhed by God, all human actions are nothing

nothing but the operations of God actuating men, as the soul actuates the body.——If this mean, that God is the remote and first cause of all things, and that he brings to pass all things and all human actions, either by an immediate influence, or by the intervention of second causes, motives, temptations, &c. we allow it: We firmly believe, that these are under the control and at the disposal of Providence. But because the devil tempted Eve, it will not be pretended, that she acted nothing, and was merely acted upon by the devil, as the human body is actuated by the soul; that because God sent his prophets to the Israelites, to preach to them, the prophets acted nothing; that when God affords the aids of his grace to any man, so far as he is influenced by these aids to an action, it is no action of his; that when the goodness of God leadeth a sinner to repentance, the sinner does nothing, does not repent; but this repentance is the act or exercise of the divine mind, and in it God repents.

If when it is objected, the scheme of moral necessity precludes action, action mean volition; the objection is groundless: We hold as strenuously as our opponents, that we all have action in this sense. But if by action they mean any thing else, they must mean something in which there is no volition. But that any such thing should be an action is absurd and what they will not pretend. The circumstance, that a man causes his own volitions, if it were possible, would not imply agency or action, unless the causation or causing act were a volition. For instance, if a man in a convulsion, having a sword in his hand, involuntarily thrust it into his friend's bosom, this is not agency: Yet the man causes the thrust and the wound. But if the causing act be a volition, it runs into the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions causing one another.

Dr. West, in Part II, p. 8, says, "If the Deity is the "proper efficient cause of volition, then the mind is "entirely passive in all its volitions, and consequently "cannot be in any *proper* sense *an agent*." We grant,

 that

that the Deity is the primary efficient cauſe of all things, and that he produces volitions in the human mind by ſuch ſecond cauſes as motives, appetites, biaſes, &c. and the human mind, in being the ſubject of the divine agency whether mediate or immediate, is paſſive. Still we hold, that volition is *an action*, as has been already explained. Nor is there the leaſt abſurdity in the ſuppoſition, that an action ſhould be the effect of a divine or other extrinſic agency, unleſs by action or volition be meant a ſelf-cauſed or an uncauſed action or volition. But for Dr. Weſt in the preſent caſe to mean this *by action in the proper ſenſe*, is to beg the queſtion. The very queſtion is, whether action in the proper ſenſe of the word, be ſelf-cauſed or uncauſed. And if, when he ſays, "If the Deity is the efficient cauſe of volition, the mind cannot be in any "*proper* ſenſe an agent;" he mean an agent, who efficiently produces an act of will in himſelf, or who is the ſubject of a volition which is uncauſed; I grant, that the mind cannot be ſuch an agent; I believe, that ſuch agency is an abſurdity and impoſſibilty, and call on Dr. Weſt to clear it of the abſurdity and impoſſibility, which has long ſince been pointed out to be implied in it.

Beſides; the Doctor's reaſoning may be retorted, thus; If the mind itſelf be the proper efficient cauſe of volition, then the mind is entirely paſſive in its volitions, and conſequently in volition cannot be in any proper ſenſe an agent. For every effect muſt be paſſive, ſeeing it cannot contribute any thing towards its own exiſtence. Volition or the mind acting is either an effect, or it exiſted from eternity, or it came into exiſtence without cauſe. Neither of the two laſt will be pretended. Therefore it is an effect; and as every effect is paſſive, the mind in volition is, on the ground of Dr. Weſt's argument, in no proper ſenſe an agent in volition.

The Doctor proceeds, ibid, p. 8, "Either volition is "only the immediate action of the Deity on the mind,

"or

"or it is distinct from it. If volition is distinct from "the action of the Deity on the mind, then the action "of the Deity on the mind, is only to produce all the "requisites for action; and consequently there is no "absurdity in supposing, that when all these requisites "have taken place, the mind is then only put in a ca-"pacity for acting."——On this I remark, Volition is granted to be entirely distinct from the action of the Deity, as distinct from it, as the motion of a planet is. But it is not granted to follow hence, that the action of the Deity does no more than produce all the necessary requisites for action. Dr. West will grant, that when the Deity causes a planet to move, he does more than to produce the requisites for its motion, unless in requisites for its motion be comprehended the actual production of its motion. If this be his meaning with regard to the action of the mind, there is an absurdity in supposing, that when all those requisites have taken place, the mind is only put into a capacity for acting or not acting. And whatever be his meaning in producing requisites, I do not allow they do or can put the mind into a capacity of *not acting*, *i. e.* of sinking itself into perfect torpitude.

What immediately follows the last quotation is, "If "besides presenting to the mind the requisites for ac-"tion, the Deity does produce a certain modification "of the mind called volition, in which modification the "mind is wholly passive, then there is no action, but on-"ly the immediate action of the Deity on the mind; and "volition is nothing distinct from the immediate action of "the Deity." The very same mode of reasoning will prove, that bodily motion is nothing distinct from the action of the Deity; thus, If besides producing the requisites for motion, the Deity produce a certain modification of matter, called motion, in which matter is wholly passive, then there is only the immediate action of the Deity on matter, and motion is nothing distinct from the immediate action of the Deity.——Yet it is presumed, that Dr. West will not pretend, that when God causes a plan-

et to move round in its orbit, the Deity himſelf and he only moves round in that orbit; or that the motion of the planet is nothing diſtinct from the action of the Deity. Now volition, though cauſed by the Deity, is as diſtinct from the action of the Deity, by which it is cauſed, as the motion of a planet is from the action of God by which that is cauſed.

The Doctor ſays, p. 10, "If when the mind acts on "any particular object, the Deity produces *a new act* "or a new operativeneſs in the mind, then there muſt "be a change in the mind." Doubtleſs there is ſo far a change, as is implied in the new act: And what then? Why the Doctor "upon the cloſeſt examination can-"not find any change in the *operativeneſs* of his mind." Be it ſo; yet as it is ſuppoſed, that his mind is the ſubject of a new *act*, he can doubtleſs find a change in the *act* of his mind; and if he cannot find a change in the *operativeneſs* of it, it muſt be becauſe operativeneſs, which is a peculiar and favourite word with the Doctor, means ſomething different from *act*, and therefore is nothing to the preſent purpoſe, as the ſubject under conſideration is the production of a new act by the Deity: And we do not pretend, that when the Deity produces a new *act* in the mind, he produces a new *operativeneſs* too, unleſs act and operativeneſs be the ſame. If they be the ſame, whenever the Doctor can perceive a change in the *act* of his mind, he can doubtleſs perceive a change in this operativeneſs of it.

The Doctor thinks he has ſaid ſomething new concerning his favourite word *operativeneſs*: But I ſee nothing new or important in it, unleſs it be a new word uſed in an ambiguous manner.

"I ſay, that the operativeneſs of the mind on "different objects is always uniformly one and the "ſame thing, and not that there are as many ope-"rations, as there are objects on which the mind "acts;" ibid, p. 13. Here it is manifeſt, that the Doctor uſes the word *operativeneſs* as ſynonymous with *operation*, otherwiſe he is guilty of the moſt groſs

groſs equivocation. And is it indeed one and the ſame operation of mind to love virtue and love roaſt beef? To chooſe the ſervice of God and chooſe a pine apple? This is new indeed: In this, I preſume the Doctor is an original!

5. My actions are *mine;* but in what ſenſe can they be properly called *mine*, if I be not the efficient cauſe of them?——Anſwer; My thoughts and all my perceptions and feelings are *mine;* yet it will not be pretended, that I am the efficient of them all.

6. It is ſaid to be ſelf-evident, that *abſolute neceſſity* is inconſiſtent with *liberty*.——Anſwer; This wholly depends on the meaning of the words *liberty* and *neceſſity*. Abſolute *natural* neceſſity is allowed to be inconſiſtent with liberty; but the ſame conceſſion is not made with regard to abſolute moral neceſſity. All that is requiſite to anſwer this and ſuch like objections is to explain the words liberty and neceſſity. If by *liberty* be meant *uncertainty*, undoubtedly abſolute moral neceſſity, which is the certainty of a moral event, is utterly inconſiſtent with liberty. But if by liberty be meant exemption from *natural* neceſſity, there is not the leaſt inconſiſtence between the moſt abſolute *moral* neceſſity and the moſt perfect freedom or exemption from natural neceſſity. The moſt perfect exemption from natural neceſſity is conſiſtent with the moſt abſolute previous certainty of a moral action. Judas in betraying his Lord "according to the determinate counſel and foreknowledge of God," was entirely exempted from natural neceſſity; yet his conduct was according to an abſolute previous certainty.

7. That we have liberty of ſelf-determination is argued from our *moral diſcernment*, or ſenſe of right and wrong and of deſert of praiſe and blame. And ſome are ſo confident of the ſufficiency of this argument againſt moral neceſſity, that they are willing to reſt the whole cauſe on this ſingle point. It is therefore a very important point. It is ſaid, that our eſtimating the moral character of the man, from his internal diſ-

poſitions and acts, is on the ſuppoſition, that theſe are *within the power of* the man. But the word *power* is equivocal; if it mean *natural* power, and that the agent is under no *natural* inability, (as before explained) to other diſpoſitions and acts; it is granted, that in this ſenſe they are in his power. But if it mean, that there was no previous certainty, that he would have thoſe very diſpoſitions and acts; and that no man will or can reaſonably blame himſelf or another but in caſe of a perfect previous uncertainty with reſpect to thoſe diſpoſitions and acts; this is not granted, nor is it proved.

It is ſaid, that no man ever did commend or blame himſelf for what he knew to be *neceſſary* and *unavoidable*, not within his power, or not determined by himſelf. This ſtript of the ambiguity of words is this merely; that no man ever did commend or blame himſelf for what he knew to be previouſly certain, and was not entirely caſual. But this is manifeſtly falſe; becauſe every man knows or may know, that all things are previouſly certain, as they are the objects of the infallible foreknowledge of God: And if no man can commend or blame himſelf for what is previouſly certain, no man can commend or blame himſelf for any thing.

Will it be pretended, that we are more blamable for an action, which is previouſly uncertain and caſual, and which we perform by chance without motive, end or deſign, than for that which is previouſly certain and future, and which we do from motive, and with an end and deſign? Take the inſtance of Judas's treachery. The fact is, that this treachery was previouſly certain and infalliby foreknown by God. Now, was Judas leſs blamable than if his conduct had been previouſly uncertain, and had taken place by pure chance? To ſay, that he was blamable, if this conduct proceeded from ſelf-determination, affords no ſatisfaction, unleſs this ſelf-determination were by chance. For otherwiſe the ſelf-determining act was previouſly certain and morally neceſſary, and therefore liable

able to all the objections, which are brought againſt moral neceſſity in any caſe.

Blameworthineſs is nothing but moral turpitude or odiouſneſs; praiſeworthineſs is nothing but moral amiableneſs or excellence. But the moral amiableneſs of an action does not depend on the circumſtance, that it is efficiently cauſed by ourſelves; becauſe this runs into the abſurdity and impoſſibility of an infinite ſeries of actions cauſing one another. Nor does it depend on this circumſtance, that the action is, as Dr. Weſt holds, uncauſed; for no actions of creatures fall under this deſcription. Either of thoſe hypotheſes would ſhut moral amiableneſs and odiouſneſs out of the world.

That moral neceſſity or previous certainty of moral conduct is conſiſtent with moral diſcernment, may be argued from the caſe of the ſaints and angels in heaven. It will not be pretended, but that there is a certainty, that they will continue in their ſtate of perfect holineſs and happineſs to eternity. Nor will it be pretended, but that they are the ſubjects of moral diſcernment and of that virtue and holineſs which is truly amiable in the moral ſenſe, and the proper object of approbation and reward. Therefore moral neceſſity is not inconſiſtent with praiſe and blame.

I need not inſiſt on the neceſſary holineſs of God and of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.

The writers in oppoſition to moral neceſſity inſiſt much on its inconſiſtence with accountableneſs. This is really no other than to inſiſt, that it is inconſiſtent with praiſe and blame or with moral agency; and is the ſame objection, which we have been conſidering. To be accountable is to be liable to be called to an account for an action, and to be the proper ſubject of reward or puniſhment. But this is no other than to be worthy of praiſe or blame, and to deſerve love or hatred, complacency or diſapprobation, on account of moral temper or conduct. So that what has been

ſaid concerning praiſe and blame, is equally applicable to accountableneſs.

It has been long ſince ſhown by Preſident Edwards, that the moral amiableneſs and odiouſneſs of actions, and their deſert of praiſe or blame, or the eſſence of virtue and vice, depend not on the circumſtance, that actions are efficiently cauſed by the ſubject; but that the acts themſelves, without any conſideration of their efficient cauſe, are amiable or odious: As otherwiſe virtue and vice will be thrown back from the cauſed act, to the cauſing act, till they are thrown out of the univerſe. If they conſiſt not in acts of the will themſelves, but in the acts by which they are cauſed, as theſe cauſing acts are alſo cauſed, virtue and vice muſt for the ſame reaſon conſiſt not in them, but thoſe by which they are cauſed, and ſo on to an act which is not cauſed. But this being not cauſed by the ſubject, can, on the principle of our opponents, have no virtue or vice in it. Thus there would be no place found in the univerſe for virtue and vice; Not in the cauſed acts, becauſe virtue and vice conſiſt not in them, but in their cauſe. Not in any uncauſed act or acts, becauſe they, by the ſuppoſition, are not cauſed by their ſubject. There is no way to avoid this conſequence, but to allow that virtue and vice, deſert of praiſe and blame, conſiſt, in the acts themſelves and not in their cauſe; or if there be any virtue or vice in the cauſe, this is diſtinct from the virtue or vice, which there is in the acts themſelves. If I be accountable for any volition, for the ſole reaſon, that I cauſe it; then I am accountable for the act, by which I cauſe it, for the ſole reaſon, that I cauſe that, and ſo on in an infinite ſeries.

Beſides; the mere circumſtance, that I cauſe my own volition, does not on the principles of our opponents, make me accountable for it: Becauſe that I ſhould cauſe it may be a matter of previous certainty, as it may be foreknown, and even decreed, by God, that I ſhall cauſe it; and therefore I cauſe it not

not freely in the ſenſe of our opponents, but neceſſarily, under the influence of abſolute moral neceſſity.

But Dr. Weſt holds, that all our volitions are without cauſe. Then they take place by blind fate or chance. And how, on his principles, are we accountable for them?

The true ground of accountableneſs and of praiſe and blame, is not the circumſtance, that we ourſelves efficiently cauſe our own volitions; or the circumſtance, that they take place without cauſe, by mere chance; but the nature, moral aſpect and tendency of thoſe volitions, and of the actions which flow from them.

Our opponents obſerve, that we allow, that men muſt be the voluntary cauſes of their external actions, in order to be accountable for them: And then they aſk, why we do not for the ſame reaſon allow, that we muſt be the voluntary cauſes of our acts of will, that we may be accountable for them? The anſwer is, that external actions are not volitions. The volitions of rational beings, are in their own nature moral acts, and for that reaſon the ſubjects of them are accountable for them. But external actions are not of a moral nature in themſelves, and therefore the ſubjects of them are accountable for them then only, when they are the effects of volition. Beſides; that external actions ſhould be the effects of volition does not run into the abſurdity of an infinite ſeries, as is implied in the ſuppoſition, that all volitions are the effects of previous volitions.

Dr. Weſt ſays, "I have already ſhown, that neceſſity ſhuts out all ſenſe of vileneſs and unworthineſs;" Part II, p. 39. Where he has ſhown this, he has not informed us. If he had, perhaps his readers, on peruſal of the paſſage, would not have joined with him in the opinion, that he had ſhown it. For my part, I cannot find, that he has ſhown it in any part of his two books.——If moral neceſſity, which is previous certain futurity of a moral act, "ſhut out all ſenſe of "vileneſs and unworthineſs;" then it ſeems, that in order that a man may have any ſenſe of vileneſs in ſin, he muſt act without any previous certainty in the nature

ture of things, or in divine foreknowledge, what his actions will be ; *i. e.* he must act by mere chance.

8. It is objected, that this doctrine of moral necessity makes men mere machines.——This objection, which is frequently made by all our opponents, depends on the sense affixed to the word *machine*. If it mean an intelligent voluntary agent, who does not act by perfect contingence or chance, and who does not take one step before his first step ; but acts from such motives and pursues such objects, as appear to him most eligible ; I grant, that we are machines : And in the same sense the saints and angels in heaven, and all intelligent beings, are machines. But whether it be not a great abuse of language, and whether it be not an artifice of our opponents, to excite a popular prejudice and clamour against our doctrine, to use the word *machine* in this sense ; I leave the reader to judge.——If by *machine* be meant, what is commonly meant by it, a mere material engine, without volition, knowledge or thought in itself ; I presume, that our opponents themselves will not pretend, that on our principles, men are such machines as this.

Do those who make this objection, hold, that the human understanding is a *machine ?* Or that, in understanding, reasoning, judging, remembering, &c. man acts mechanically ? Yet all grant, that in these things he acts necessarily.

If moral necessity imply, that we are machines, then whatever induces a moral necessity, or actually influences or persuades us to any conduct, turns us into machines. Now the opposers of moral necessity often speak of the aids of grace and of the Spirit, as necessary and influential to virtue and religion. But if any man become the subject of true virtue or piety *by the aids of God's grace*, so far he is passive, he is wrought upon and governed by an extrinsic cause, and his conduct is the effect of that cause. But every effect is *necessary* with respect to its cause. Therefore whoever is led by this cause to virtue or piety,

piety, is led neceſſarily, and according to the objection now before us, is turned into a mere *machine*.——On the ground of this objection all ſinners abandoned by God, all the damned and devils in hell, all the ſaints and angels in heaven, the man Chriſt Jeſus, and even God himſelf, are mere *machines*.——How neceſſary it is, that thoſe who make an objection to any ſyſtem, ſhould conſider firſt whether the objection be not equally forcible againſt doctrines which they themſelves hold!

9. It is further objected, that moral neceſſity places men, with reſpect to liberty, on a level with brutes.——If by liberty be meant contingence or previous uncertainty, I grant that the actions of men and brutes are in this ſenſe equally void of liberty; a previous certainty attends them equally. Or if it could be made to appear, that the actions of men are previouſly uncertain; I ſhould maintain, that thoſe of brutes are equally uncertain, and in this ſenſe equally free.——If by liberty be meant exemption from extrinſic cauſality of volition; I grant, that in this ſenſe alſo the actions of men and brutes are equally void of liberty. Men no more manufacture their own volitions, than brutes; and there is no more evidence, that men act without motive or deſign, than that brutes do. But if by liberty be meant *rational* liberty, the liberty of *a moral* agent, I hold that men are poſſeſſed of this, and brutes not. Brutes are no moral agents; but it is for the want of reaſon and intelligence, not of any power of will. If Sir Iſaac Newton's horſe had had as much reaſon and knowledge as his maſter, he no doubt would have had as much moral liberty, and would have been equally a moral agent and equally accountable. Without reaſon and intelligence, though a horſe ſhould have a liberty of perfect uncertainty and act by the pureſt chance; and though he ſhould propagate one volition by another, or without another, with ever ſo great dexterity; he would be a brute ſtill, and no more a

moral

moral agent, than he is now that he acts by motive or appetite. So that the difference between a man and a beaſt, as to moral agency, conſiſts not in liberty of contingence or liberty of ſelf-determination; but in reaſon and knowledge.

We might on this ſubject venture to turn the tables on our opponents, and hold, that if a power of ſelf-determination be liberty, brutes are free as well as men. The aſs determining to eat of one of two equally good bundles of hay, is as good an inſtance to prove, that ſhe has a ſelf-determining power, as any brought to prove it in men. So that if thoſe inſtances prove it in men, this proves it in brutes. Self-determining power then is nothing diſtinctive between men and brutes.

The capacity of conſidering and judging, of diſtinguiſhing virtue and vice, of deliberating, reaſoning, reflecting, and ſuſpending, have been mentioned as diſtinguiſhing between men and brutes. But all theſe, except *ſuſpending*, are acts of the intellect, not of the will: And ſuſpenſion, though an act of the will, does not appear to imply ſelf-determination more than any other act of the will. Beſides; brutes ſuſpend, as well as men. A dog in queſt of his maſter, will ſuſpend proceeding in any road, till he is ſatisfied, in which his maſter has gone. And ſheep, a more ſtupid race, on hearing a dog bark, will often ſuſpend their flight, till they ſee from what quarter their enemy is approaching.

It is ſaid, that external liberty and ſpontaneity belong to brutes and mad men, as well as to rational men. Be it ſo; yet the power and proper exerciſe of reaſon does not belong to them.——It is ſaid, that if an action's being voluntary makes it virtuous or vicious; then brutes would be the ſubjects of virtue or vice. But merely that an action is voluntary does not conſtitute it virtuous or vicious. It muſt beſides be the action of a rational being.

Dr. Clarke, the greateſt champion for the ſelf-determining power, expreſsly grants that children,

dren, beasts and even every living creature possess it. Remarks on Collins, p. 27. "The actions of *chil-* "*dren*, and the actions of *every living creature* are "all of them *essentially free*. The mechanical and "involuntary motion of their bodies, such as the pul- "sation of the heart and the like, are indeed all nec- "essary; but they are none of them *actions*. Every "*action*, every motion arising from the *self-moving* "*principle*, is essentially *free*. The difference is this "only, in men this physical liberty is joined with a "sense or consciousness of moral good or evil, and "is therefore eminently called liberty. In beasts "the same physical liberty or self-moving power, is "wholly separate from a sense or consciousness or ca- "pacity of judging of moral good or evil and is vul- "garly called spontaneity. In *children* the same "physical liberty always is from the very beginning; "and in proportion as they increase in age and in ca- "pacity of judging, they grow continually *in degree* "not more *free*, but more *moral*, agents." Thus we have the Doctor's authority, that children and beasts possess a self-determining power, as well as men, and that they are not only as really free as men, but that their freedom is *in degree* equal to that of men; and that what they want to constitute them *moral* agents, is not *liberty*, but *reason* and a capacity of judging.

10. Much has been said by Dr. Clarke and others after him, concerning the *beginning of motion*; by *motion* meaning *volition*, if they mean any thing to the purpose. The argument is, that if motion, *i. e.* volition, had a beginning, it was begun by God, and of course he had a self-moving or self-determining power, a power efficiently to cause volition in himself, and actually did thus cause it. That volition even in the Deity had a beginning, the Doctor argues thus; "Motion must either finally be resolved "into a first mover, in whom consequently there is "liberty of action," *i. e.* self-determination, "or else "into an infinite chain of causes and effects without "any

"any cauſe at all; which is an expreſs contradiction, "except motion could be neceſſarily exiſtent in its "own nature; which that it is not, is evident, be- "cauſe the idea of reſt is no contradiction; and alſo be- "cauſe there being no motion without a particular "determination one certain way, and no one deter- "mination being more neceſſary than another, an eſ- "ſential and neceſſary tendency to motion in all de- "terminations equally, could never have produced "any motion at all." *Remarks on Collins*, p. 11, 12. Motion throughout this quotation means internal motion or volition, or the whole is nothing to the purpoſe. I grant that external motion, the motion of matter, had a beginning, and that after the creation of matter. But the whole queſtion is concerning volition, the act or motion of the mind. That this is not neceſſarily exiſtent, and therefore not from eternity, the Doctor argues firſt from this, that "the idea of reſt," *i. e.* of an entire abſence or non-exiſtence of volition, "is no contradiction." It is doubtleſs as much and in the ſame ſenſe a contradiction, as the idea of the entire non-exiſtence of knowledge or intelligence, or of all being: And if this argument prove, that volition had a beginning, it will equally prove, that knowledge or the divine exiſtence had a beginning. Volition is juſt as neceſſarily exiſtent as God is; without volition he would not be God. It is impoſſible, that God ſhould from eternity have intelligence and not from eternity have volition.

The Doctor goes on to argue the beginning of volition thus; "There being no motion, *i. e.* volition, "without a particular determination one certain way, "and no one determination being in nature more "neceſſary than another, an eſſential and neceſſary "tendency to volition in all determinations equally, "could never have produced any volition at all." On this I obſerve,——

1. That by the ſame argument all intellectual ideas and perceptions of happineſs in the divine mind have

a beginning ; thus, There being no intellectual idea without a particular determination one way, and no one determination being in nature more neceſſary than another, an eſſential and neceſſary tendency to all determinations of idea equally, could never have produced any idea at all. And with regard to perception of happineſs, thus ; There being no perception of happineſs or miſery without a particular determination one certain way, and no one determination being in nature more neceſſary than another, an eſſential and neceſſary tendency to the perception of happineſs or miſery in all determinations equally, could never have produced any particular perception of them at all.——The ſame argument will prove, that God's exiſtence is not eternal and neceſſary ; thus, There can be no being, who is not a particular, determinate being ; and no particular form or kind of being is in nature more neceſſary than another. But an eſſential and neceſſary tendency to exiſtence in all forms and kinds equally, could never have been the foundation of any particular being at all.

If in theſe caſes it ſhould be objected, that one determination of idea is in nature more neceſſary than another ; that which is according to truth and fact, is more neceſſary than that which is contrary to truth ; and that feeling of happineſs, and that form of exiſtence which is moſt complete and perfect, is more neceſſary, than that which is leſs perfect : I anſwer, for the ſame reaſon, it muſt be granted, that the volition which is moſt rational, wiſe and holy, is more neceſſary, than that which is leſs wiſe and holy ; and therefore this particular volition or determination of will is neceſſarily exiſtent in its own nature, and is without beginning.

2. From the ſuppoſition, that the volitions of God are not eternal and as neceſſarily exiſtent as the divine knowledge or divine exiſtence, it follows, that he is very far from an unchangeable being ; that from eternity he exiſted without any volition or choice of one

one thing in preference to another; that when the eternity *a parte ante*, as it is called, had run out, he began to will and chooſe, and from that time he has been the ſubject of various acts of will, but never before, and therefore has been the ſubject of a very great change.

That God ſhould from eternity exiſt without volition, and that in time he ſhould become the ſubject of volition, implies not only a very great change in God, but that from eternity he was not a voluntary agent, and therefore no agent at all. So that the very argument which Dr. Clarke uſes to prove, that God is a ſelf-determinate agent, in fact does, directly contrary to his intention, prove, that he was from eternity no agent at all.

If God began volition in himſelf, he began it either voluntarily or involuntarily. If he began it voluntarily, he would be the ſubject of an infinite ſeries of volitions cauſing one another; which is an abſurdity, impoſſibility and contradiction. If he began it involuntarily, he did not begin it freely.

In his remarks on Collins, p. 6, Dr. Clarke ſays, "To be an agent ſignifies, to have a power of beginning motion." *Motion* here, if it be at all to the purpoſe, muſt mean *volition*: And to ſay, "To be an agent ſignifies to have a power of beginning volition." is a ſervile begging of the queſtion, utterly unworthy of Dr. Clarke.

In the ſame book, p. 44, he obſerves, "That if motion exiſt neceſſarily of itſelf——with a determination one certain way; then that determination is neceſſary, and conſequently all other determinations impoſſible; which is contrary to experience." And how does it appear by experience, that any other determinations of will are, or ever were, poſſible in the divine mind, than that which actually exiſts in it? Did Dr. Clarke experience divine exerciſes, and find by that experience, that other volitions are poſſible in God than what actually exiſt? Surely this

was

was written by the Doctor with great inattention!—— If to save the Doctor it should be said, that this observation relates not to volition, but to the motion of matter; this, if it were the meaning of the Doctor, would argue equal inattention. Would he have imagined, that because the motion of matter is not from eternity and necessarily existent; therefore the same is true of thought and volition?

11. Self-determination has been argued from the irregular conduct of mankind, and especially from the consideration, that their *moral exercises* are so irregular and out of course. But the exercises and conduct of men, are not more irregular than the blowing of the wind, or the state of man's body often is in sickness. Yet it will not be pretended, that this consideration proves, that sickness or the blowing of the wind is self-determinate.

12. Dr. West objects, that "according to Mr. Edwards, the mind must always be governed by chance "or accident; *i. e.* by something unforeseen or not designed by the mind beforehand. Thus, let a man's mind "be ever so strongly determined at present, to pursue "any particular object, yet that extrinsic cause, which "has the entire command of his will, may the next "hour frustrate all his purposes, and determine him to "a quite contrary pursuit. If this is not to be governed by blind fate and chance, I know not what is." Part II, p. 31.——On this I observe,——

1. Whether the Doctor do or do not know, what it is to be governed by blind fate and chance, is of no importance to his readers; and what a pity, that he should consume so much of his own and his readers' time, in appeals to himself as an authority.

2. According to this account, to be under the governing influence of any extrinsic cause, is to be governed by blind fate and chance. Therefore the planetary system and all the material world are under the government of blind fate and chance; so were the prophets and apostles, so far as they were inspired

and influenced by the Spirit of God. Does Dr. Weſt acknowledge this? If not, muſt he not own, that when he wrote the paſſage above quoted, he was miſtaken in his idea of being governed by blind fate and chance?

3. Doubtleſs Preſident Edwards holds, that the human mind is often governed by motives "unforeſeen and not deſigned by the mind beforehand." And as Dr. Weſt holds, that the mind never acts without motive, unleſs he hold alſo, that it always foreſees beforehand, the motives on which it will in future act, he muſt join with Preſident Edwards in the idea, that it acts on, or which is the ſame, is governed by motives "unforeſeen and not deſigned by the mind beforehand:" And therefore on the ſame ground, on which he charges Preſident Edwards with holding principles, which imply that the mind is governed by blind fate and chance, he may be charged with the ſame.

He alſo holds, that God "regulates and governs "all things and ſets bounds to the actions of all ra-"tional creatures, to bring about his own purpoſes," and that "infallibly." Part II, p. 46, 47. "That "the Deity *governs* free agents as *perfectly* and *makes* "them perform his purpoſes as *infallibly*, as though "they had no agency at all." Ibid, p. 67. And that "every thing is *firmly fixed* in the divine mind." Ibid, p. 49. Now the Deity is a cauſe extrinſic to the human mind, and by conceſſion, he *regulates*, *governs*, and *overrules* all the actions of intelligent creatures, and *makes* them *infallibly* perform *his purpoſes*. Therefore "let a man's mind be ever ſo ſtrongly determin-"ed at preſent to purſue any particular object, yet "that extrinſic cauſe," the Deity, "which has the "entire command of his will, may," and certainly will, "fruſtrate all his purpoſes," unleſs the object of his purſuit be agreeable to the purpoſes of the Deity. Now then I appeal to the reader, whether Dr. Weſt do not as fully hold thoſe principles which he ſays imply, that men are governed by blind fate and chance, as Preſident Edwards.

CHAPTER.

CHAPTER VIII.

In which is considered the Objection, that Moral Necessity implies, that God is the Author of Sin.

IT is objected to the doctrine of moral necessity, that since this necessity and the connection between motives and volitions are established by God, he is the author of all the sin and wickedness in the universe; that he by the motives which he lays before creatures, tempts them to sin, and is himself answerable for all the sin committed by them. And a great deal of vehement declamation is poured out on this subject, well suited to take hold of the feelings and passions of men, but not to inform their understandings and assist their reason.

Before we proceed to a more direct and particular consideration of this objection, it is proper to show in what sense the advocates for moral necessity hold that the divine agency is concerned in the existence of sin.

1. They do hold, that all necessity and certainty or certain futurity, whether of natural or moral events, is established by God; of course that the connection between all causes and effects, and particularly the connection between motives and volitions, is established by the same supreme agent.

2. They hold, that all things, which come to pass in time, were certainly foreordained by God from eternity; that he foreordained them not in consequence of foreseeing, that the free will of man will bring them into existence; but the free will of man brings them into existence, in consequence of the divine decree, so far as that will does at all bring them into existence.

3. They hold, that whatever sin takes place among creatures, takes place not by the bare permission or non-influence of God; but under his superintend-

ing providence, and in conſequence of his diſpoſing things ſo, that ſin certainly or with moral neceſſity, follows.——Preſident Edwards has explained himſelf fully on this head. Inquiry, p. 254; "If by *the au-*
"*thor of ſin* be meant the *ſinner*, the *agent* or *actor* of
" ſin, or the doer of a wicked thing; ſo it would be
" a reproach and blaſphemy, to ſuppoſe God to be *the*
" *author of ſin*. In this ſenſe I utterly deny God to
" be the author of ſin; rejecting ſuch an imputation
" on the Moſt High, as what is infinitely to be abhor-
" red; and deny any ſuch thing to be the conſe-
" quence of what I have laid down. But if by *author of*
" *ſin* is meant the permitter or not hinderer of ſin, and
" at the ſame time, a *diſpoſer of the ſtate of events in ſuch*
" *a manner*, for wiſe, holy and moſt excellent ends and
" purpoſes, THAT SIN, if it be permitted and not hinder-
" ed, WILL MOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW——I do not
" deny, that God is the author of ſin——it is no re-
" proach for the Moſt High to be *thus* the author of ſin."

The objections againſt ſuch an agency of God in the exiſtence of ſin, as has been now deſcribed, are two; (1) That ſuch divine agency is inconſiſtent with human liberty, moral agency and accountableneſs: (2) That it is inconſiſtent with the perfect holineſs of God.——Before I anſwer theſe objections diſtinctly, I wiſh it to be obſerved, that they are inconſiſtent and mutually deſtroy each other.

If the divine agency in the eſtabliſhment of moral neceſſity and the connection between motives and volitions, be inconſiſtent with our liberty and moral agency; then God in eſtabliſhing ſuch a neceſſity of any action in us, which we call ſin, is not the cauſe or author of *ſin*; for his agency ſo far from producing ſin in us, renders us *incapable* of ſin. Suppoſe God with moral neceſſity influence a man to kill another with malice prepenſe; if this neceſſitating influence as really deſtroy his moral agency, as if it turned him into a windmill, though the man kills the other, he commits no more ſin in it, than if a windmill had

had killed him; and consequently God is no more the author of sin in this instance, than if he had influenced the windmill to kill him, or had first turned the man into a windmill, and this windmill had in the course of providence been the instrument of his death. So that they who hold, that moral necessity is inconsistent with moral agency, must never object, that God is *the author of sin*, by establishing that necessity, and thus acts inconsistently with his perfect holiness.

On the other hand, if God do influence any man to *commit sin*, and thus act inconsistently with his perfect holiness, the man is a moral agent notwithstanding such influence, and there is no foundation to object, that the influence is inconsistent with liberty and moral agency; and they who object that such influence implies, that God is the author of *sin*, must forever be silent concerning the inconsistency of that influence with human liberty and moral agency.

If moral necessity be inconsistent with moral agency, it is absolutely impossible and contradictory for God to dispose things so, that sin will certainly or with moral necessity follow. For on this supposition whatever certainly follows such a disposal cannot be sin or any other moral act, as moral agency is in the case destroyed by the disposal. Therefore it is impossible, that God in this way should cause sin, and therefore it is absurd and self-contradictory in those who hold, that moral necessity is inconsistent with moral agency, to charge us with blasphemy, as they frequently do, because we avow the sentiment, that God so disposes events that sin certainly follows.

Yet so far as I know, all those who oppose moral necessity, make both the objections before mentioned, and thus pull down with one hand, what they build up with the other. This is eminently true of Dr. West.

I now proceed to consider those objections distinctly.

1. It is objected, that a divine agency establishing a moral necessity of sin, is inconsistent with human

liberty, moral agency and accountableneſs.—— Anſwer: The divine agency in this caſe is no more inconſiſtent with human liberty, &c. than the moral neceſſity which it eſtabliſhes. If this neceſſity be inconſiſtent with liberty, be it ſo; the divine agency which cauſes it, does not increaſe the inconſiſtency, beyond what would be, if that neceſſity took place without ſuch agency. A mountain placed acroſs the channel of a river, may be inconſiſtent with the river's flowing in that channel. But whether it were placed there by God, were conſtructed there by human art and labour, or happened there without cauſe, are queſtions immaterial as to the river's running in that channel, ſo long as the mountain is the very ſame. Therefore let our opponents prove, that moral neceſſity or a previous certainty of moral actions, is inconſiſtent with moral agency, and that moral agents muſt act by perfect contingence, mere chance and blind fate, and they will carry their point, without ſaying a word concerning the divine agency: And until they prove this, whatever they may ſay concerning the divine agency, will ſerve no good purpoſe to their cauſe, as to this part of the argument.

2. It is objected, that for God to eſtabliſh a moral neceſſity of ſin, or as Preſident Edwards expreſſes it, "for God to diſpoſe of the ſtate of events in ſuch a "manner, for wiſe, holy and moſt excellent ends, "that ſin will moſt certainly and infallibly follow;" is inconſiſtent with the perfect holineſs of God.—— But in what reſpects is it inconſiſtent with his holineſs? Or for what reaſons are we to conclude, that it is inconſiſtent with his holineſs? So far as I have been able to collect the reaſons from the ableſt writers on that ſide of the queſtion, they are theſe:

(1) That whatever is in the effect is in the cauſe, and the nature of every cauſe may be known by the effect. Therefore if God ſo order things, that ſin will certainly follow, he is the cauſe of ſin, and therefore is ſinful himſelf.——If this argument be good, God

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is the ſubject of pain, ſickneſs and death, ſince he is the cauſe of them: He is material and is the ſubject of all the properties of matter, extenſion, ſolidity, mobility, figure, colour, &c. becauſe he created matter and all its properties. Yea he ſuffers the torments of hell, becauſe he inflicts them.——This argument, though urged by men of great fame, is too weak and abſurd to bear inſpection!

(2) If God diſpoſe things ſo, that ſin will certainly follow; he doubtleſs takes pleaſure in ſin, and this implies ſin in God himſelf.——If God do take a direct and immediate complacency in ſin, it is granted, that this would imply ſin in God. But if he chooſe the exiſtence of ſin as a mean of good only, as pain and ſickneſs may be the means of good; this implies no ſin in God. Nor does it follow from his diſpoſing things ſo, that ſin certainly takes place, that he does directly delight in ſin itſelf abſtractly conſidered, any more than it follows from his inflicting ſickneſs and miſery on his creatures, that he takes a direct complacency in theſe. And we do not allow, but utterly deny, that God from a direct complacencey in ſin diſpoſes things ſo, that it certainly follows. If our opponents believe that a direct complacency of God in ſin is implied in our doctrine, it behoves them to make it out, and not to take it for granted.

Dr. Weſt inſiſts on this argument, Part II, p. 43. "If the Deity produces ſinful volitions——then ſin "is his own work——and then he cannot hate ſin, "but muſt love it and delight in it." It ſeems the Doctor foreſaw that to this argument it would be anſwered that God's producing ſin in the manner before explained, no more implies a direct complacency in it, than his producing *miſery* implies a direct complacency in that; and he replies, that "the two caſes "are by no means parallel——that the Deity is no "where repreſented as being angry at his creatures, "becauſe they ſuffer pain and diſtreſs——whereas "with regard to moral evil, God is always repreſented

"as hating it, and punishing the impenitent." To this I rejoin, that the want of parallelism does not appear. For though God is not represented to be angry at *pain* and *misery*, as they are not the proper objects of anger; yet he is represented to be displeased with them; and anger is only one kind of displeasure, displeasure at moral evil. And if God do produce a thing, with which he is displeased, why may he not produce a thing with which he is angry, and which he is disposed to punish as it deserves? Let a reason be given, why he may not do the latter, as well as the former.

(3) God hates sin and doubtless he must hate to bring it into existence; and therefore he will not so dispose things, that it will certainly come into existence. But God hates the pain, misery and death of his creatures in the same sense, that he hates sin; yet we find in fact, that he does dispose things so, that they do take place among his creatures.

(4) That God should so dispose of events, that sin is the certain consequence, is doing evil, that good may come of it; which is contrary to scripture, as well as reason.——This is merely asserting, but not proving what is asserted. How does it appear, that for God so to dispose of events, that sin is the certain consequence, and this to subserve the most wise and holy purposes, is doing evil? To do evil is to commit sin; and to say that this is to commit sin, is to beg the question. Let it be proved to imply, that God commits sin, and the point is gained. We assert, that to say, such a disposal implies, that God commits sin, is as groundless a proposition, as to say, that if God so dispose of events, that sickness is the certain consequence, implies, that God himself is sick. I presume, it will not be denied, that God did so dispose of events, that the certain consequence would be that Joseph should be sold into Egypt, and that our Saviour should be crucified. Nor will it be denied, that God made this disposition of events with a holy

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and wiſe purpoſe. And if God may do this in one or two inſtances; why may he not do the ſame in every inſtance, in which ſin actually exiſts?

(5) That God ſhould make an eſtabliſhment whereby any creature is laid under a moral neceſſity of ſinning is a great injury, both to the creature himſelf, and alſo to the ſyſtem; as all ſin is injurious to the ſyſtem.——Anſwer: What injury can be pretended to be done to the creature, who is the ſubject of the ſin, in the caſe deſcribed, ſo long as his liberty and moral agency remain entire? And they do remain entire by the ſuppoſition; elſe he would be incapable of ſin. A creature which is not, and ſo long as it remains to be, not a moral agent, cannot be influenced even by God himſelf to commit ſin: It would imply a contradiction. So that there is no foundation for complaint, that the ſubject is injured, by being laid under a moral neceſſity, or previous certainty, of ſinning.——Beſides; this objection implies, that every moral agent is injured, unleſs it be a matter of perfect uncertainty, what his future actions ſhall be, uncertainty not only to himſelf and all creatures, but to God and in the nature of things: *i. e.* every moral agent is injured, unleſs he be left to act by pure chance.

With regard to injury to the ſyſtem of intelligent beings, there is, if poſſible, ſtill leſs foundation for objection on this ground. For it is a part of the doctrine of moral neceſſity, that God never eſtabliſhes it, excepting when it's eſtabliſhment is ſubſervient and neceſſary to the general good of that ſyſtem, implying the divine glory; and to be ſure, that God never ſo diſpoſes of events, that ſin certainly follows, unleſs ſuch a diſpenſation is neceſſary to the general good: Nor ought the contrary to be taken for granted. If God do in any inſtance ſo diſpoſe of events, that ſin certainly follows, when the exiſtence of that ſin is not neceſſary to the general good, but injurious to it; I confeſs, I ſee not how in this caſe, the divine holineſs

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can be vindicated. But this is nothing peculiar to the introduction of ſin. It would alſo be inconſiſtent with the divine perfect holineſs and wiſdom to create matter, or to cauſe holineſs, in ſuch circumſtances as to differve the general good.

(6) It is inquired, Where is the conſiſtence between God's laying a man under a moral neceſſity of ſinning, and then puniſhing him for that ſin ?——I anſwer,

1. How can God conſiſtently make a man ſick, and then apply medicines or any remedy toward his reſtoration ? Puniſhment is inflicted to prevent either the ſubject of the puniſhment, or others, from falling into the ſame practice. If there be no inconſiſtence in bringing ſickneſs on a man, and then healing him by medicine ; where is the inconſiſtence in bringing ſin, which is moral ſickneſs, on a man, and whereby both he and that ſyſtem are ſo far morally diſeaſed, and then by puniſhment healing him or the ſyſtem ?

2. There is no conſiſtence in the caſe, if moral neceſſity be incompatible with moral agency. But if it be entirely compatible with moral agency, there is no inconſiſtence in the caſe : For in laying a man under a moral neceſſity of *ſinning*, as he is ſuppoſed ſtill to *ſin*, nothing is done to impair his moral agency or his deſert of puniſhment. On this ſuppoſition it is immaterial as to deſert of puniſhment, who or what is the cauſe of the moral neceſſity, whether God or any other being, or whether it happen without cauſe. Therefore God may as conſiſtently puniſh a ſinner, whom he himſelf has laid under a moral neceſſity of ſinning, as he may puniſh him, provided he be laid under the ſame moral neceſſity by any other being, or by mere chance. If moral neceſſity be entirely conſiſtent with deſert of puniſhment, it is as impertinent to aſk how God can conſiſtently lay a man under a moral neceſſity of ſinning and then puniſh him for it, as to aſk how God can conſiſtently make a man of a dark complexion or a low ſtature and then puniſh him, for any ſins, which he may commit. For moral

moral neceſſity is no more inconſiſtent with ſin and deſert of puniſhment, than a dark complexion or a low ſtature. To lay a man under a moral neceſſity of ſinning, is to make it certain, that he will ſin: And to aſk how God can conſiſtently make it certain, that he will ſin, and then puniſh him for that ſin, implies that previous certainty is inconſiſtent with ſin, and that in order to ſin a man muſt act by mere chance.

It is no more inconſiſtent, for God to forbid men to ſin, and yet ſo diſpoſe things, that they certainly will commit ſin; than it is to forbid them to ſin, and yet voluntarily to ſuffer other cauſes to lead them into ſin. Nay, ſince liberty is out of the queſtion, as by the very ſtatement of the objection, it allows, that notwithſtanding the divine diſpoſal, the man who is the ſubject of that diſpoſal does commit *ſin*; it is no more inconſiſtent for God to forbid men to ſin, and yet ſo diſpoſe things, that ſin will follow, than it is for him to forbid it, and yet voluntarily permit men to ſin by ſelf-determination. For in diſpoſing things ſo that ſin follows, when the diſpoſal is ſuppoſed to be conſiſtent with ſin and moral agency, nothing can be pretended to be inconſiſtent with the prohibition of ſin, unleſs it be the divine conſent, that ſin ſhould come into exiſtence; and this equally exiſts in the caſe of bare permiſſion, as in the caſe of the aforeſaid diſpoſal. The law of God, which forbids all ſin, does not imply, that God will prevent ſin, by introducing the greater evil of deſtroying moral agency. Nor does it imply, that he will not conſent in his own mind, that it be committed by men or other moral agents, rather than the ſaid greater evil or other as great evil ſhould take place. Therefore rather than that the ſame or as great an evil ſhould take place, the Deity may not only conſent to the exiſtence of ſin, but may conſent, that ſecond cauſes, motives, temptations, &c. ſhould do whatever they can do, toward the introduction of it, conſiſtently with the freedom of the creature. He may do all this without

inconſiſtence

inconſiſtence and inſincerity. The prohibition of ſin in the law does not imply a wiſh or choice of the divine mind, all things conſidered, that ſin ſhould not be committed. It barely points out our duty, but reveals nothing of God's deſign, whether or not to permit it, or to diſpoſe things ſo, that it will follow. Therefore there is no inconſiſtence between this prohibition and ſuch a diſpoſal in providence, as will be followed by ſin.——A good maſter may ſtrictly forbid his ſervant to ſteal; yet convinced, that he does ſteal, the maſter may in a particular caſe, wiſh him to ſteal, and even leave money expoſed to him, that he may ſteal, and ultimately with a deſign that an advantage may be put into the maſter's hand, to convict, puniſh and reform his ſervant. There is no inconſiſtence in the maſter's thus forbidding theft, and yet from the motive before mentioned wiſhing to have it committed.

(7) It is ſaid, that if God chooſe that the ſinfulneſs of volitions ſhould come into exiſtence, and if he ſo diſpoſe events, that it will certainly come into exiſtence; there is no difference between this, and God's being himſelf the ſubject of ſinful volitions.——I anſwer, there is the ſame difference in this caſe, as there is between God's chooſing that a man ſhould be ſick, and being the ſubject of ſickneſs himſelf; as there is between creating matter, and being himſelf material; and as there is between willing and cauſing the damnation of a ſinner, and being himſelf the ſubject of damnation. It will not be pretended, that if God diſpoſe events and circumſtances in ſuch a manner, that repentance, godly ſorrow, faith in a Redeemer, ſubmiſſion and holy fear, take place in the heart of a man, God himſelf is the ſubject of thoſe exerciſes.

If, though human liberty be left entire, God cannot ſo diſpoſe things, that ſin will certainly follow, without being himſelf the ſubject of a diſpoſition friendly to ſin; he cannot without the ſame implication chooſe, that ſin ſhould take place, rather than a greater evil. But our opponents allow, that God did chooſe,

chooſe, that ſin ſhould take place, rather than a greater evil; they allow, that he had a perfect foreknowledge, that if he ſhould create man with a ſelf-determining power, and leave him to the free exerciſe of that power, the conſequence would be, that he would commit ſin. Therefore they allow, that God choſe, that ſin ſhould come into exiſtence, rather than human liberty ſhould be deſtroyed, and rather than free agents ſhould not be brought into exiſtence. So that in the ſame ſenſe, in which we hold, that God choſe or was willing, that ſin ſhould come into exiſtence, our opponents hold the ſame. We hold, that God choſe that ſin ſhould take place, rather than a greater evil; and therefore diſpoſed of events conſiſtently with human liberty, ſo that it certainly followed. They hold, that God choſe, that ſin ſhould take place, rather than a greater evil, and therefore diſpoſed of events, conſiſtently with human liberty, ſo that it certainly followed, and when God certainly foreſaw, that it would follow.

In that our opponents charge us with holding principles, which imply, that God is *the author of ſin*, they allow, that whatever God does according to our principles toward the introduction of ſin, is conſiſtent with free agency in the ſubject of ſin. This muſt be conceded by them; elſe their charge is perfectly inconſiſtent and ſelf-contradictory, as has been ſhown. Therefore ſince it is allowed, that whatever God has done toward the exiſtence of ſin, is conſiſtent with the creature's free agency, the only queſtion remaining, is, whether he have acted in this affair, with a holy and wiſe deſign, a deſign to promote the general good: And we argue from the eſſential perfections of God, that whatever he has done in this, as well as in every other inſtance, muſt have been done with ſuch a deſign.

If it be ſaid, that ſin cannot even by the Deity, be made ſubſervient to good; the queſtion will ariſe, why then did he ſo diſpoſe circumſtances that it did come

come into exiſtence, and this when he foreſaw the conſequence? To anſwer, that he could not, conſiſtently with free agency, keep it out of exiſtence, is on the preſent ſuppoſition groundleſs. It is now ſuppoſed, that God did bring it into exiſtence, conſiſtently with free agency; and therefore he could doubtleſs keep it out of exiſtence, conſiſtently with the ſame free agency.

If the exiſtence of ſin be ultimately made ſubſervient to good, or if it be neceſſary to the prevention of greater evil; what reaſon in the world, can be given, why God ſhould not bring it into exiſtence, in a way conſiſtent with human free agency? In this way it muſt be brought into exiſtence, if at all.——Our opponents themſelves allow, as has been obſerved, that the exiſtence of it was neceſſary to the prevention of greater evil, the evil of deſtroying human liberty, or of the non-exiſtence of free agents: And for God in this view to conſent to the exiſtence of ſin, as our opponents grant that he did, is as inconſiſtent with his moral character, as to give the ſame conſent and to put forth any exertion toward its exiſtence, conſiſtent with human liberty. So long as the exertion is conſiſtent with liberty, it cannot be pretended, that there is any thing in it more oppoſite to the moral character of God or more friendly to ſin, than there is in the conſent implied in that permiſſion of ſin, which our opponents hold. Therefore their plan is in this reſpect equally liable to the ſame objection of being inconſiſtent with the moral character of God, as our's.

(8) Dr. Weſt argues, that if the Deity order things ſo that ſinful volition follow, "he muſt place the object in ſuch a view before the mind, as to make it "appear the greateſt good under preſent circumſtances; which implies, that he preſents the object in "a falſe point of light, and effectually deceives the "mind;" and "the apoſtle was under a great miſtake, "when he ſaid, it was impoſſible for God to lie;" and to lie is ſin. The Doctor, as uſual, tells us, "I "can

" can have no idea, that the Deity can produce a ſin-
" ful volition in the human mind, in any other way,
" than what I have now deſcribed ;" Part II, p. 41.——On this I remark ;

1. It is very immaterial to others, what Dr. Weſt can, and what he cannot, have an idea of. Does the Doctor mean this as an argument, that no other perſon can have an idea of it, or that it cannot be true ?

2. If when he ſpeaks of God's making ſin appear the greateſt good, he mean, that he makes it appear ſo to a man's unbiaſed reaſon, this is not true, nor is it pretended by any man.

3. When ſin appears to any man the greateſt good, it is in conſequence of the influence of his corrupt appetites, and not by the dictates of his unbiaſed reaſon. How a man becomes the ſubject of corrupt appetite, I do not undertake to ſay any further than Preſident Edwards has ſaid already, that God has diſpoſed things ſo, that it takes place as an infallible conſequence. But if God ſo diſpoſe things, that an inordinate appetite for ſtrong drink take place in the mind of a man, and by the influence of ſuch appetite ſtrong drink appear to him the greateſt good ; does it hence follow, that God is a liar ? Will Dr. Weſt aſſert it ? If not, the ground of his argument fails.

The Doctor further obſerves, that " if God is the
" author of men's luſts, he deceives them, by cauſing
" them to view things through the falſe medium of
" their luſts ;" ibid, p. 42, 43.——The expreſſion, " God is the author of men's luſts," is the Doctor's, not Preſident Edwards's. It tends to miſlead, and cannot be admitted, without explanation and qualifying. Suppoſe a man by leading his neighbour frequently into the immoderate uſe of ſtrong drink, ſhould produce an appetite for it in his neighbour, ſo that henceforward ſtrong drink ſhould appear to him the greateſt good ; is the man, who does this, a liar ? Whether he be guilty of other ſin, than lying, is nothing to the preſent purpoſe ; for Dr. Weſt's argument is, that God

God by producing luſt in men, deceives the man in ſuch a ſenſe, as to diſprove the words of the apoſtle, *that God cannot lie.* If the man above ſuppoſed be not guilty of lying, neither is the Deity in ſo diſpoſing things, that luſt infallibly follows.

(9) "If the Deity be the poſitive efficient cauſe of "ſin, then there can be no foundation for repentance: "For how can a man repent or be ſorry, that he is juſt "ſuch a creature, in every reſpect, as the Almighty has "been pleaſed to make him?" Ibid, p. 44.——With the ſame objection to the expreſſion, "poſitive efficient cauſe of *ſin*," I obſerve, that this argument is equally good with reſpect to pain, ſickneſs and calamity; and will prove that no man ought to be ſorry for any calamity befalling himſelf or others: For "how can a man be ſorry, that he is juſt ſuch a creature," juſt as miſerable, "as God has made him?" If the Doctor ſay, that though calamity in itſelf is an evil and therefore to be regretted; yet as God ſends it, he will overrule it for good, and that in that view it is not to be regretted; the ſame obſervations are applicable to the exiſtence of ſin. Sin in itſelf conſidered is infinitely vile and abominable, and proper matter of ſorrow and repentance. But conſidering that it no more came into exiſtence without the deſign and providence of God, than calamity did; and conſidering, that its exiſtence will be certainly overruled for final good; its exiſtence is no more to be regretted, than the exiſtence of calamity and miſery, eſpecially extreme and eternal miſery.

The Doctor proceeds; "What remorſe of con-"ſcience can there be, when the ſinner believes that "every ſinful volition was formed in him by the De-"ity?" Ibid. Sinful volitions proceed from ſome cauſe, or no cauſe. If they proceed from no cauſe, what remorſe of conſcience can there be, when the ſinner believes and knows, that every ſinful volition happened in him by pure chance? If ſinful volitions proceed from ſome cauſe, that cauſe is either the ſinner himſelf

himſelf or ſome extrinſic cauſe. If they proceed from any other extrinſic cauſe, beſide the Deity, the ſame difficulty will ariſe, and it may be aſked with the ſame pertinency, as the above queſtion is aſked by Dr. Weſt, What remorſe of conſcience can there be, when the ſinner believes, that every ſinful volition was formed in him by an extrinſic cauſe? If the efficient cauſe be the ſinner himſelf, then "ſelf acts on ſelf and produces volition," which the Doctor denies: And if he did not deny it, it is abſurd and impoſſible, as it runs into an infinite ſeries of volitions propagating one another, and yet all this ſeries would really amount to but one ſingle volition, and this, as there would not then be a preceding cauſal volition, would not be efficiently, voluntarily and freely cauſed by the ſubject himſelf.

Beſides; if the ſubject efficiently cauſe his own volitions, he either cauſes them under the influence of motives or not. If he cauſe them under the influence of motives, he cauſes them neceſſarily, and acts neceſſarily in cauſing them; and Dr. Weſt ſays, "Where "neceſſity begins, liberty ends;" ibid, p. 19. Therefore if a man efficiently cauſe his own volitions ſo as to be free from neceſſity, he muſt cauſe them without motive, aim or end; *i. e.* he muſt cauſe them in perfect ſtupidity, and in the exerciſe of Dr. Weſt's torpid liberty of *not acting*. And then I aſk, what remorſe of conſcience can there be, when the ſinner believes, that he himſelf cauſed every ſinful volition in himſelf, as involuntarily as a man in a convulſion ſtrikes his friend, and as ſtupidly and unmeaningly as a door turns on its hinges?

Remorſe of conſcience is a ſenſe of having done wrong; and whenever a perſon has done wrong, there is a foundation for remorſe of conſcience; and to take it for granted, that there can be no remorſe of conſcience, unleſs we determine our own volitions, is to take it for granted, that without ſelf-determination we can do no wrong and are no moral agents; which is to beg the main queſtion in this controverſy. Let it

be ſhown, that without ſelf-determination, we are not moral agents, and one important ſtep will be taken toward ſettling this controverſy. Yet even this ſtep will not be deciſive: It muſt be alſo ſhown, that our ſelf-determination was not previouſly certain, but is exerciſed by mere chance: For if it be previouſly certain, it is morally neceſſary.

(10) If God have ſo diſpoſed of events, that ſin certainly follows, it is his work; and to be oppoſed to ſin is "to be oppoſed to God's work, and to be oppoſed to God;" ibid.——So calamity is the work of God, and to be oppoſed to that, is to be oppoſed to God's work, and to be oppoſed to God. And will Dr. Weſt admit that every one who wiſhes to eſcape any calamity, is in a criminal manner oppoſing God?

(11) "If the Deity has formed ſinful volitions in a "man, becauſe his glory could not be promoted "without it; then ſurely the ſinner, if he loves God, "muſt love him becauſe he has made him a ſinful crea-"ture, and ought to thank him for all the ſins, which "he has committed;" ibid.——The difficulty attending moſt of Dr. Weſt's arguments, is, that if they prove any thing, they prove too much, and confute principles and facts, which he will not dare to deny. So with reſpect to this argument. The Doctor will not deny, that pain and calamity are the work of God. "And if the Deity has" ſent pain and calamity "on "a man, becauſe his glory could not be promoted "without them; then ſurely the ſinner, if he loves "God, muſt love him, becauſe he has made him a" miſerable "creature, and ought to thank him for all" the calamity and miſery, which he ſuffers, for all his ſickneſs and dangers, for the death of his wife, children, &c. &c. And if a man ought to thank God for theſe things, no doubt, "a ſinner ought to thank God "for damnation." If theſe conſequences do not inevitably follow from the principle of Dr. Weſt's argument, let the contrary be ſhown, and not merely aſſerted.——Again; "If we are to thank God for

all

all the calamities and miſeries which we do or ſhall ſuffer; "this will imply, that" calamity and miſery "are bleſſings or favours; and conſequently, if the "ſinner is to thank God for damnation, then damna- "tion is a bleſſing and favour——Hence ſinners who "believe this doctrine, will be apt to conclude, that "it is a matter of no conſequence, whether they be "ſaved or damned; ſeeing upon either ſuppoſition, "they are ſure that whatever they receive from God "will be ſuch a bleſſing, that they ought to be thank- "ful for it." Ibid, p. 45.——Thus may the Doctor's arguments be retorted againſt himſelf.

If the Doctor ſhould anſwer, Though calamity and miſery in themſelves are no bleſſings, yet when they are overruled by God to the good of thoſe who ſuffer them, or to the general good, they become bleſſings; I acknowledge the ſufficiency of the anſwer. But the ſame anſwer may with equal truth and force be made to his obſervations concerning ſin. The Doctor grants, that the wickedneſs of the vicious ſhall be overruled to the glory of God and the advancement of the happineſs of the righteous; ibid, p. 49. Though wickedneſs is in itſelf no bleſſing and no matter of thankfulneſs; yet when God overrules it to good, greater good than could have been effected in any other way; in this connection it is in the ſame ſenſe a bleſſing, and matter of thankfulneſs, as calamity and miſery are.

(12) On the plan of moral neceſſity, God tempts mankind to ſin.——If the meaning of this be, that God eſtabliſhes a connection between motives and volitions, and a previous certainty of thoſe volitions; and in the courſe of his providence brings into the view of men motives which actually influence them to ſin; I grant, that God does in this ſenſe tempt mankind to ſin; as he did our firſt parents, Judas, &c. Nor is there any ground, on which this can be denied, unleſs it be allowed, that this previous certainty is eſtabliſhed by ſome other cauſe than the Deity, or that it exiſts without cauſe, or that volitions

are not previouſly certain, but happen by chance. To hold that the previous certainty of all volitions is eſtabliſhed by ſome other cauſe than God, is to run into the Manichean ſcheme of two Gods, and at the ſame time to hold, that the ſecond God is an involuntary agent and is the cauſe of all the volitions of the voluntary God, as well as of all creatures. If we ſay, this previous certainty of all volitions is uncauſed, we may as well ſay, that every thing elſe is uncauſed. If we ſay, that volitions are not previouſly certain, but happen by mere chance, we may as well ſay, that every thing elſe happens by chance.

But if by *tempting* be meant ſoliciting or enticing to ſin, as the devil tempts men, we deny that this is implied in our doctrine.

Dr. Weſt makes ſome remarks, Part II, p. 75, &c. on Jam. i. 13——16, which appear to be remarkable.——1. He tells us, that "a man is tempted, when "he conſents to the gratification of his own luſt; *i. e.* "when he commits ſin." Indeed! Is no man tempted, but he who actually commits ſin in conſequence of the temptation? The apoſtle Paul declares, Acts xx. 19, that he "ſerved the Lord with all humility "of mind, and with many tears and *temptations*, which "befel him by the lying in wait of the Jews." And were all theſe temptations ſucceſsful with the apoſtle? The very text implies the contrary. Gal. iv. 14. "And my temptation, which was in my fleſh, ye deſ- "piſed not nor rejected, but received me as an angel "of God, even as Chriſt Jeſus." Jam. i. 2. "Count "it all joy, when ye fall into divers temptations." V. 12. "Bleſſed is the man, that endureth temptation: For when he is tried, he ſhall receive the crown of life."

Or if Dr. Weſt ſhall allow, that a man is or may be tempted without falling into ſin, this will ſpoil his argument. His words immediately following thoſe laſt quoted from him, are, "This proves, that when it is "ſaid, neither tempteth he any man, the ſenſe is, "God cauſeth no man to ſin." But if a man may be tempted

tempted without committing ſin, then God may tempt a man, without cauſing him to ſin.

2. He obſerves from *Leigh*, that the Greek verb πειραζω, uſed in the paſſage in James now under conſideration, ſignifies to *make trial*, *i. e. to try* a perſon. But becauſe James ſays of God, *neither tempteth he any man*, will Dr. Weſt adventure to ſay, that God never *tries* any man? and particularly that he did not try Abraham?

3. Becauſe this text declares, that God does not *tempt*, *i. e.* according to the Doctor's explanation, *try* any man, he infers that God "does not cauſe them to "ſin." This conſequence follows not from the principle premiſed. Whether God do or do not, try men, he may ſo diſpoſe things that ſin will be the certain conſequence; and this may be done not to *try* any man.

4. He ſays, that "a voluntary conſent to indulge or "gratify luſt, is ſin." Yet in the next ſentence he ſays, "the apoſtle makes every ſin to be the *effect* of "a conſent to gratify ſome particular luſt:" *i. e.* every ſin is the effect of ſin.

5. The whole force of this text, to prove, that God does not diſpoſe things ſo, that ſin is the certain conſequence, if it prove any thing to this effect, lies in theſe words, "Neither tempteth he any man." The Doctor ſays, "theſe muſt mean, Neither cauſeth he "any man to ſin;" ibid, p. 75.——But if "the Deity "infallibly and perfectly regulate, govern and ſet "bounds to the actions of all rational creatures, and "overrule all thoſe actions to accompliſh his pur-"poſes," if he *make* them perform his purpoſes infallibly; as Dr. Weſt ſays; then every thing which they in fact do, and every ſin which they commit, was God's purpoſe and he *makes* them perform it. Is he then in no ſenſe the cauſe of their ſin? Does he not at leaſt ſo diſpoſe things, that ſin is the certain conſequence?

Dr. Weſt abundantly aſſerts thoſe things which neceſſarily imply both abſolute decrees and ſuch diſ-

poſal of God, that ſin certainly and infallibly follows. "The creature," ſays he, "in every moment of its "exiſtence, is ſubject to the divine *control*; conſe- "quently *no act can take place*, but what the Deity "foreſaw and *determined* from all eternity to *overrule* "to his own glory and the general good. If the Dei- "ty foreſaw, that a creature ——— would do that "which could not be overruled to the divine glory "and the general good ——— he would *reſtrain* him "from doing that;" Part II, p. 22. "He who has "made all things ——— does *regulate* and *govern* "all things, and *ſets bounds to the actions of all ration-* "*al creatures.*——The Deity, by his permiſſive de- "cree, *ſuperintends* and *governs all the actions* of his "creatures to accompliſh *his own purpoſes, in as ſtrong* "*a ſenſe, as though he brought them to paſs by his poſ-* "*itive efficiency*;" ibid, p. 46. "We believe, that "the Deity *governs* and overrules the actions of theſe "beings" [rational creatures]" to bring about his own "purpoſes and deſigns *as infallibly*, ——— as though "they were *mere paſſive* beings;" ibid, p. 47.

Now if theſe things be ſo; no act of the creature *can* take place, but what God determined from all eternity, to overrule to his own glory. If God *reſtrain* the creature from the contrary; if he *overrule* all thoſe actions to accompliſh his purpoſes, in as ſtrong a ſenſe, as though he brought them to paſs by his poſitive efficiency, and as infallibly as though they were mere paſſive beings; then certainly he does diſpoſe things ſo, that all thoſe actions do infallibly take place. To be ſubject to the *control* of our Creator in every moment of our exiſtence, ſo that no act *can* take place in us, but what God from eternity *determined*; to be *regulated* and *governed* by God in *all things*; if he ſet bounds to *all* our actions; and if he *govern* and *overrule* all our actions in as ſtrong a ſenſe as if he brought them to paſs by his *poſitive efficiency*, and as *infallibly* as though they were mere *paſſive beings*; ſurely all this implies, that God does ſo diſpoſe of e-

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vents, that ſin certainly follows. And on this plan, where is ſelf-determination? Where is liberty to either ſide? liberty to act or not act? All the actions of rational creatures are limited, bounded and reſtrained to certain definite objects and purpoſes, which God from eternity had in view. They are therefore ſhut up to act one way only, and cannot act otherwiſe. They can act in ſuch a manner only, as God from all eternity ſaw would accompliſh his glorious purpoſes, *i. e.* his glorious *decrees*. Therefore all the actions of creatures are decreed from eternity to be preciſely what they are, and all creatures are as infallibly reſtrained from acting contrary to the decrees of God, as if he brought their actions to paſs by his poſitive efficiency, and as though they were mere paſſive beings.

If it ſhould be ſaid, that though God bounds and reſtrains his creatures from acting in a manner which is oppoſite to his purpoſes and decrees; yet he does not neceſſitate them to act at all, but leaves them at liberty to act or not act:—On this I obſerve,

1. As I have already ſaid, whenever any thing is propoſed to any intelligent being, as the object of his choice, it is, as Mr. Locke has long ſince thought, abſolutely impoſſible for that being not to act. He may indeed either chooſe or refuſe the object. But to refuſe it is to act, equally as to chooſe it. In either caſe the being acts and cannot avoid acting, unleſs he be ſunk into a ſtate of perfect unfeeling ſtupidity.

2. If it were poſſible for a creature to act or not act; ſtill according to Dr. Weſt he could do neither the one nor the other, unleſs it were ſubſervient to the glorious purpoſes of God. For if God will infallibly reſtrain creatures from acting in all inſtances, in which their acting is not ſubſervient to his purpoſes; will he not reſtrain them from *not acting*, *i. e.* prevent their ſinking into unfeeling ſtupidity, and excite them to action, in all inſtances in which not acting would not in like manner be ſubſervient to his

purpoſes? If not, let a reaſon be given; a reaſon why God will not prevent creatures from counteracting his purpoſes by *not acting*, as well as by *acting*. Surely it will not be pretended, that to excite by rational motives and conſiderations, a creature to action, is more inconſiſtent with liberty, than infallibly to reſtrain, whether by motives or without motives, the ſame creature from action.

3. I appeal to the reader, whether the Doctor have not in the paſſages above quoted, given up the whole queſtion both with reſpect to liberty as oppoſed to infallible moral neceſſity or certainty of moral action, and with reſpect to abſolute decrees. If all men be limited and bounded by God, to act in all caſes according to his purpoſes; if they be ſhut up to this way of acting, and cannot voluntarily refuſe to act in this way, as that would be to act contrary to God's purpoſe; if they cannot abſolutely ceaſe from all action when an object is propoſed to their choice, but muſt either chooſe or refuſe, and that according to God's purpoſe; if, as Doctor Weſt expreſsly declares to be according to his ſentiments, "Every thing is as firmly fixed in the "divine mind, by his permiſſive decree, and ſhall be "as infallibly accompliſhed, as though he was the im-"mediate author or efficient cauſe of all the actions "of creatures;" ibid, p. 49. Let the candid reader judge, whether the Doctor do not grant both abſolute neceſſity and abſolute decrees.

He as we have ſeen in his Part II, p. 22, allows, that God permits and overrules ſin to his own glory and the general good; but thinks this a demonſtrative proof of ſelf-determination. Let us conſider what he ſays on this ſubject.—Ibid, p. 34; "If the "doctrine of neceſſity be true, and we are not ſelf-"determined, then it will follow, that we are conſtant-"ly determined by the poſitive efficiency of the Deity." If it be true, as the Doctor holds, that God *regulates* "and *governs* all things, and *ſets bounds* to the actions "of *all* rational creatures, to bring about *infallibly*

"his

" his own purpoſes;" if he "*govern* free agents *as* " *perfectly* and *make them perform* his purpoſes as in- " fallibly, *as if they had no agency at all;*" I leave the reader to judge, whether we, in all our actions, be not, mediately or immediately, determined by the poſitive efficiency of the Deity. "If God make them perform his purpoſes *infallibly*," it ſeems he muſt by his poſitive efficiency determine them to the performance; for what is it *to make* men perform a purpoſe, but to put forth poſitive exertions to this end? This is alſo by poſitive efficiency to aboliſh all liberty of ſelf-determination.——If theſe things be denied, and it be affirmed, that ſtill the man is at liberty to act in that particular manner, which is ſubſervient to the divine purpoſe, or not to act at all, and thus there is room for ſelf-determination; I anſwer,

1. It is not allowed, that a man on a propoſal to act, can poſſibly *not act at all;* and this ought not to be taken for granted.

2. Then God does not infallibly make men comply with his purpoſe, but leaves them to comply or not; which is directly contrary to Dr. Weſt himſelf, in the quotations made above.

3. If the Deity by his poſitive efficiency prevent his creature from every action, but that which is agreeable to his purpoſe, he will prevent him by his poſitive efficiency from refuſing to comply with that purpoſe, and this is by poſitive efficiency to determine him to comply with that purpoſe. And the Doctor grants, that all the actions of rational creatures are agreeable to God's purpoſes. Therefore all rational creatures in all their actions are determined by the poſitive efficiency of God. And all thoſe which Dr. Samuel Weſt mentions as abſurd conſequences of the ſentiments of Dr. Stephen Weſt, may be retorted on the former, thus; Since God infallibly *makes* and determines all men to perform his purpoſes, in all their actions, "ſin is as much the work of God, as " any thing that he has made. But that the Deity " ſhould

" ſhould have an infinite averſion and an immutable " hatred to his works, is inconceivable. It is ſome- " times ſaid, that the tendency of ſin is to dethrone " the Almighty, to kill and utterly to deſtroy his ex- " iſtence. But is the Deity conſtantly working to " deſtroy himſelf? This will make the Deity a ſtrange " contradiction to himſelf, and will conſtitute ſuch a be- " ing, as cannot exiſt in the univerſe. If the Deity " forms wicked volitions in the human mind, and " then infinitely hates and abhors thoſe very works of " his, he muſt be infinitely miſerable and wretched. " God is ſaid to rejoice in his own works——If then " ſin is God's work he rejoices in it——God is the " greateſt lover of ſin in the univerſe." Whatever abſurdities theſe be, it concerns Dr. Samuel Weſt, as much as any man, to remove them. As appears, it is preſumed, by what has been ſaid already.

Beſides; moſt or all theſe objections lie with equal force againſt the divine efficiency of pain, miſery or death. The Doctor will not deny, that theſe are inflicted by God. Therefore miſery and death " are as " much the works of God, as any that he has made." Yet " he does not willingly afflict and grieve the children " of men." And " he has no pleaſure in the death " of" even " the wicked." Therefore " God has an in- " finite averſion and an irreconcilable hatred to his own " works:" And if this be inconceivable to Dr. Weſt he will not deny it to be fact; and therefore that a thing is inconceivable to him, is no proof, that it is not true. And that the Deity ſhould hate miſery and death and yet cauſe them, would equally as in the caſe ſtated by Dr. Weſt concerning the introduction of ſin, " make the Deity a ſtrange contradiction to " himſelf, and would conſtitute ſuch a being as can- " not exiſt in the univerſe." " If the Deity forms" miſery and death, " and then infinitely hates and ab- " hors theſe very works of his hands, he muſt be in- " finitely miſerable and wretched. God is ſaid to re- " joice in his own works. If then" miſery and death

" be

" be his works, he rejoices in them, and God is the " greateſt lover" of all the miſery and death " in the " univerſe." Whenever Dr. Weſt will anſwer theſe obſervations concerning the divine efficiency of miſery and death, he will furniſh himſelf with an anſwer to his own ſimilar obſervations concerning the divine agency in the introduction of moral evil. If he ſhall ſay, that God does indeed hate miſery and death in themſelves conſidered, and inflicts them, becauſe they are neceſſary to greater good, and to the accompliſhment of his own moſt benevolent purpoſes; the ſame may be ſaid concerning moral evil.

The Doctor quotes the following paſſage from Dr. Hopkins; " If God be the origin or cauſe of moral evil " this is ſo far from imputing moral evil to him, or " ſuppoſing, that there is any thing of moral evil in " him, that it neceſſarily ſuppoſes the contrary:" On which he remarks, " Conſequently, if God be the or- " igin and cauſe of holineſs, this by the ſame kind of " reaſoning, is ſo far from imputing holineſs to him, or " ſuppoſing, that there is any thing of that nature in " him, that it neceſſarily ſuppoſes the contrary; that " is to ſay, that the Deity has no moral character at " all." In the above quotation, Dr. Hopkins evidently means, If God be the cauſe of *all* moral evil, or of the firſt which exiſted in the univerſe. This the word *origin* implies; he evidently uſes it to mean *original* cauſe. Now whatever is in God, is uncauſed. Therefore if there be moral evil in him, neither he nor any other being is the cauſe of that; of courſe whatever moral evil he cauſes, muſt all be out of himſelf; and if he cauſe all moral evil, it muſt all be out of himſelf and none of it in him. So that Dr. Hopkins's propoſition on this head is manifeſtly true. Suppoſe the Doctor had ſaid, If God be the cauſe of all matter, this ſo far from ſuppoſing matter in him, neceſſarily ſuppoſes the contrary; no doubt Dr. Weſt himſelf would have acknowledged the truth of the propoſition: And let a reaſon be given why the former

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er propoſition, in the ſenſe now given of it, is not as true as the latter. As to the conſequence which Dr. Weſt draws from Dr. Hopkins's propoſition, "that "if God be the cauſe of holineſs [of *all* holineſs] this "is ſo far from ſuppoſing holineſs in God, that it ne- "ceſſarily ſuppoſes the contrary;" this is ſo far from an abſurdity, as Dr. Weſt imagines, that it is a manifeſt truth. Holineſs in God is no more cauſed or created, than the divine eſſence. If then there be no other holineſs, than created holineſs, there is and can be none in God.

On a paſſage in which Dr. Hopkins aſſerts, that moral evil and holineſs are equally the conſequence of the divine diſpoſal, but whether by the ſame mode of operation he could not tell; Dr. Weſt remarks, "This makes it extremely unhappy for us; for we "ſeem to have no way to know a true revelation "from a falſe one, both equally coming from the De- "ity;" p. 46, Part II. But how this conſequence follows from the aſſertion of Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Weſt does not illuſtrate. God may ſo diſpoſe things, that ſin infallibly follows, and yet not be the author of a falſe revelation: And as the Doctor merely aſſerts, without attempting to prove what he aſſerts, he has no right to expect, that his aſſertion ſhould be received as truth. If the Doctor take it for granted, that if God, in the way which I have explained, introduce ſin, he is himſelf as real a ſinner, as he would be, if he were to give a falſe revelation, he takes for granted the very thing in queſtion, which is to be fairly proved, not pitifully begged.

In the ſame page, he ſays, "According to Dr. "Hopkins will it not follow, that many who are led "by the Spirit of God, are the children of the devil?" This implies, that whenever God, by means of motives or in any other way, ſo diſpoſes of things, that ſin infallibly follows, the man who is the ſubject of that ſin, is in that ſin led by the Spirit of God. The principle on which this argument is built, is, that

that whenever God ſo diſpoſes things, that an action is the certain conſequence, in that action the man is led by the Spirit of God. But Dr. Weſt will not avow and abide by this principle: For he grants, that men always act upon ſome motive and never without motive. Nor will he deny, that the conſtitution, that men ſhould always act upon motive and never without, is eſtabliſhed by God. Yea, the Doctor expreſsly aſſerts, that "God overrules *all the actions of his* "*creatures* to accompliſh his own purpoſes in as "ſtrong a ſenſe as though he brought them to paſs "by his *poſitive efficiency*." Yet he will not pretend, that in all thoſe actions they are led by the Spirit of God.

The Doctor proceeds; "The Deity is called the "Father of lights, from whom proceeds every good "and perfect gift. But according to theſe principles, "may he not, with as much propriety, be called the "Father of darkneſs, from whom proceeds all ma-"lignity and wickedneſs?" Since the Doctor holds, that "The Deity governs free agents as perfectly and "*makes* them perform his purpoſe as infallibly, as if "they had no agency at all;" the queſtion which the Doctor here propoſes concerning the principles of Dr. Hopkins may with equal propriety be propoſed on his own principles. And notwithſtanding any agency which God exerciſes toward the production of moral evil, he may with the ſame truth and propriety be called *the Father of lights*, as he is called *the Father of mercies and the God of all comfort*, although all the pains and miſeries, which his creatures ſuffer, whether in this world or the future, are inflicted by him.

The Doctor ſeems to attempt to ſcreen himſelf from thoſe, which he ſuppoſes to be abſurd conſequences of Dr. Hopkins's ſcheme, by repreſenting, that he holds, that God barely *permits ſin*. But to *ſuperintend*, *govern* and *overrule* the actions of rational creatures "as infallibly, as if they were mere paſ-"ſive beings;" Part II, p. 47; and "in as ſtrong a ſenſe, "as though he brought them to paſs by his poſitive ef-"ficiency;"

"ficiency;" ibid, p. 46. "So to fix them, that they "shall as infallibly be accompliſhed, as though he was "the immediate author or efficient cauſe of them," ibid, p. 49. "And to *govern* free agents *as perfectly* and "to *make* them perform his purpoſes *as infallibly*, as "though they had no agency at all;" ibid, p. 67; is more than barely to permit free agents to act of themſelves. Barely to permit them to act of themſelves, by which the Doctor explains himſelf to mean, "ordaining "things contingently, *i. e.* avoidably, and with a poſſi- "bility of not coming to paſs," ibid, p. 47; is not to govern them at all, but to leave them to govern themſelves; it is not to overrule their actions, but to leave them to overrule their own actions; it is not to *make* them perform his purpoſes, but to leave them looſe to perform or to omit thoſe purpoſes. And much leſs is it to govern and overrule their actions *as infallibly as if they were mere paſſive beings, and in as ſtrong a ſenſe as though he brought them to paſs by his poſitive efficiency;* to *fix* thoſe actions *as infallibly as though he was the immediate author of them;* or to *govern* them as *perfectly* and to *make* them perform his purpoſes *as infallibly, as though they had no agency at all.*

Dr. Weſt conſtantly inſiſts, that "the Deity has "communicated to man a ſelf-moving or ſelf-active "principle." But what kind of a ſelf-moving principle is that, which is always and in all its actions infallibly and perfectly regulated, governed and overruled by an extrinſic cauſe? and which is made by God as infallibly to perform his purpoſes, as if it were no ſelf-moving principle at all? Such a ſelf-moving principle as this, is ſo like a principle that never moves itſelf, but is always moved by an extrinſic cauſe, that I requeſt Dr. Weſt to point out the difference.

The Doctor grants, that "there is a ſenſe in which "God *hardens* the hearts of men," and that this is by his "taking from *them* what he had granted them, as "a juſt puniſhment of their neglect and abuſe of the "advantages which they enjoyed;" Part II, p. 52. He grants

grants therefore, that God may consistently with his holiness harden the heart, and cause sin in men, in some cases; viz. when they deserve it as a just punishment of their sin. But the only reason, which renders it consistent with the divine perfections, to inflict this or any other just punishment, is, that the glory of God and the general good of his kingdom require it. Now no one pretends, that God ever in any sense causes sin to take place, unless its existence be subservient to the glory of God and the good of his kingdom. And if this reason will in one case justify his so disposing of things, that sin is the infallible consequence, why not in another? Until a reason is given to the contrary, we may presume, that whenever the glory of God and the general good of the creation require it, God may and does so dispose things, that sin is the infallible consequence.

"A man's becoming a vessel to honour or dishon-
"our, is in consequence of his own conduct and be-
"haviour." Part II, p. 54. If by becoming a vessel to dishonour the Doctor mean, *being punished*, no doubt it is in consequence of a man's own misconduct, and to assert this is to assert nothing very great or pertinent to the question concerning the cause of sin. But if he mean by it committing sin; this is not, nor can be always in consequence of the sinner's own misconduct; because this like the self-determining power, implies the absurdity of an infinite series of actions, in consequnce of each other; and that a man is doomed to commit sin in the first instance, in consequence of a prior sin committed by him.

"God does not harden the hearts of men, by any
"positive efficiency in forming or infusing any wick-
"edness into their heart, but only taking from them
"those things, which were designed to restrain them
"from the committing of sin, and by permitting them
"to walk in their own wicked ways;" ibid, p. 55. Of all men Dr. West so long as he holds, that God as perfectly and infallibly regulates, governs and over-

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rules all the actions of free agents, and makes them conform to his purposes, as perfectly as if they had no agency at all, should be the last to object to the idea of God's positive efficiency of sin; as has been already illustrated. But aside from this, if God by taking from men what is necessary to restrain them from sin, lay them under an infallible certainty or absolute moral necessity of sinning; what advantage is gained by this mode of representing the matter? Is it at all more favourable either to the liberty of men, or to the holiness of God? To be sure this representation implies all that necessity, for which President Edwards pleads in the case. It is so to dispose things, that sin is the infallible consequence. Or if this taking away of restraints be attended with no certain consequence of sin, how does God by it harden the sinner? It seems, that after all he is left in a state of uncertainty, *i. e.* Dr. West's perfect liberty, whether he will sin or not. Where then is hardness of heart? Does it consist in perfect liberty? It is further to be observed, that if sin, for instance, an act of malice, envy or inordinate self-love, should come into existence, without any positive causation, whether by motive or in some other way; why may not any other positive thing, either substance or mode, and even the whole material universe, come into existence in the same way?

Dr. West remarks on Isai. lxiii. 17. *O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear?* "Now it is certain from "the texts that have been already examined, that "nothing more is intended, than that God leaves "men to err, and to harden their own hearts;" ibid, p. 51. This positive assertion led me to review the Doctor's remarks on those texts, and I am very willing the candid should judge concerning the Doctor's exhibition of certainty, that nothing more is intended, by God's hardening the hearts of men, than that God leaves them to harden their own hearts. He says, p. 52, in what sense God hardens the heart, our Saviour will

will inform us, Mat. xiii. 14, 15. "This people's "heart is waxed groſs, and their ears are dull of hear- "ing, and their eyes *they* have cloſed." In anſwer to this it may be ſaid with equal force, In what ſenſe God hardens the heart, we are informed in Joh. xii. 40. "*He* hath blinded their minds, and hardened their "hearts, that they ſhould not ſee with their eyes," &c. Whatever right the Doctor has to ſuppoſe, and without a reaſon to deliver the *opinion* as truth, that Joh. xii. 40, is to be explained by Mat. xiii. 15; any other perſon has the ſame right to *ſuppoſe* and to deliver the opinion as truth, that Mat. xiii. 15, is to be explained by Joh. xii. 40.

The Doctor conſtantly inſiſts, that "God never hard- "ens any man or withdraws his ſpirit and grace," ibid, p. 52, but in conſequence of his abuſe of them. If this were ever ſo true, it would not ſettle the queſtion concerning the origin of moral evil. For the queſtion is not what is the cauſe or ſource of ſin in ſome particular caſes, as in hardening the heart, in conſequence of a former ſin or ſins; but what is the cauſe of all ſin, and particularly of the *firſt* ſin, whether in man or in the univerſe. Now to anſwer this queſtion by ſaying, that when a man has "abuſed God's ſpirit and grace," God delivers him up to ſin, is as abſurd as to anſwer the queſtion concerning the origin of the human race, by ſaying, that after Adam had lived a while, he begat a ſon.

Although the Doctor thinks it certain from the texts, which he had examined, that Iſai. lxiii. 17, "in- "tends nothing more than that God leaves men to "err and to harden their own hearts;" he does not chooſe to reſt the matter on that foundation; but obſerves, that "Hebrew verbs in Hiphil often ſignify only "permiſſion." If this were ever ſo true, it would decide nothing concerning Iſai. lxiii. 17. If verbs in Hiphil do often ſignify only permiſſion, this implies, that they often do not ſignify that only. Then the queſtion would be, what does it ſignify in this text?

Neither Dr. Weſt nor any other Hebraiſt, will pretend, that a verb in Hiphil *naturally* ſignifies permiſſion only. If therefore any verb in that conjugation do ſignify that only, it muſt be for ſome other reaſon, than merely becauſe it is in that conjugation. If there be any ſuch reaſon in this caſe, the Doctor has not informed us of it. Nor can I conceive of any, unleſs it be the ſuppoſed abſurdity of underſtanding the text as it is tranſlated. But the Doctor muſt on reflection be ſenſible of the impropriety of taking that ſuppoſed abſurdity for granted. Let him prove it, and he will oblige us to believe him.

On 1 Sam. xvi. 14, "The ſpirit of the Lord de-"parted from Saul, and an evil ſpirit from God troub-"led him," the Doctor remarks, "*i. e.* he was left "of God to his own gloomy and frightful imagina-"tions;" ibid, p. 57: But who was the efficient cauſe of his own gloomy imaginations? Surely they did not happen out of nothing, like the atheiſt's world. Nor will the Doctor pretend, that Saul deſignedly produced them in his own mind. So that he gives no account of the cauſe of thoſe imaginations, and no explanation of the text.

"If then the Deity creates ſin, in the ſenſe in which "he creates darkneſs, it will follow, that as darkneſs is "the conſequence of God's withdrawing light, ſo the "conſequence of God's withdrawing his ſpirit and "grace from any perſon, is ſin; which will fall in "exactly with our ſenſe of God's hardening the heart." If ſin in no inſtance take place, but in conſequence of God's withdrawing his ſpirit and grace from a perſon; then God's ſpirit and grace are ſometimes withdrawn from a perſon, antecedently to his ſinning: And in thoſe caſes they are not withdrawn in righteous judgment, and as a juſt puniſhment of ſin; becauſe the perſon, by the ſuppoſition, has been guilty of no antecedent ſin. Yet the Doctor every where conſiders the withdrawment of God's ſpirit and grace as a juſt puniſhment of the ſin of thoſe from whom it is withdrawn;

drawn; as a juſt puniſhment of the neglect and abuſe of the advantages, which they enjoyed, &c. &c. And on this ground only he attempts to juſtify the withdrawment. If on the other hand, ſin in any inſtance, do take place when there has been no withdrawment of the divine ſpirit and grace; then the Doctor has here given no account of the exiſtence of ſin in that inſtance; and ſuch an inſtance there was, when ſin firſt came into exiſtence; it took place without a withdrawment of grace, in the way of righteous judgment.

It may here be added, that though darkneſs, a mere non-entity, will take place in conſequence of the withdrawment of light; yet malice, envy and inordinate ſelf-love, poſitive acts of the mind, will no more take place in conſequence of mere withdrawment of influence, than benevolence or ſupreme love to God, or the whole material creation, would come into exiſtence in conſequence of a mere withdrawment of the influence of God.

"We ſee in what ſenſe God is ſaid to move, ſtir "up or incline men to evil actions; viz. by permit-"ting Satan to tempt men to evil, or by permitting "things to take place, which *occaſion* men to become "perverſe." Ibid, p. 64. If the Doctor by "*permitting* "things to take place," mean that God ſo diſpoſes things that certain definite events will infallibly follow; this is all for which I plead, and which Preſident Edwards held on this head. And ſurely the Doctor does not mean, that things are of their own accord and by their own native power, independently of the divine agency, endeavouring to take place, and will effect the object of their endeavour, if they be permitted by the Deity; as a high mettled ſteed, when permitted by his rider, leaps into a race. This would ſavour too much of atheiſm, to be holden by a Chriſtian divine. As to the human mind's making one volition by another or without another, I have nothing more to ſay; nor do I wiſh to ſay any more

concerning it, till an anſwer is given to what has been already ſaid.

This text, "I will ſend him againſt an hypocritical "nation, and againſt the people of my wrath will I "give him a charge," Iſai. x. 6; Dr. Weſt ſays, "implies no more than that the Deity meant to puniſh the Jews, by *letting looſe* the King of Aſſyria upon "them;" ibid, p. 67. Yet in the ſame page he ſays, that the king of Aſſyria "was as much under the "control of the Deity, as the axe and the ſaw are under the control of the workman." Yet this control over that king implies no more, it ſeems, than that God let him looſe on the Jews. And is no more implied in the control which the workman has over the axe and the ſaw, than that he *lets them looſe* on the timber? I appeal to the reader, whether if the king of Aſſyria "was as much under the control of the Deity, as the "axe and the ſaw are under the control of the workman;" a poſitive and efficacious influence, and not a *bare permiſſion*, be not implied in ſuch control.

On Rev. xvii. 17, "For God hath put in their "hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree and give their "kingdom unto the beaſt, until the words of God "ſhall be fulfilled;" the Doctor remarks, "Theſe "ten kings are to agree —— in giving their kingdom "to the beaſt, that by his protection and aſſiſtance, "they may be able —— entirely to deſtroy the whore, "by whom they have been long oppreſſed." Ibid, p. 68. Thus the Doctor ſuppoſes, that the end, for which theſe ten kings give their power to the beaſt, is that by his aſſiſtance they may deſtroy the great whore. But this is a mere *ſuppoſition*, unſupported by any thing in the text or context; nor does the Doctor give any reaſon toward its ſupport. Beſides, what advantage is there in this ſuppoſition? Is the beaſt mentioned a friend to virtue and religion? And did thoſe kings do their duty in giving their power into his hands? If they did not; of courſe they did wrong;

and

and then the difficulty of God's putting it into their hearts to do this wrong ſtill remains.

On quoting Iſai. v. 4; "What could have been "done more to my vineyard, that I have not done "in it? Wherefore, when I looked, that it ſhould "bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" the Doctor adds, "according to the ſcheme I am "oppoſing, all that the Deity has done to his vine-"yard, was to make it bring forth wild grapes. How "could he then appeal to the men of Judah and the "inhabitants of Jeruſalem, to judge between him and "his vineyard?" Ibid, p. 71, &c. Now this and all the reſt that the Doctor adds in his remarks on that text, lies equally againſt the ſcheme of a permiſſive decree "perfectly and infallibly bounding," "reſtrain-"ing," "marking out" and "fixing bounds to the ac-"tions of men, beyond which they cannot paſs." For "according to this ſcheme" of the Doctor, "all that "the Deity has done to his vineyard was" by re-ſtraining them from all other actions, by bounding them to thoſe very actions which they have perform-ed, and by fixing ſuch bounds as they could not paſs, "to make them bring forth wild grapes. How then "could he appeal to the men of Judah and Jeruſalem "to judge, between him and his vineyard? Will "it be ſaid, that the means uſed with them were ſuch, "that if they had been rightly improved they would "have enabled them to have brought forth good "grapes? The anſwer —— is very eaſy; theſe means "could have no effect but ſuch as the Deity deſigned "them to have;" becauſe "the Deity fixed their bounds, "beyond which they could not paſs," "and they "muſt produce either good or bad grapes, according "to the" bounds fixed by the Deity.——And ſo on through the ſame and following page. But I need not republiſh Dr. Weſt's book by way of retortion.

The Doctor in his 4th eſſay, Part II, (and in his Poſtſcript) on 1 Kings xxii. 23, "Now therefore, be-"hold, the Lord hath put a lying ſpirit in the mouth

" of all theſe thy prophets;" ſays, " The word tranſ-
" lated *put* ought to have been tranſlated, The Lord
" hath *permitted* or *ſuffered* a lying ſpirit, &c. for the
" verb here tranſlated *put*, frequently ſignifies to *per-*
" *mit* or *ſuffer*. For the truth of this I appeal to
" every good Hebrician. Thus in Ezek. xx. 25,
" inſtead of, I *gave* them ſtatutes that were not good,
" it ſhould be, I *ſuffered* them to have ſtatutes that
" were not good;" p. 66. It is always a ſufficient anſwer to a mere confident aſſertion, as confidently to deny it. Therefore my anſwer is, " The verb here
" tranſlated *put*," which is נתן does not " frequently ſig-
nify *permit* or *ſuffer*;" and in Ezek. xx. 25, " Inſtead
" of, I *gave* them ſtatutes that were not good, it ſhould"
not " be, I *ſuffered* them to have ſtatutes that were not
" good." Dr. Weſt for the confirmation of his criti-
ciſm " appeals to every good Hebrician." Whom he would acknowledge as a good Hebrician, is very uncertain. Therefore, inſtead of appealing to ſo uncertain a judge, I call on the Doctor himſelf, or any other Hebrician good or bad, to point out the inſtances, whether frequent or unfrequent, in which נתן ſignifies merely to *permit* or *ſuffer*. Beſide this, ſufficient reaſons muſt be given to convince the candid and judicious, that it is uſed in this ſenſe, in the text now under conſideration, and reaſons which do not beg the main point, that God can do nothing toward the exiſtence of ſin, but barely to permit it. When theſe things ſhall have been done, we ſhall have better ground, on which to believe the Doctor's criticiſm, than his mere round aſſertion.

CONCLUSION.

CONCLUSION.

I HAVE now finiſhed my remarks on Dr. Weſt's *Eſſays on Liberty and Neceſſity*. If he ſhall think proper to write again on thoſe ſubjects and to reply to theſe remarks, I requeſt him to attend to thoſe points only, which are material and affect the merits of the cauſe. If I have expoſed myſelf by ever ſo many inadvertencies, which do not affect the merits of the cauſe, to take up his own time and that of his readers, to exhibit them, ſeems not worth while. In diſputes of this kind ſuch inadvertencies are frequent. Alſo ſuch diſputes are apt to degenerate into miſrepreſentations, perſonal reflections and logomachy. How far I have fallen into any of theſe, it is not proper for me to ſay. However, I may ſay, that I have endeavoured to avoid them. I hope the Doctor will be ſucceſsful in the ſame endeavour.

If he ſhall write again, I requeſt him to inform us more clearly, what he means by ſelf-determination. If he mean no more than he hitherto profeſſes to mean, "that we ourſelves determine;" he will inform us, wherein on that head he differs from Preſident Edwards or any other man; and whether it be his opinion, that we determine our own volitions in any other ſenſe, than we determine all our perceptions and feelings.—— If he ſhall be of the opinion, that we efficiently cauſe our own volitions; I requeſt him to inform us, how we do or can do this otherwiſe than by antecedent volitions. If he ſhall grant, that this is the way, in which we cauſe them; he will pleaſe to remove the abſurdities ſuppoſed to attend that ſuppoſition; and alſo decide whether or not we cauſe them without any reſtraint by previous certainty, *i. e.* whether we cauſe them by mere chance, and at hap-hazard.

If he ſhall ſtill be of the opinion, that volition is no effect; he will pleaſe to inform us how to reconcile

cile that with the idea, that it proceeds from an intrinsic cause and is originated by him who is the subject of it. If volition have a cause, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, it is of course an effect.—He will also be so kind as to inform us, whether every human volition existed from eternity, or whether it came into existence without cause.

If he still maintain, that with respect to praise and blame, there is no difference between natural and moral necessity; I wish him to inform us, whether Judas were as blameless in betraying his Lord, because it was previously certain and certainly foretold, that he would do it, as he was for being attached to the surface of the earth, and not ascending to heaven as Elijah did.

I hope the Doctor will explain himself concerning antecedent and consequent necessity. If he mean, that before the existence of any human action, there was no certainty, that it would exist; he will please to reconcile this both with divine foreknowledge, and with the prophecies of scripture. If by antecedent necessity, he mean any thing else than antecedent certainty, he will please to show how it is to the purpose, or how it opposes what we mean by antecedent necessity.

I request him to show the consistency between these two propositions, that motive is necessary to every volition; and that men do not always act on the strongest motive. He will of course show, what the motive is which persuades a man to pass by the strongest motive, and to act on a weaker.

It is to be wished, that the Doctor would explain his favourite power *to act or not act*. If he shall own, that he means a power to choose or refuse merely, it is presumed, that his candour will lead him to own also, that he means nothing on this head different from President Edwards, unless by *power* he mean previous *uncertainty*, and by a man's power to choose or refuse, he mean, that it is in itself and in the divine view *uncertain*,

certain, whether he will chooſe or refuſe: And if he mean this, I wiſh him to avow it.

I hope he will not ſpend time in diſcuſſing queſtions, which are merely verbal, ſuch as whether motive be the *cauſe* or the *occaſion* of volition. All that Preſident Edwards means by *cauſe* in this caſe, is *ſtated occaſion* or *antecedent*.

Perhaps the Doctor will find his book to be no leſs uſeful, if he ſhall confine himſelf more to *argument*, and indulge himſelf leſs in *hiſtory*. Narratives, however true and accurate, of his own opinion without his reaſons, and of his ability or inability whether to do or to conceive, are very unintereſting to thoſe who think for themſelves, and do not depend on the Doctor as an authority. If he had hitherto ſpared all ſuch narratives, his books had been conſiderably ſhorter and no leſs demonſtrative.

I hope the Doctor will be very explicit in communicating his idea of liberty. I preſume he will join with me in the opinion, that the whole controverſy turns on this. If the liberty neceſſary to moral action be an exemption from all extrinſic influence, we hold that the certain conſequence is that either we cauſe one volition by another; or that our volitions come into exiſtence without cauſe and by mere chance. Therefore the Doctor will pleaſe to ſhow, that neither of theſe conſequences follows; or will avow whichever he believes does follow.

He ſuppoſes ſelf-determination is free action. Now I wiſh him to inform us, whether ſelf-determination, that is limited, bounded, governed and overruled, to a conformity to the divine purpoſe, as he aſſerts all the actions of rational creatures to be, is free action. If it be, I requeſt him to inform us, why an action decreed to be conformed to the ſame divine purpoſe, is not alſo free.

I rejoice, that this important ſubject has been taken up by ſo able an advocate as Dr. Weſt. From his high character we have a right to expect, that if

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the cauſe which he has undertaken, be capable of ſupport, it will be ſupported by the Doctor. I wiſh the other ſide of the queſtion had an advocate able to do it juſtice. However, ſince I have embarked in the cauſe, I ſhall, ſo long as important matter is brought forward, do as well as I can, till I ſhall either be convinced that the cauſe is a bad one, or find myſelf unable to reply: And I doubt not, that my failure will draw forth to the ſupport of the truth, ſome more able advocate, who now through modeſty or ſome other cauſe, does not appear for its defence.

I think it is but fair, that Dr. Weſt, and all others who write againſt moral neceſſity, ſhould take the explanations, which we give of moral and natural neceſſity and inability, and all other important terms in this diſquiſition. And ſo far as they oppoſe any doctrine which we hold, they ought to oppoſe it in the ſenſe in which we hold it, and not in a ſenſe which they may find it convenient to impute to us, becauſe they can more eaſily confute it. Such a management of any queſtion as the laſt mentioned, will never bring it to an iſſue, and beſides is exceedingly diſingenuous, and gives reaſon to ſuſpect the goodneſs of the cauſe, in favour of which it is employed.

As this queſtion concerning liberty and neceſſity affects the moſt important ſubjects of morality and religion; it is to be wiſhed, that the diſcuſſion of it may finally conduce to the more clear underſtanding and the more ſincere and cheerful practice of virtue and piety, and to the glory of our God and Redeemer.

FINIS.

8 JA 66

ERRATA.

THE Reader is requeſted to correct the following Errors, moſt of which eſcaped the Author, in preparing the Manuſcript for the Preſs.

Page 8, line 21, for *the*, read *ſome*.
37, 17, for *freedom*, read *power*.
50, 11, read, it does *it*.
65, 7, read, why it is *as it is*.
84, 20, for *then*, read *than*.
105, 14, for *Johnſon*, read *Jackſon*.
140, 17, read, which *do not* happen
143, 31, read, judge *the world*.
164, 11, read, *without* a cauſe.
180, 28, for *this*, read *the*.
215, 23, for *thought*, read *taught*.

8 JA 66